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ABSTRACT 
The battle for traditional leadership successions continue to have negative effects on 
many Tribal Authority Councils across Africa, for example, the Valoyi Tribe, part of 
Tsonga/Shangaan nation in South Africa, and the Godban chieftaincy conflict in the 
northern town of Yendi in Ghana.  Community conflicts related to chieftaincy 
positions across South Africa are apparent.   
This study was an attempt to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict in Mthonjana village, Mqanduli.  The analysis focused on exploring 
the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in terms of conflict and conflict process theory.  
This explorative study sought to explore and describe the perceptions of eight ad hoc 
committee members (government officials) who had been involved with attempting to 
resolve the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict. The researcher conducted extensive 
face-to-face interviews with these committee members and thoroughly studied the 
necessary documents that informed the study.  
Thematic data analysis revealed latent conflict, conflict emergence, conflict 
escalation, conflict stalemate, and conflict de-escalation, as key conflict phases in the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  A number of recommendations are made about how 
those in authority could better manage communal conflict. The recommendations 
may, for instance, be used in the formulation of policies to influence better conflict 
management by government and help the Eastern Cape House of Traditional 
Leaders to manage communal conflicts better and to facilitate public education 
programmes about issues relating to birthright leadership positions and lineage 
procedures.  
Key words: Conflict, conflict stages, chieftaincy, traditional leadership, conflict 
processes, conflict dynamics, ad hoc committee members, female regent, male 
regent, heir  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General background to the study 
The institution, status and role of traditional leadership in terms of customary law 
have been recognised, subject to the Constitution1 of the Republic of South Africa 
(Act 108 of 1996, section 211:123).  Mthonjana Village, or Coffee Bay, in Mqanduli in 
the Eastern Cape is one of the many villages ruled by traditional leaders.  The 
Constitution of South Africa recognises Traditional Councils2 as structures that 
govern traditional leaders.  Traditional leaders are not appointed or elected but are 
born and inherit the status through the patrilineal line.  In customary law in South 
Africa, only the heir of the royal family is eligible to become a traditional leader of a 
community.3  Act 41 of 2003 provides that a traditional community is recognised if it is 
subject to a system of traditional leadership in terms of that community’s customs 
and observes a system of customary law (section 2 [1] a and b).  Based on Act 41 of 
2003, Mthonjana Village is eligible to be recognised as a traditional community and to 
be led by a traditional leader.  In terms of customary law, the person who qualifies to 
be the traditional leader is the male heir of the royal family. 
The AmaTshezi family followed this trend until 1975 when the then chief/traditional 
leader died of natural causes.  At the time of his death, his heir was still too young to 
lead the community.  Therefore, a regent,4 who was the cousin of the late leader, 
was appointed to lead the community.  That particular regent led from 1975 until 
1986.  Thereafter, the AmaTshezi tribe decided to appoint a second regent (brother 
to the chief who had died in 1975) who came directly from the AmaTshezi clan.  The 
second regent led from 1987 until 2002, when he also passed away.   
                                            
1
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is referred to as Act 108 of 1996. 
2
 Traditional Council means a council established in terms of section 3 of Act 41 of 2003. 
3
 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act 41 of 2003. 
4
 A regent is any person who, in terms of customary law of the traditional community concerned, holds 
a traditional position in a temporary capacity until a successor to that position, who is a minor, comes of 
age and is recognised as a man who can lead that community. 
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During the period in which the second regent led, the heir became old enough to 
lead, but he was based in Johannesburg where he worked as a labourer on the 
mines.  This heir of the AmaTshezi was working out of his own will.  In addition, he 
still had to undergo the traditional cultural practice of circumcision.  As a general 
practise of the AmaXhosa culture, boys are expected to be circumcised at the age of 
18 or between the ages of 18 and 21 in order to be recognised as dignified.  
According to AmaXhosa culture, a male is fully recognised and listened to by 
circumcised men only after he had undergone the circumcision ritual.  The elders of 
the AmaTshezi clan advised the heir to come back home and be circumcised in 
2001.  The reason why elders asked the heir to come back home was that the 
second regent was sick and unfit to lead the community. 
The heir agreed to come home and be circumcised, and 31 August 2001 was the 
date set for the ritual.  He had to resign from his job because he would not be going 
to go back to Johannesburg. However, on 12 August 2001 he was shot and killed in 
Johannesburg, the same week he was due to return home to prepare to take over as 
chief of the AmaTshezi Tribal Authority.  The second regent died the following year 
due to natural causes.  This then meant that another regent had to be appointed until 
the heir (son of the deceased heir) come of age (Mdlele, 2007). 
At that stage, in 2002, the heir to the late heir who had died in August 2001, was still 
a minor.  After the death of the second regent, the wife (widow) of the heir was 
appointed in 2002 by the king of the AbaThembu tribe to be a regent of the 
AmaTshezi clan.  The AbaThembu king is the head of the Traditional Council to 
which the AmaTshezi clan belongs.  The Traditional Council is the highest decision-
making body of a tribal authority.  A traditional council is comprised of traditional 
leaders and members of the community selected by the senior traditional leader.  
Among other things, its function is to administer the affairs of the traditional 
community in accordance with its customs and traditions.  After the appointment of 
the widow of the heir as a regent, not everybody in the family and the community was 
happy about being led by her.  Some members of the AmaTshezi clan and the 
community challenged their king on this.  This went on until July 2004.  In July 2004, 
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the king of the AbaThembu tribe officially declared the widow the regent on behalf of 
her heir.  The community, including some relatives of the family, could not accept 
being led by a woman.  They started attacking the female regent and everyone close 
to her.  The first attempt on her life was during the night in September 2004, when 
she was shot while sleeping at home.  She escaped unharmed (Sokana, 2007:2).   
According to an article that appeared in the City Press (Sokana, 2007:2), after 2004, 
10 people including a 91-year-old woman and a three-year-old boy were killed, and 
about 35 huts and three cars burnt.  The female regent’s homestead and the homes 
of close relatives were burnt down between March and September 2007.  Close 
relatives were afraid to sleep in their houses, and as a result, people were sleeping in 
nearby bushes, gardens and kraals.  One community member was quoted as saying, 
“We had to wait until dark, take our blankets and sleep in nearby forests or in the 
garden or kraal” (Sokana, 2007:2). The female regent was killed on 24 September 
2007, when the perpetrators, some family members of the AmaTshezi clan and 
community members who were against being led by a female, surrounded the hut 
she was sleeping in and set it alight, randomly shooting at anyone who came out.  
The female regent was the first one who attempted to run out, and as a result, she 
was shot in the stomach while trying to open the door.  She fell back into the burning 
hut and could not escape.  The female regent was burnt beyond recognition.  Other 
relatives, in the same house with her, managed to escape unharmed.  Immediately 
after her funeral, in October 2007, the AbaThembu King appointed the deceased’s 
daughter as regent.   
The AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict took people back to the late 1990s when the 
struggle to liberate South Africa turned black brothers and sisters against one 
another.  Between 2002 and 2007, different factions of the AmaTshezi clan fought for 
the chieftaincy position after the heir was shot and killed.  Similar to most African 
states, the majority of South Africans are still living under a patriarchal system, which 
dictates that male traditional leaders rule only traditional areas.  Even though there 
are tribes that are under the rule of a female traditional leader, they are few due to 
the dominance of the patriarchal system.  The patriarchal system accommodates 
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male succession only.  Generally, the top-down order of patriarchal traditional 
leadership is as follows: The king leads a certain tribe; for example, the AmaZulu 
have one king.  Below the king are senior chiefs who lead a group of clans that 
belong to a certain tribe, followed by chiefs and headmen who are right-hand men of 
chiefs.  They lead sub-groups of clans.  Chiefs lead clans and all the people living in 
their demarcation irrespective of their clan.  If the chief dies, the male heir traditionally 
is expected to take over and lead the clan, but if the heir is younger than 21 years, 
mostly any male member identified by the family may be recommended to the king to 
be appointed as regent.   
Regents, mostly male, have led the AmaTshezi Tribal Authority at Mthonjana Village 
for more than three decades, from 1975 to 1986, 1987 to 2002, 2004 to 2007, and 
again from 2008 to 2009.  From 2002 to 2007, the AmaTshezi clan of Mthonjana 
Village in Mqanduli in the Eastern Cape has experienced a power struggle resulting 
in violence that led to the death of many people, including the female regent and her 
close relatives.  The AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict continued to escalate during this 
period because it divided the extended family and polarised the Mthonjana 
community.  One group was willing to be lead by the female regent (the deceased’s 
wife); the other group was opposed to being led by a woman.  The opposing group 
proposed certain people, while the other group stood by the female regent as the 
rightful leader on behalf of her heir who was a minor.   
After the death of the heir, until 2007, government initiated very little intervention to 
manage the conflict.  It was when the conflict was at its climax, in June 2007, that an 
ad hoc committee, consisting of government officials, was formed with the mandate 
to mediate the conflict in order to negotiate a settlement between the opposing 
groups. The ad hoc committee was made up of civil servants who were drawn from 
various provincial departments such as Safety and Liaison, Social Development, the 
Office of the Premier, the South African Police Service, King Sabata Dalindyebo the 
local municipality within which Mthonjana village falls, and Oliver Reginald Tambo 
District Municipality.  The ad hoc committee was involved in the community until the 
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first court case on 27 November 2007 when perpetrators accused of killing the 
female regent appeared before the Mqanduli magistrate.   
The Constitution of South Africa prohibits interference with the judicial process 
undertaken by the courts.  The ad hoc committee had to allow for the court 
processes to continue uninterrupted.  For the benefit of this study, it was important to 
explore the perceptions of the ad hoc committee members in an effort to understand 
the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict between 2002 and 2007. 
1.2 Definition of Concepts 
Words and terms have various meanings in different disciplines and fields of enquiry.  
The definition and clarification of key terms are essential to eliminate ambiguity and 
increase understanding. Key concepts used in this study are defined below.  
1.2.1 Conflict  
A conflict is a struggle over values, claims to scarce status, power, and resources in 
which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals 
(Coser, 1956:8).  According to Avruch (1998:24), conflict refers to perceived 
divergence of interests, or a belief that parties’ current aspirations cannot be 
achieved simultaneously.  Burton (1990:2) describes conflict as an act that is likely to 
be intractable and which can lead to behaviour that seriously prejudices the physical 
and psychological security and future development of the individuals, groups, society 
or nations concerned.   
1.2.2 Disputes  
Burton (1990:2) distinguishes between disputes and conflict.  He regards disputes as 
those situations in which the issues are negotiable, in which there can be 
compromise and which do not involve the restructuring of societal structures.  These 
disputes are a normal and constructive feature of social interaction.  For Burton, 
conflicts, comprise the kind of behaviour that is not part of the normal disputes and 
confrontations, which arise in communities and societies.  They are "destructive of 
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persons, properties and systems” (Burton, 1990:2), their sources are deeply rooted in 
human behaviours and they cannot be negotiated as part of normal human 
interaction.  The challenges for resolving deep-rooted conflict are very different from 
interpersonal disputes and management problems in institutions.   
1.2.3 Conflict Resolution  
The term conflict resolution refers to the need to understand how conflict evolves and 
ends.  It encourages the development of strategies and skills for dealing with the 
volatile and often destructive outcomes of conflict (Lederach, 1997:87).  It is an 
ambiguous term in that it is used to refer both to the process (or the intention to bring 
such processes about) and the completion of the process (Miall, Ramsbotham & 
Woodhouse, 2000:21). 
1.2.4 Deep-Rooted and Protracted Social Conflicts 
A deep-rooted conflict is a conflict that is based on strife regarding the satisfaction of 
human needs between people with communal, collective identities.  Deep-rooted 
conflict often becomes destructive.  Burton (1990:3) defines deep-rooted conflicts as 
those conflicts founded in fundamental human needs for security, identity, recognition 
and development.  The issues at the heart of deep-rooted conflicts cannot be 
compromised but require accommodation through problem solving rather than 
power-driven bargaining approaches.  These conflicts often escalate into long-term 
malignant processes with high social and economic costs, eventually appearing 
boundless and hopelessly unsolvable (Kriesberg, 2007:165).   
Intractable, never-ending conflicts are conflicts that go on for more than a generation.  
Such conflicts are particularly resistant to settlement.  They persist despite efforts to 
resolve them even if they do eventually terminate or become transformed (Kriesberg, 
2007:373).  On the other hand, Azar (1990:16) defines protracted social conflict as 
mutually incompatible goals among parties amidst a lack of resolution mechanisms 
that cause communal rifts to become petrified and the prospects for cooperative 
interaction become progressively poorer. 
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1.2.5 Chieftaincy position 
The term chieftaincy is used in South Africa to describe the position held by a 
traditional leader of a particular village.  Chieftaincy is used in this research with 
specific reference to traditional leadership position that in terms of South African 
customary law of the traditional community concerned is occupied by a traditional 
leader and is recognised in terms of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Amendment Act 41 of 2003.  The meaning of chief/chieftainess or 
headman/headwoman is the same as Inkosana/inkosazana in isiXhosa.  Chieftaincy 
is preferred in this study because the work is more gender-sensitive. 
1.2.6 Regent 
A regent is any person who, in terms of customary law of only a traditional 
community concerned, holds a traditional position in a temporary capacity until a 
successor to that position-who is a minor-is recognised (Act 41 of 2003).  
1.6.7 Civil Servant 
In this study, the term civil servant is used to refer to people who work for 
government.  White (1955:39) defines a civil servant as a person who works in the 
civil service or the government departments in a country.   
1.2.8 Ad Hoc Committee  
In this thesis, ad hoc committee refers to a group of government officials who were 
selected from different provincial departments by the Eastern Cape government as 
recommended by different Heads of Departments with a mandate to mediate and 
manage the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict. 
1.3 Motivation for the Study 
Africa has seen many communal conflicts because of chieftaincy succession 
disagreements, and chieftaincy conflicts are becoming a trend in South Africa.  In 
most instances, communities where few or no people have conflict analysis skills or 
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conflict management skills, are affected.  Poor management of chieftaincy conflicts 
results in a societal milieu being annihilated because of the destructiveness of the 
conflicts.  The AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict demonstrated similar circumstances as 
in the cases described above.  In the research reported here, the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict were explored and described.  The consent to 
conduct the study was obtained from the Eastern Cape’s Department of Housing, 
Local Government and Traditional Affairs (see Appendix A). 
The findings from this study may act as a reference to future research about 
communal conflicts in general as well as those motivated by chieftaincy succession.  
The explosive nature of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict prompted a desire to 
investigate the dynamics of the conflict.  Why the conflict occurred and who was 
involved are of less concern than describing how the conflict developed.  The 
findings of the study may be used for policy development by both government 
departments and non-government organisations to improve the management of 
communal conflicts. 
1.3.1 Problem Statement 
For many years, chieftaincy succession conflicts have occurred across South Africa.  
Many contributing factors exist for the phenomenon: polygamy, greediness and the 
patriarchal system are some of the contributing factors to chieftaincy succession 
conflicts.  Some of the succession cases have had to be resolved in a court of law. 
According to Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003, a 
traditional leader is any person who, in terms of the customary law of the traditional 
community concerned, holds a traditional leadership position and is recognised as 
such in terms of the Act.  However, because of the patriarchal system, people find it 
difficult to accept female chiefs as leaders.  If the chief does not have a son within a 
marriage, he is encouraged to take a second wife.  This complicates the situation if 
the first wife gives birth to a boy who is younger than the first-born son of the second 
wife.  Most often, the recognised heir is the son born of the first wife, which is in line 
with the patriarchal succession lineage system.  However, greediness forces the heir 
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of the second wife to contest for the chieftaincy position, especially if elders support 
him.  If the heir is still underage and is not ready to take his position, his mother can 
be appointed regent on behalf of the heir.  However, the tendency is apparently not 
to recognise female traditional leaders as regents, based on gender.  The 
AmaTshezi clan faced this challenge, and many lives were lost in the ensuing 
chieftaincy conflict.   
The intention of the study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Conflicts move through a series of stages that should 
not be treated as rigidly bounded and sequenced.  Conflict is generally, but not 
always, characterised by the following stages: emergence, escalation, de-escalation 
and termination (Kriesberg, 2007:22).  In order to explore and describe the conflict 
dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict, the following research questions 
were posed to ad hoc committee members (interviewees): 
• When (year) were you made aware of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict? 
• How did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict develop?  
• Which factors made the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict worse? 
• Before the death of the heir in 2001, were there signs of disagreement over the 
chieftaincy position? 
• Which conflict incidences were reported after the death of the female chief?  
• Which role did government play?  
• How has the conflict been resolved?  
• What would you recommend as a peacebuilding or reconciliation method for 
Mthonjana Village? 
• When did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict come to the attention of those in 
authority, and what was their approach towards managing the conflict?  
 
1.3.2 Significance of the Study 
The main purpose of the study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  In the 21st century, most people desire to live in a 
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peaceful environment.  The United Nations advocates peace around the world and 
the African Union (AU) is a busy organisation because numerous conflicts in Africa 
are ongoing.  South Africa has seen many court cases related to chieftaincy 
succession and applicants challenging customary law.  In 2008, South Africa was 
struck by incidences of xenophobia and it became apparent that no appropriate 
systems were in place to handle the communal conflicts that occurred regularly. 
In most cases, communal conflicts are left alone to unfold, ripen and settle.  The only 
intervention is by the police because their visibility is supposed to encourage the 
antagonists to retreat.  However, if conflict is not managed as it unfolds, it may prove 
perilous for vulnerable groups.  The intention of the study was therefore to explore 
and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Exploring and 
describing the dynamics will serve as a guide for institutions like the Eastern Cape 
House of Traditional Leaders (ECHTL), the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature, the 
South African Police Services (SAPS), and the provincial Department of Safety and 
Liaison in the formulation of policies that seek to address communal conflicts.   
1.3.3 The Central Research Question 
How did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict processes unfold? 
1.4  Aim and Objective of the Study 
The aim of this study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  The objective of the study was to explore the perceptions of the 
ad hoc committee members who attempted to mediate in the AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict.   
1.5 An Exposition of Research Design and Methodology 
Chapter Four extensively discusses the research design and methodology, highlights 
the challenges and limitations encountered in this explorative and descriptive 
qualitative study. The qualitative research method was employed because the 
purpose of the study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the conflict, not the 
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causes of the conflict.  A meta-theoretical tradition of interpretivism was selected for 
the research design.  For this study to reach its aim and objectives, an intrinsic case 
study analysis was adopted. An intrinsic case study analysis was appropriate for this 
study because the aim of the study was to explore and describe the process of a 
single conflict. 
The target population from which the sample was drawn from were civil servants who 
formed an ad hoc committee that was intended to mediate in the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  The researcher employed a non-probability purposive sampling 
method, which is typically used in an exploratory research.  Data were collected by 
interviews and all interviewees were interviewed individually. 
Multiple methods of data collection were employed, such as interviews, studying of 
documents and archival records, and audio-visual material.  The data were analysed 
by using a well-structured coding system that assisted in conceptualising themes and 
analytical categories.  
1.6  Dissemination of Findings 
Neuman (2006:510) asserts that a “major norm of the scientific community is to 
publicly distribute knowledge.  Powerful groups or institutions can impinge on social 
research by limiting the flow of information, restricting publication, or silencing 
researchers.”   The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) requires the 
findings of all research to be developed into a treatise and a copy of the treatise to be 
made available to its libraries.  Copies of this treatise would be given also to the ad 
hoc committee members and to the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders 
(ECHTL). 
The recommendations of the research would be beneficial to NMMU’s Department of 
Political and Governmental studies for teaching in the Conflict Management and 
Transformation programme as well as the ECHTL and provincial Department of 
Safety and Liaison for their policy formulation and the management of chieftaincy 
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conflicts.  The findings may prove particularly helpful to the ECHTL when handling 
the challenges of chieftaincy conflicts.  
1.7 Chapter Outline 
1.7.1 Chapter One: General introduction and Background to the Study 
This chapter introduced the research topic and highlights the sectional order of the 
entire research project, namely the background of the study, the central research 
question, problem statement, aims and objectives of the study and an exposition of 
the research design and methodology.   
1.7.2 Chapter Two: Literature Review 
In this chapter, a detailed account of the necessary literature sourced for the 
research is given and discussed and it is shown how the research topic fits into the 
existing literature.  Furthermore, the significance of the topic, its contribution to 
knowledge of conflict and the conflict process theory are discussed. 
1.7.3 Chapter Three: Institution of Traditional Leadership 
In this chapter, the historical background of the Institution of Traditional Leadership in 
South Africa from colonialism to democracy will be discussed.  In addition, the 
dynamics of the Institution of Traditional Leadership and customary law succession 
process are described and the case study is discussed extensively. 
1.7.4 Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
This chapter presents a description of the research framework in order to provide a 
clear outline of the research procedures used in this research study.  The research 
procedures related to the research design, sampling strategy, and data collection and 
analysis strategies, as well as measures to ensure validity, reliability, trustworthiness 
and credibility are given.  The ethical considerations relevant to the research will also 
be addressed. 
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1.7.5 Chapter Five: Findings and Discussion   
This chapter discusses the findings of the research and interprets the thematic 
categories of the data collected. 
1.7.6 Chapter Six: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this chapter, a summary of the research is given.  A conclusion is drawn on the 
entire research project, indicating the salient thematic discussions in the research.  In 
addition, recommendations are made on how traditional leadership conflicts should 
be managed. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This section has sought to provide a general background to the phenomenon of 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict that had arisen in Mthonjana village in Mqanduli.  A 
background of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict was discussed to give the reader 
an overview and understanding of the entire research context.  The next chapter, the 
literature review, introduces the reader to a wider context of literature on conflict and 
conflict process theory.  It exposes the reader to the rich literature that has been 
compiled on the process that conflicts follow and the methods employed to manage 
conflicts.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Conflict is inevitably triangular.  At its simplest, it is party A, party B, and issue X.  If 
this is not immediately resolved, the most anxious person will triangle C to gain an 
ally, so configuration may be AC-B.  (Augsburger, 1992:155) 
2.1  Introduction 
Almost every academic discipline has contributed to the understanding of conflict; 
therefore it is difficult to include all the theories and approaches for explaining conflict.  
The main objective of this chapter is to provide the theoretical perspectives by which 
the phases of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict can be explored.  The first part of 
this chapter provides a review of the various conflict theoretical perspectives, which 
underpin this study.  Thereafter, conflict processes, which involve the stages or 
phases of escalated conflict, are discussed.  Furthermore, the incremental conflict 
manifestations that occur when conflict is not properly managed are discussed. 
2.2  Conflict Perspectives 
Weeks (1992:ix) states, “Conflict is an inescapable part of our daily lives, an 
inevitable result of our highly complex, competitive and often litigious society”.  
Conflict is intrinsic to organisations, families and modern city life.  Fisher, Kopelman 
and Schneider (1996:1) label conflict a “growth industry”.  They say in most settings, 
where humans live and work together, conflict erupts, sometimes in unexpected 
ways.   
Isenhart and Spangle (2000:2) view conflict as a phenomenon that is complex 
because of its overlapping dynamics and processes.  They add that, if conflict 
involves only a decision between two choices, most people would compromise or 
negotiate.  Often, however, conflict involves a struggle for power and the outcome 
depends on the way decisions are made, the way parties talk to each other, and 
unresolved problems from past interactions.  Several of these factors may be evident 
at the same time, so no one may be sure what the real problem is.  Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall (2005:11) align themselves with this view by saying the 
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process of conflict escalation is complex and unpredictable.  New issues and conflict 
parties can emerge, internal power struggles can alter tactics and goals, and 
secondary conflicts and spirals can further complicate the situation. 
Augsburger (1992:48) claims that conflict is essentially competitive in nature, but not 
all competition is conflicted.  Augsburger adds that conflict is a feature of all human 
societies, and potentially, an aspect of all social relationships.  How conflict and the 
root causes of conflict are conceptualised will determine to a large degree the sort of 
conflict resolution theories and practices favoured or even thought possible.  
Bradshaw (2008) goes further by saying that human conflict is truly a ubiquitous 
social phenomenon.  It is experienced by all people much of the time.  “It is the 
inevitable result of living in close proximity to vast numbers of intelligent and complex 
beings with ambitious goals that are not always going to be compatible in the context 
of a world of finite resources” (Bradshaw, 2008:15).   
However, Pruitt and Kim (2004:9–19) give a different view.  They state the positive 
about conflict is that although it is found in almost every realm of human interaction 
and although episodes of escalated conflict are among the most significant events of 
human life, it would be a mistake to assume that interaction necessarily involves 
conflict or that conflict usually takes a heavily escalated form.  Furthermore, they 
state that when conflicts exist, they differ in size or magnitude because of differences 
of interest.  The higher a party’s own aspirations, the higher the other party’s 
apparent aspirations; and the less promising the known alternatives, the more rigid 
the parties’ apparent aspirations. 
Burton (1984:138) writes that the scarcity of basic human needs motivates conflict 
between people and the state.  If the division of a cake of any given size or the 
allocation of scarce resources by normative processes is irrelevant to the nature of 
conflict, much of the law and order framework on which societies rely for social 
stability and the deterrent measures applied to deviance are doomed to failure.  
Conflict scholars agree that the causes of conflict emanate from inter alia socio-
economic inequalities, ethnicity, absence of opportunities for political participation, 
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differences in religious inclinations, fragile government structures, inadequate civic 
structures, differences in political ideologies and competition over scarce resources 
(Anstey, 1991:14; Bradshaw, 2008:18; Kriesberg, 1973).   
In the conflict literature, different types of conflict are outlined as follows: 
intrapersonal, interpersonal, intra-group, intergroup, interstate and intrastate. The 
focus of this study was on intra-group conflict. The AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict 
involved members of the same clan who reside in one geographical area.  When 
destructive conflicts unfold, these, in most cases reflect different elements. These 
elements include blaming of opponents; insensitivity to different cultures and values, 
disempowerment, relationships that are positional, rigid and defensive and various 
forms of aggression, prejudice and stereotyping, breakdown in communication, and 
domination (Anstey, 1991; Burton, 1984; Taylor and Marais, 1999).  All of these 
aspects of conflict are obvious and sometimes they are not.  At times, what may 
appear to be a serious conflict may not be that at all (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985:45). 
Due to the continuous existence of conflicts in society, conflicts have undermined 
and devastated the lives of individuals, destroyed groups and organisations, and 
impoverished and traumatised communities.  Scholars have embarked on the 
process of studying conflict and have provided various frameworks for understanding 
conflict.  Anstey (2006:10) found that Thomas (1976) distinguishes between a 
structural model and a process model of conflict.  According to Thomas (1976:893), 
the structural model of conflict attempts to understand conflict phenomena by 
studying how underlying conditions shape events, identify parameters that influence 
conflict behaviour and specify the form of the influence.  Because these conditions 
are relatively fixed, they are seen as structural in nature.  On the other hand, the 
process model of conflict focuses on the internal dynamics of conflict episodes, 
studying events and the effects on succeeding events in conflict episodes.   
It is during the conflict episodes that conflict escalates.  It is unknown how extreme 
the conflict is going to become until it starts to decline.  Zartman and Faure (2005:3) 
note that escalation is the dynamics of determining where the conflict peak is and if it 
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has been reached.  Wright (1965:435) also adds that escalation is the mark of 
conflict in its dynamic form, and conflict occurs when parties who hold incompatible 
views seek to make their will prevail in a situation in which parties are taking action 
against each other. 
Based on the views of conflict scholars, the general observation emanating from the 
literature consulted is that conflict is a social phenomenon.  It affects all humans at all 
levels of society and has many bases.  In order for us to understand the bases of 
conflict, the next section discusses the conflict processes.  
2.3  Conflict Processes 
Conflict process refers to the series of stages that micro and macro conflicts follow.  
Wehr (1979:8) argues that less work has been done by social scientists on conflict 
regulation than on the origins of conflict.  Social conflict is a dialectical process that 
occurs in phases in which synthesis takes place and by which society is transformed 
from one state to another.  Social conflict is primarily cyclical in its development and 
moves through predictable sequence of stages.   
Bradshaw (2008:39) states that regardless of the type of conflict being dealt with, 
most conflicts follow certain patterns of ebb and flow that collectively are called 
conflict dynamics.  Although conflicts may differ from circumstance to circumstance, 
in general, similar patterns or similar processes can be discerned.  These processes 
are important; they determine much of how conflict is perceived. 
Conflict progresses as oppressed groups become more aware of a conflict of interest 
and move to alter the situation.  Curle (1971) sees the linear sequences of this 
process as a lowering of awareness, a higher awareness of the basic conflict of 
interests, a confrontation of oppressed and oppressor by either violent or nonviolent 
means, conciliation and bargaining, and a restructuring of the formerly unmerciful 
relations.  Each conflict situation contains predictable elements and dynamics such 
as escalation, inhibition and facilitation of processes and leadership change. 
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Conflict literature shows that it has become common to describe conflict as passing 
through a series of phases.  Different authors identify different stages that are almost 
identical.  The conflict stages (see Appendix D) identified by authors include latent 
conflict, conflict emergence, conflict escalation, hurting/stalemate, de-escalation, 
settlement/resolution, and post conflict/peacebuilding (Brahm, 2003; Deutsch, 1973; 
Gulliver, 1979; Kriesberg, 2007; McRoberts, 1988; Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994; 
Shriver, 1995; Wehr, 1979; Zartman, 1985, 1989).   
Kriesberg (1973, 2007) provides the most comprehensive review of sociological 
conflict theory.  His mode of analysis is a cyclical one tracing the formation of 
objectives conflict (latent conflict) and following it through the awareness (conflict 
emergence), escalation, stalemate, de-escalation and termination phases (conflict 
resolution/settlement), as well as post-conflict peacebuilding to outcomes that may or 
may not contain the potential for a recycling of the conflict.  Appendix D shows the 
phases of conflict in diagrammatic form as listed by conflict scholars.  It is important 
to be acquainted with these stages or phases and to use them to explore and 
describe the dynamics and events that relate to the chosen case study.   
2.3.1 Latent Conflict 
Social life is above all the struggle for power and status regardless of the type of 
structure.  An inevitable power differential between groups and between individuals 
produces latent conflict in all social relations (Wehr, 1979).  The seeds of conflict may 
exist for long periods without actors being aware of them.  Often one side, most likely 
the privileged one, is largely unaware of the existence of tensions.  While the less 
privileged party may be aware of the situation and even consider it unjust, conflict 
does not emerge until adversaries act to change the situation (Deutsch, 1973). 
At its roots, the latent conflict stage comprises the possibility of conflict that is 
inherent in different meanings, values, norms, statuses and classes among people.  
Latent conflict involves socio-cultural spaces as potentialities.  Consequently, the 
latent conflict stage always exists wherever there is more than one person, group, 
society or culture (Berkowitz, 1993:168; Deutsch, 1958; Wright, 1965). 
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The latent conflict stage consists of those potentialities that are transformed into 
dispositions or attitudes defining specific situations and goals and which are clustered 
into role-dispositions and sentiments involving religion, self-esteem, and the 
superego among other things.  These clusters of attitudes define motivational 
components along which lie socio-cultural inequalities.  Inequalities in wealth, power, 
prestige and class define the major attitudinal differences between people and their 
propensity to be mutually opposed (Deutsch, 1973). 
At the latent conflict stage, conflict is encouraged whenever individuals, groups, 
organisations or nations have differences that bother one or the other.  These may 
be influenced by perceived differences in socio-economic inequalities, ethnicity, 
absence of opportunities for political participation, differences in religious inclinations, 
fragile government structures, inadequate civic structures, differences in political 
ideologies, and competition over scarce resources (Anstey, 1991; Burton, 1990).  
These differences are not big enough to cause one side to act to alter the situation, 
but deprivation of basic human needs, power and resources and different interests or 
values all have the potential to spark conflict if a triggering event occurs. 
2.3.2 Conflict Emergence 
Bartos and Wehr (2002:79) assert that the way conflicts begin varies.  Some conflicts 
start suddenly, while others develop gradually; some start violently, while yet others 
start moderately.  After a conflict has remained latent for some time, a triggering 
event will cause the emergence of that conflict if the underlying grievances or 
frustrations are strong enough.  The event or episode may be the first appearance of 
the conflict or a confrontation that erupts in the context of a protracted, but dormant, 
low-level conflict. 
The potential for conflict exists whenever people have different needs, values or 
interests.  Certain conditions are necessary for conflict to manifest (Kriesberg, 
2007:53).  First, another group has to be identified by members of the contending 
party as the opponent.  Second, members of the contending group must feel 
aggrieved.  Third, members of the aggrieved group must develop goals that require 
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changes on the part of the adversary.  Finally, members of the aggrieved party must 
believe that their actions can induce the other party to change.  The way these four 
conditions change for each adversary and the way the adversaries interact with each 
other largely determines the course of the conflict and the degree to which it 
becomes destructive or constructive.  Furthermore, these four conditions are 
interdependent and provide the spark in the tinderbox that ignites a struggle 
(Denhardt, Denhardt & Aristigueta, 2002:336; Mitchell, 1981:15–18).   
Conflict that starts from an early incubation stage goes through a dangerous phase 
before erupting (Sokalski, 2003:19).  Kriesberg (2007:53) takes the argument further 
and remarks that the outbreak of a fight seems sudden, but is usually the result of 
many gradual changes.  The circumstances producing an overt social conflict may 
have persisted for a long time; yet, some necessary component had been missing.  
Then some event indicates that an effective collective resistance is possible or 
necessary.  Thereafter, many members suffering discrimination coalesce and act on 
their demands to end that discrimination, thus igniting a series of actions that make 
the struggle manifest. 
Scholars argue that conflict emerges when members of one or more potential 
antagonistic parties develop a shared identity, generate a sense of grievance, form a 
goal to change another party so as to reduce the grievance, and, finally, believe that 
they can bring about the change to their perceived incompatibilities.  Each of these 
conditions is necessary, but none is sufficient alone to ignite conflict (Cheldelin, 
Druckman & Fast, 2003:73; Kriesberg, 2007:86; Zartman, 2007).  These various 
combinations provide the impetus for at least one side to move against another, and 
by doing so, ignite a conflict (Isenhart & Spangle, 2000). 
2.3.2.1  Contentious Tactics  
A variety of strategies for either resolving or perpetuating conflict is available to 
adversaries.  Pruitt and Kim (2004:38) state that four strategies are available for 
adversaries to employ immediately when conflict emerges.  These are contending, 
problem-solving, yielding and avoiding.  If these settlement strategies fail to yield 
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positive results, the adversaries employ contentious tactics to resolve the conflict.  
The contentious tactics can either terminate or perpetuate the conflict.  Coleman 
(2003:4) claims that, as conflict escalates, the issues in contention are transformed 
and take a threatening character, and so do the tactics employed by parties.  
Adversaries employ various tactics as conflict intensifies.  Application of contentious 
tactics involves an increase in coercive actions that impose costs on the adversary, 
and ultimately, involve violence and physical harm (Mitchell, 1981). 
The contentious tactics that parties can employ in an effort to prevail in conflict can 
be presented in an order that moves from lighter contentious tactics to their heavier 
counterparts, as follows: ingratiation, promises, persuasive argumentation, shaming, 
tit-for-tat action, threats, coercive commitments, and violence and nonviolence.  The 
light-to-heavy sequence is often seen as conflict unfolds, reflecting the common 
tendency to conflict escalation, although not all the tactics are found in every conflict 
(Sharp, 1970:32). 
As the conflict unfolds, a belief emerges among the adversaries that the solution to 
the conflict is attainable through superior force or trickery.  The use of contentious 
tactics is increased further when the parties are emotionally aroused, for example, 
angry or frustrated.  Where strong protections exist against punishing the actual 
source of frustration, the emotion may be displaced, finding expression in acts 
against more vulnerable and accessible targets (Anstey, 2006:40).  Failure to 
terminate conflict when contentious tactics have been employed leads to conflict 
escalation. 
2.3.3 Conflict Escalation 
According to Kriesberg (1998:152), conflict escalation refers to an increase in the 
intensity of a conflict and in the severity of tactics used in pursuing it.  Escalation is 
driven by changes within each of the parties, new patterns of interaction between 
them and the involvement of new parties in the struggle.  Bartos and Wehr (2002:99) 
assert that when conflict escalates, more people tend to become involved.  Parties 
begin to make bigger and stronger threats and impose harsher negative sanctions.  
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Violence may start, or if violence has already occurred, it may become more severe 
and/or widespread as the number of participants involved in the conflict increases 
and a greater proportion of people actively engage in fighting. 
When adversaries engage in a coercive strategy, they generate a spiral of tit-for-tat 
retaliation.  They increase the amount of tit-for-tat punishment with each move, both 
parties paying higher and higher prices for a continuing standoff (Oberschall, 
2007:33).  Pruitt and Kim (2004:89) list five changes that occur as conflict escalates: 
1. Parties move from light tactics to heavy tactics.  Light tactics include things 
such as persuasive arguments, promises and efforts to please the other side, 
while heavy tactics include threats, power plays and even violence. 
2. The conflict grows in size.  The number of issues in contention expands, and 
parties devote more resources to the struggle. 
3. Issues move from specific to general, and the relationship between the parties 
deteriorates.  Parties develop ostentatious positions and often perceive the 
other side as “evil”. 
4. The number of parties grows from one to many, as more and more people 
and groups are drawn into conflict. 
5. The goals of the parties change from doing well to winning and, finally, to 
hurting the other. 
2.3.3.1  Transformations in Conflict Escalation  
As conflict escalates, parties attempt to influence each other to renounce demands.  
Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994:69) argue that understanding transformations in conflict 
escalation is important because when conflict escalates, it is intensified and becomes 
difficult to undo.  They explain that one reason why escalated conflicts are so hard to 
undo is that when one side uses more aggressive tactics, the other side also uses 
more aggressive tactics, producing a vicious cycle. 
When conflict escalates, the cluster of emergency behaviours that accompany 
competitive confrontations exaggerates the destructive processes: anxiety rises, 
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perceptions and reasoning become more selective.  The atmosphere of competition 
inevitably accelerates anxiety in the urgency for victory.  As anxiety rises, 
misperceptions and biased perceptions increase because biased perceptions create 
conflict within persons and the need to reduce dissonance creates cognitive 
consistency by bending and blending thought and belief (Augsburger, 1992:48).  
These behaviours interlock, reinforce and accelerate a spiral of intensification. 
The use of progressively heavier contentious tactics is by no means an inevitable 
outcome of conflict, but it is important because of the great human cost it often 
carries.  Escalation is commonly accompanied by several other transformations: 
– issues proliferate;  
– parties become increasingly committed to the struggle;  
– specific issues give way to general ones;  
– the desire to succeed turns into a desire to win, which turns into a desire to 
hurt members of the other party;  
– positive feelings give way to negative feelings; and  
– both sides expand by recruiting formally neutral individuals and groups 
(Anstey 2006: 36; Kriesberg 2007).   
Several models have been developed to help understand how parties attempt to 
influence each other during conflict escalation.  These models may be conceived as 
“flowcharts” that assist in understanding the order of events and the influence of 
variables during conflict escalation.  Three different models are discussed to 
understand the modifications during conflict escalation better: the contender–
defender model, the conflict-spiral model, and the structural-change model.  All three 
models have the some value for accurately describing the developments in some 
kinds of conflict escalation (Pruitt & Kim, 2004:92).   
a) The contender–defender model  
The contender–defender model traces escalation to the contending party’s efforts to 
pursue its ends and escalating its use of contentious tactics progressively as its 
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efforts are frustrated.  The defending party only reacts on the contenders’ actions, 
increasing levels of response in accordance with the activities of the aggressor.  The 
escalation continues until the contending party desists or wins (Anstey, 2006:36).  
The win-at-all-costs behaviour, or zero-sum thinking as it is termed by Pruitt and Kim 
(2004), encourages conflict because there seems to be no way both sides can 
achieve their aspirations.  One party must win.  According to Kriesberg (2007:9), 
antagonists in a conflict generally see themselves in such a zero-sum situation.   
The contender–defender model appears to present one side as being mainly at fault.  
The aggressor seems to lead the conflict escalation.  One party is viewed as having 
a goal of creating change, and that places it in conflict with the other party.  The goal 
may consist of taking something from the other party, altering reality at the expense 
of the other party, or stopping the other party’s annoying behaviour.  The party with 
the goal (the contender) usually starts with less contentious tactics.  If the contender 
does not achieve the goal through less risky tactics, he/she will eventually resort to 
heavier contentious tactics.  On the other hand, the defender may remain passive or, 
alternatively, may escalate the conflict, but only as a defensive measure.  White 
(1984:95) states that each action is a result of the cumulative impression from all the 
previous actions by the other side, but actions that are more recent are usually given 
greater weight than earlier actions. 
The contending party’s escalation of the conflict is never in defence and is used 
strategically and intentionally to achieve its goal.  However, Pruitt and Kim (2004:96) 
argue that, in reality, both sides usually contribute equally to a conflict so that the 
conflict-spiral model may be a better description. 
b) The conflict-spiral model 
The conflict-spiral model traces conflict escalation from a vicious circle of action and 
reaction – their anger escalate in response to each other.  One party’s contentious 
tactics encourage a contentious retaliatory or defensive reaction from the other party, 
which provokes further contentious behaviour from the first party, completing the 
circle and starting it on its next interaction.  Each retaliation action in the spiral 
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provides a new grievance.  These dynamics explain the movement from lighter 
tactics to heavier tactics, as well as the expansion of issues in conflict (Mitchell, 1995; 
Pruitt & Kim, 2004:96). 
The conflict-spiral model can be either retaliatory or defensive.  In the retaliatory 
spiral, each party punishes the other for actions it finds hurtful.  In contrast, in the 
defensive spiral, each party reacts to protect itself from a threat it finds in the other’s 
self-protective actions (Kriesberg, 1998:158; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994:79).  The 
conflict-spiral model is a bilateral reaction model because each party is reacting to 
the other party’s prior actions.  Conflict escalation is best explained by invoking both 
retaliatory and defensive reactions.  The conflict-spiral model helps with 
understanding conflict escalation by viewing the progressively heavier tactics as 
either a contender–defender episode embedded in a broader conflict spiral or a 
conflict spiral that is part of a larger contender–defender dynamic. 
Augsburger (1992:53–55) argues that, if conflict is not channelled, undirected trends 
become self-perpetuating vicious cycles.  The cycle, as it intensifies, escalates until 
the conflict becomes detached from its original causes and develops its own self-
energising cause.  Augsburger adds that a negative spiral becomes fully self-
perpetuating as personal, positional and relational investments are made. 
The conflict-spiral model recognises that conflict escalation causes flow in both 
directions.  Each party’s actions influence the other party’s responses; yet, these 
responses themselves are actions provoking yet another round of responses.  With 
each cycle, parties increase the contentiousness of their tactics and the 
competitiveness of their orientation (Cheldelin, Druckman, & Fast 2003, 2003:71).  
Using the analogy of tactics moving from light to heavy, issues proliferate and the 
parties become absorbed and polarised.  As a consequence, communication breaks 
down, suspicions are heightened, misperceptions increase, tactics become more 
coercive, perceived similarities and common interests disappear, and the focus shifts 
to use of power (Deutsch, 1973). 
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c) The structural-change model 
D’Estrée (2003:73) names the final model for understanding transformations in 
conflict escalation the structural-change model.  The structural-change model is built 
on the conflict-spiral model.  This latter model sheds light on the persistence of a 
conflict, and helps to explain why de-escalation is so difficult to achieve.  The 
structural-change model states that, in more enduring psychological states, changes 
in group structure and function and community polarisation carry a conflict past 
thresholds that make it difficult to return.  In addition to psychological states, 
contentious tactics by one party also produce structural changes in the receiving 
party, encouraging contentious tactics in response. 
In the structural-change model, a set of changes occur in the individuals and groups 
involved in a conflict and the communities to which they belong.  Intra-party structural 
changes are changes that take place once a group, community or nation finds itself 
in conflict with another group, community or nation.  At least five conflict-exacerbating 
dynamics seem common during conflict escalation: mobilisation, enlargement, 
polarisation, dissociation and entrapment.  The result of these changes is a more 
complex conflict that becomes much more difficult from which to disentangle 
adversaries (Mitchell, 1995; Oberschall, 2007:33). 
Intra-party structural changes during conflict escalation are both a cause and a result 
of significant psychological changes among the parties involved.  Anger, fear, 
negative attitudes, perceptions and stereotypes of the opponent can drive escalation, 
as well as be caused by it, thus initiating another conflict spiral.  Parties have a 
tendency to blame the other side for any harm suffered and want at least restitution, if 
not retaliation (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994:85).  Parties may also form ideas about the 
dispositions, basic traits and motives of the other side.  For example, each side may 
believe that the other is fundamentally selfish, unfriendly and hostile to its welfare.  As 
a result, actors often come to regard revenge and punishing the other side as an end 
in itself.  Discussions about substantive issues and grievances give way to personal 
attacks upon the other group. 
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Group structural changes include the development of hostile group goals, the 
emergence of runaway norms, enhanced group identity and cohesiveness, and the 
emergence of militant subgroups and leaders.  Groups can also be polarised, with 
their members moving from moderation to militancy, as can the communities 
surrounding the conflicting parties (Kriesberg, 1998:167; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 
1994:94).  Hostile perceptions of the group and destructive motives become 
cemented with group norms, and pressures are brought to bear on members to 
accept these norms as right (Kelman, 1997, cited in Zartman, 2007:95).  Groups 
often become more internally cohesive when facing an external enemy and the 
attractiveness of this dynamic alone makes rapprochement with the other party 
costly.  Such structural changes are difficult to restrain, given their self-perpetuating 
quality (Cheldelin, Druckman, & Fast, 2003:74; Coser, 1956; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 
1994:90–93; Simmel, 1955).   
Negative feelings and beliefs about the other party lead to negative interpretations of 
the other party’s behaviour, reduced contact, making retaliation more acceptable, 
resulting in reduced empathy (Bartos & Wehr, 2002:111; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989).  
Reduced empathy against the other group allows group members to be judged 
based on their group affiliation and not as individuals.  Furthermore, group members 
are de-individualised.  De-individualisation together with dehumanisation is employed 
because inflicted aggression is perceived as more acceptable; control over 
aggression is reduced and violence is justified (Zimbardo, 1970).  Because of a 
group having a common enemy, the psychological changes enhance group cohesion 
and group mobilisation and contribute to the enforcement of these norms and the 
dedication of group members to the newly found goals and means of implementing 
goals (Cheldelin, Druckman, & Fast, 2003:73). 
Another structural change that occurs as conflict escalates is the development of 
militant leadership and militant subgroups.  The development of militant leadership 
during conflict escalation gives certain individuals status, wealth and even a sense 
that life is meaningful.  These leaders perpetuate conflict because they fear that they 
will be replaced should they be seen as weak or submissive.  Such leaders often 
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refuse to admit past mistakes and are likely to grow in militancy and take a harder 
line.  In many instances, these leaders seek to ritualise the conflict and exhibit a 
complete lack of interest in conflict resolution.  Such individuals have incentives to 
resist conflict resolution and make sure that the war effort continues (Kriesberg, 
1998; Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994:108). 
The structural-change model shows how continuing conflict further reinforces 
increasing polarisation and makes de-escalation and cooperation processes difficult 
to set in motion. During conflict, neutral community members find it hard to remain 
neutral.  In effect, relationships in a community are restructured such that community 
members have to interact as part of two opposing poles, a process called community 
polarisation (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994).  The community polarisation dynamic adds 
to escalation as each pole continues to strengthen at the expense of those on neutral 
ground.  The swelling ranks increase confidence that the position of the group to 
which a community member belongs is justified and further provide a rationale for the 
use of heavier tactics.  The bonds within one’s group are strengthened, while the 
bonds across groups are neglected and therefore deteriorate because, as 
controversy develops, associations wither between persons on opposing sides 
(Coleman, 1957:11).  This contributes to misunderstandings and hence to the 
proliferation of conflict issues. 
The three models discussed above explain why conflict escalation persists.  As 
conflicts escalate, they become increasingly difficult to manage because they 
become self-perpetuating.  The conflict escalation phase diminishes the chances of 
managing or resolving conflicts.  The downside of conflict escalation is not only the 
pains and costs that the parties endure, but the resistance to de-escalation and 
resolution that the negative interactions create, resulting in the stalemate stage 
(Deutsch, Coleman & Marais, 2006:185; Fisher, 1997:166; Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse & Maill, 2005:11). 
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2.3.4 Conflict Stalemate 
Vasquez, Johnson, Jaffe and Stamato (1996:91) argue that stalemate is a turn-
around stage that may entail a crisis that leads to further escalation or de-escalation.  
Once conflicts have escalated for a while, they often reach a stalemate, a situation in 
which neither side can win but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either.  
Conflict stalemates emerge for a number of reasons: the failure of contentious 
tactics, exhaustion of necessary resources, loss of social support, and unacceptable 
costs (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986, cited in Anstey, 2006:50). 
Bradshaw (2008:41) remarks that parties involved in a conflict will eventually become 
exhausted.  They will run out of resources to invest in the conflict.  When the conflict 
has reached a plateau, the escalation of conflict has begun to level off.  At a point of 
perceived stalemate, parties will usually not escalate the conflict further, although the 
parties may not yet be willing to take the actions that will eventually generate an 
agreement.  Stalemate is a high-water mark for the conflictual ark.  Wallensteen 
(2007:43) argues that this is likely to be a moment requiring change of action.  At this 
point, the parties might agree on a cease-fire in order to reduce the pain, have a 
chance for recuperation, or even to have an opportunity to buy weapons.  The painful 
stalemate can be used as a move forward to settlement and not simply as a way to 
freeze the status quo. 
Stalemates represent a balance of effective power: neither side has the power to 
move the other.  Stalemates can be broken by yielding, withdrawing or problem-
solving strategies.  However, it is not always possible to withdraw from a conflict.  
Yielding may be unacceptable, particularly if the parties are already over-committed 
and strongly concerned with losing face.  The most important consequence of 
stalemate is that the parties may be compelled to adopt a problem-solving strategy 
(Starr, 1999).   
Kriesberg and Dayton (2009:70) affirm that it is only when a conflict is at a stalemate 
that third-party intervention may be possible.  Mediation is only successful when the 
conflict has lasted a long period, the conflicting parties have reached an impasse, the 
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parties no longer want to shoulder the costs of escalation and both parties are ready 
to engage with each other.  Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmais (2004:198) have a 
different view.  They argue that a stalemate on the battlefield will lead to persistence 
of the dispute in the post-war period.  Conversely, the avoidance of war may bring 
about the end of the dispute by means of a negotiated agreement, while a standoff in 
the crisis will result in the continuation of the dispute. 
Ganguly and Macduff (2003:18) remark that the prospects of peace are at their 
highest and brightest when a conflict is at the stage of “hurting stalemate”, where 
adversaries are exhausted and have come to believe that little can be gained by 
further prolonging and escalating the conflict.  Stalemate influences one of the 
antagonists to come to the grudging realisation that it cannot prevail at acceptable 
cost and risk, yet it is also unwilling to cede victory to the other party through yielding 
or withdrawing.  Antagonists view yielding as a blow to their pride and if adopted, it 
signals weakness to other.  On the other hand, antagonists see withdrawal as 
tantamount to capitulation; hence, it would also be unacceptable. 
When parties find themselves locked in a conflict that they cannot escalate to victory 
and the deadlock is painful to both, they tend to seek a way out.  A recent or 
impending catastrophe can provide a deadline or sharply increased pain, which may 
force the parties to take a step back and think (Zartman, 2008:232).  Druckman and 
Green (1995) and Mitchell (2000) support this view by saying some shock may be 
needed to bring adversaries to their senses, for example, a striking event that 
dramatises the hopelessness of their campaign or the costs and risks involved in 
pursuing the conflict that mobilises careful examination of what is actually happening.  
Then parties will reconsider their actions and start formulating other objectives, like 
settling the dispute. 
It is at this stage that unilateral initiatives are successful because they result in a de-
escalatory spiral, a sequence of alternating conciliatory actions by the two sides 
producing enough trust on both sides for negotiation to seem viable.  In such a spiral, 
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each action is a confidence-building move that encourages reciprocal action from 
both sides. 
2.3.5 Conflict De-Escalation 
After a conflict has been in equilibrium for a long time, it tends to de-escalate.  
Conflict de-escalation is a process whereby coerciveness between parties lowers, 
hostility decreases and the tendency to retaliate is reduced (Bartos & Wehr, 
2002:113).  When parties have reached the stalemate stage, they no longer have the 
energy or resources to invest in conflict, so the conflict de-escalates.  Sislin and 
Pearson (2001:86) hold that manifestations of de-escalation include a contraction of 
the scope of the fighting, a lessening of the intensity of the conflict, the declaration of 
a cease-fire by some or all of the parties, or the initiation of negotiations among the 
disputants. 
Fisher (1997:177) adds that closely related to de-escalation is timing, that is, 
recognising the most propitious points in the cycle of conflict for parties to make de-
escalation moves.  Kriesberg (1973) explains that timing involves knowing when the 
parties are ready to move down from stalemate to de-escalation and then to 
resolution.  He states that timing is important because inappropriate initiatives can be 
counterproductive.  Initiatives like unofficial problem-solving interactions among 
coalitions of “doves” from opposing camps can lay a basis for future de-escalation.   
Conflict scholars argue de-escalation may be influenced by non-coercion, which can 
lead to de-escalation in two ways.  That is, it is sufficient to prevent the other side 
from continuing with the conflict.  As the other party loses its capacity to continue its 
conflict behaviour at the same level, it allows the conflict to de-escalate and loses its 
will to persist in the conflict.  It may doubt its abilities and question the desirability of 
continuing (Kriesberg, 1973:167; Vledder, 1997:110).   
Brockner & Rubin (1985:193) focus on how the de-escalation stage can be realised 
by avoiding destructive escalation and how it can lead conflict towards de-escalation.  
They argue that, although entrapment often fosters escalation, it can be controlled 
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and so help avoid destructive escalation.  They say if individuals set limits on how far 
they will go prior to embarking on a possibly entrapping course of action, they will 
tend to avoid entrapment and therefore open space for conflict de-escalation. 
In the de-escalation phase, concessions and conciliation play something of the same 
role that demands and coercion play in escalation.  De-escalation of conflicts do not 
guarantee that re-escalation of conflict will not occur.  If escalation is pursued too 
vigorously, it could be dangerous because the opponent might conclude that the 
resolve or assurance is weakening and that more pressure would yield results.  In 
addition, the other party may retaliate and re-escalate the conflict (Kahn & Schelling, 
2010:231–233).   
In support of the above, Kriesberg (2007:200) argues that, for seemingly intractable 
destructive conflicts to pass through a transition to a mutually acceptable de-
escalation, each side must believe that the other does not threaten its collective 
existence.  In addition, it is easier to stop a conflict from escalating destructively if the 
struggle has not persisted for a long period and has not escalated greatly.  Kriesberg 
(2007:209) adds that one way to increase the likelihood of crisis de-escalation is for 
one or more adversaries to allow time for the other side to reflect on its course of 
action and not be pushed into a corner and face humiliation. 
Furthermore, Oberschall (2007:33) warns that a crisis may also erupt in the course of 
de-escalating conflict when those who reject transformation try to disrupt the initiative.  
A case in point is what happened during the transformation ending apartheid in South 
Africa when a threat arose. An African National Congress (ANC) prominent member, 
Chris Hani, was assassinated.  His assassination nearly reversed all the good work 
that had been done by all parties who were involved in the negotiations that led to the 
end of apartheid.  However, Frederik Willem de Klerk (commonly know as FW de 
Klerk), who was President of South Africa at the time, and Nelson Mandela, the ANC 
leader, handled the tragedy well by advising fellow South Africans, blacks and 
whites, that they should take the act as a crime that was not politically motivated.  By 
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doing this, Kriesberg (2007) says, De Klerk and Mandela prevented the negotiations 
that were underway from being derailed. 
2.3.6 Conflict Resolution 
As conflict ends, the components of the conflict start to change.  Thus, after de-
escalation, neither side’s new goals include the destruction of its adversary.  All of the 
underlying causes of the conflict are remedied.  Finally, the conflict may be resolved 
permanently or at least temporarily.  If some grievances remain, however, the conflict 
may be resolved for the time being and may develop later as grievances again 
become significant.  Formal negotiation is more effective to a conflict because all 
parties involved own the terms of resolution (Holsti, 1974; Thackrah, 2009:18). 
Mazrui (1997:206) maintains that a conflict resolution process involves a measure of 
compromise, power sharing and gradualness, and successful implementation of a 
resolution will thus be the main work of the moderators.  On the other hand, Burton 
and Dukes (1990:83–87) argue that disputes are generally considered 
disagreements involving negotiable interest.  Such issues can be resolved through 
negotiation, mediation or adjudication.  Conflict resolution therefore refers to the 
working out of a mutually satisfactory agreement between the parties involved.  
Conflict resolution is primarily concerned with upholding established social norms. 
Burton (1990) supports this view by taking the argument further and explaining that 
conflict resolution implies suppressing differences through a power-bargaining 
context.  According to Kriesberg (2007:294), an agreement to resolve a conflict may 
put the fire out for good, but too often it only suppresses the flames and leaves 
smouldering ashes that later burst into flames.  An agreement may contribute to the 
gradual constructive transformation of the conflict, resulting in a stable and equitable 
relationship between former enemies.  On the other hand, a resolution may turn out 
to be only a pause in a protracted destructive struggle.  The losing side may regroup 
and rise again, trying to regain what it lost when signing the agreement and during its 
implementation.  However, some conflicts are terminated with a unilaterally imposed 
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resolution.  In such a case, one side of the conflict triumphs and the other is 
defeated.  The defeated side may surrender or cease to be an organised entity. 
Coser (1967:40–42) outlines a different view, which holds that explicit provisions for 
termination of social conflicts must be made by the contenders.  If no mutual 
agreements are made at some time during the struggle, conflict ceases on the death 
or in the total destruction of at least one of the antagonists.  The termination of 
conflict is a social process dependent upon but not directly deducible to its pursuits.  
It belongs to neither war nor peace, just as a bridge is different from either bank it 
connects.  Termination involves a reciprocal activity that cannot be understood 
simply as a unilateral imposition of the will of the stronger on the weaker.  Therefore, 
not only the potential victor but also the potential vanquished make crucial 
contributions to the termination of conflict. 
As conflict terminates, new or greatly changed collective identities become dominant.  
Grievances underlying the conflict are reduced for one side, but to resolve the 
conflict, the other side’s grievances must be minimised as well.  It does not work to 
satisfy one side but increase the harm to the other.  Goals also change as conflict 
ends.  This change may reflect the separation of a few leaders on one side from their 
now-transformed constituency.  The members of a communal or ideological 
organisation may repudiate the organisation leaders upon their defeat, and the 
victorious other side may accept the repudiation as genuine (Vasquez, Johnson, 
Jaffe, & Stamato, 1996:92). 
Although a particular conflict may be resolved permanently, another similar or related 
conflict may arise again if the underlying causes of that conflict still exist.  For a 
conflict to be resolved, the fundamental causes must be identified and addressed.  
These may include basic human needs and access to essential resources that have 
to be addressed because they are non-negotiable issues, and the issues can be 
dealt with beyond conflict resolution by employing peacebuilding initiatives. 
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2.3.7 Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 
Conflict management and peacebuilding are very important, not only for the recovery 
of affected parties, but also, to avoid the re-emergence of conflict and ways to 
manage it when it has emerged.  Conflict management and peacebuilding as conflict 
prevention strategies are not an event, but a process; therefore it requires more 
attention because societies emerging from conflict are usually fragile, needy and 
generally in a mess.  The prevention of a reoccurrence of conflict depends on 
satisfying the most urgent needs of a post-conflict society (Ewald & Turković, 
2006:260–261; Murithi, 2009:6).   
According to Anstey (2006:326), peacebuilding as a conflict management strategy 
require the establishment of participative mechanisms to address the root causes of 
the violence and means to overcome unnecessary delays in achieving access to 
available resources.  Lederach (1997:82–83) contend that the structural dimension of 
peacebuilding focuses on the social conditions that foster violent conflict.  When 
managing conflict, stable peace must be built on social, economic and political 
foundations that serve the needs of the populace.  In many cases, crises arise out of 
systemic roots.  These root causes are typically complex, but include skewed land 
distribution, environmental degradation and unequal political representation.  If these 
social problems are not addressed, there can be no lasting peace.  Thus, in order to 
establish durable peace, parties must analyse the structural causes of the conflict 
and initiate social structural change.  The promotion of substantive and procedural 
justice through structural means typically involves institution building and the 
strengthening of civil society. 
Even after a resolution has been reached and a peace agreement is signed, this is 
by no means the end of the conflict.  The conflict resolution process has to be 
implemented through conflict management and peacebuilding programmes.  If it is 
just a conflict between two people, this may not be hard; those two people do what 
they agree to do, and past problems may be solved.  However, in communal- and 
societal-level conflicts, implementation becomes much more complex.  In addition to 
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the elite who negotiated the agreement, their constituents also have to agree to the 
conflict management and peacebuilding programmes to be followed or else the 
agreement is likely to fail.  Usually, there is a long period of peacebuilding among the 
grassroots people, eventually culminating in apology, forgiveness and reconciliation 
(Assefa, 2001). 
The key to transforming and managing conflict is to build strong equitable relations 
where distrust and fear were once the norm.  Kriesberg (1998:322) discusses three 
ways in which to build a foundation for peaceful, equitable relations: 
• the nature of the resolution must suit the present conditions of the conflict; 
• steps must be taken to reconcile adversaries; and 
• constructive intervention is useful to move the parties to a better path. 
At the peacebuilding stage, outside actors can play an important role in monitoring 
the agreement and demobilisation efforts.  In addition, the construction of civil society 
through reconciliation may be necessary, something on which third parties may be 
able to provide assistance. 
It should be mentioned that reconciliation itself is a complicated and highly contested 
term (Crocker, 2000:99).  Some see it as simply coexistence (Villa-Vicencio, 1998), 
others as respect (Gutmann & Thompson, 1997) and still others as mutual 
forgiveness.  Kriesberg (1998) suggests there are four aspects of reconciliation: 
• truth, or coming to acknowledge there is some merit to the other side’s 
interpretation of events;  
• justice, or gaining redress as a means of putting the past to rest;  
• regard, or forgiveness on the part of victims; and  
• security, or expectations of a peaceful coexistence. 
The concept of reconciliation is a profoundly Christian one, and the post-apartheid 
South African case shows evidence that it can be achieved.  On the other hand, not 
all situations will see reconciliation fully realised.  The reconciliation process is a long 
one, and the length of time it takes to reconcile is compounded by the fact that 
individuals may take much longer to become reconciled compared to the group or 
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the nation (Muchenga-Chicuecue, 1997).  Reconciliation is not necessarily the end of 
every conflict; some conflicts may end before complete reconciliation takes place.  
However, all intractable conflicts that do end must go through some peacebuilding 
process if the parties are going to have to interact again in the future.  If 
peacebuilding or reconciliation processes do not take place, the conflict is likely to 
recur, even after a resolution of a particular episode is reached (Lederach, 1997). 
As a result, building peace requires attention to psychological and emotional layers of 
the conflict.  The social fabric that has been destroyed by conflict must be repaired, 
and trauma must be dealt with at national, community and individual levels.  At 
community level, parties can pay tribute to the suffering of the past through various 
rituals or ceremonies or build memorials to commemorate the pain and suffering that 
has been endured.  Strong family units that can rebuild community structures and 
moral environments are also crucial (Van der Merwe & Vienings, 2001:344). 
At individual level, one-on-one counselling has obvious limitations when large 
numbers of people have been traumatised and insufficient resources to address their 
needs exist.  Peacebuilding initiatives must therefore provide support for the mental 
health infrastructure and ensure mental health professionals receive adequate 
training.  Mental health programmes should be adopted to suit the local context and 
draw from traditional and communal practice and customs wherever possible.  
Participating in counselling and dialogue can help individuals to develop coping 
mechanisms and to rebuild their trust in others (Van der Merwe & Vienings, 
2001:347).  If it is acknowledged that individuals’ attitude influences behaviour, new 
emphasis must be placed on understanding the social psychology of conflict and its 
consequences.  If ignored, certain victims of past violence are at risk for becoming 
perpetrators of future violence.  Conflict management and peacebuilding through 
victim empowerment and support can help to break this cycle. 
2.4 Conflict Dynamics  
In arguing for the legitimacy of conflict, Himes (1980) states that all societies wrestle 
with tensions between conflict and cooperation.  Over time, norms tend to be 
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established around the expression of conflict behaviour, and societies sanction 
deviations from this standard.  Such norms may vary through time, but no society 
tolerates high intensity violent forms of expression that threaten the survival of a 
system.  While Clegg (1975:309–316) argues that whereas democratic societies tend 
to allow wide latitude for nonviolent protest and disruptive tactics, seeing them as a 
healthy manifestation of freedom, and conflict as functional to societal health and 
adaptability, in more rigid societies, such expression is seen as a threat to the 
survival of the system and given little latitude. 
A conflict is constructive in its process and consequences if all parties are satisfied 
with the outcome and believe they have gained because of the conflict, whereas a 
conflict is destructive if the parties are dissatisfied with the outcomes, or one party 
believes it has lost because of the conflict (Deutsch, 1969:10).  Himes (1980:21) 
asserts that the demarcations of legitimate and non-legitimate conflict reflect the self-
interests of an inclusive social system.  Legitimacy stems from tradition, collective 
policy and political authority, which are interrelated and, in stable societies, probably 
self-reinforcing.  In societies in transition or in crisis, all these sources may be called 
into question. 
Simmel (1955:31) suggests that no group can be harmonious, for it would then be 
devoid of process and structure.  He says that groups require disharmony as well as 
harmony and dissociation as well as association, and conflicts within groups are by 
no means altogether disruptive factors.  Therefore, group formation is the result of 
both types of processes.  Simmel further argues the belief that one process tears 
down what another builds up is based on a misconception: both positive and 
negative factors build group relations. 
Deutsch (1973:73) argues that group relations in a social environment often provide 
the grounds for conflict.  This is because the social context within which potential 
adversaries confront each other is non-static and changes all the time, which helps 
arouse the parties’ sense of grievance.  Changing the social context is not only a 
possible source of actual deprivation, but also helps provide the criteria for judging 
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conditions to be unsatisfactory.  The nature of the social milieu within which conflict 
arises and the style within which the parties engage indicates the type of conflict and 
its effect. 
With respect to the explanation of social conflict, Bradshaw (2008:45) claims social 
conflict emanates from the biological and psychological fields that are based on 
theories of human aggressiveness.  Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft (1990:275) state the 
inner principles by which human life are organised cannot be understood without an 
understanding of the evolutionary and genetic aspects of behaviour.  According to Du 
Pisani (1988:13), human beings do not learn aggression; aggression is an inborn 
mechanism for ensuring the survival of the species.  On the other hand, Wehr 
(1979:2) suggests that primitive human beings were, overall, peaceful beings.    
Du Pisani (1988:15) further argues that the psychotherapeutic approach to conflict 
also traces the source of conflict to within human beings, but postulates that conflict 
is the result of a particular configuration of biological, social and psychological 
elements.  Bradshaw (2008:46) explains that the balance of the arguments 
presented in the literature suggests that while conflict cannot just be laid at the door 
of instinctive human aggression, the existence of such aggressive instincts in 
humans cannot simply be discounted as one of the causal factors of social conflict 
either. 
As presented at the beginning of this chapter, certain causes of conflict and the 
dynamics associated with the escalation of conflict are:  
• a scarcity of resources that put pressure on any system, individual or group 
identity; 
• structural imbalances or perceived inequalities; 
• uncertainty as to the boundaries of acceptable behaviour; 
• the pursuit of different goals by different parties; 
• different strategies for attaining goals; 
• distorted information communicated to the parties involved; and 
• poor interpersonal relations. 
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At both the interpersonal and intergroup levels, conflict is rapid when followed by a 
slowdown, zero-sum thinking, and ambiguity about relative power, invidious 
comparisons, status inconsistency, distrust, and a lack of normative consensus.  A 
tendency toward intergroup conflict is produced by the mere presence of another 
group because favourable intergroup comparisons are a source of self-esteem.  
Intergroup conflict is even more likely if group aspirations are frustrated, producing a 
sense of fraternal deprivation (Anstey, 2006:12–30; Pruitt & Kim, 2004:35). 
Kriesberg (2007:7) acknowledges that every conflict is unique, and yet, each has 
some qualities in common with others.  The commonalities allow people to learn from 
particular conflicts and apply what has been learned to similar conflicts. 
2.5  Conclusion 
The central focus of this chapter was to define conflict dynamics and discuss the 
series of phases that a conflict passes through as presented in the conflict literature.  
While presenting the conflict phases, different trends and themes emerged from the 
first stage to the last.  These trends and themes were discussed and described.  Also 
discussed were the conflict dynamics. 
The main objective of presenting the conflict literature was to lay a theoretical 
background from which the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict will be studied.  The 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict will then be explored and discussed in order to identify 
how it follows the trends and themes of the conflict process theory described.  This 
will be achieved by applying the theory about conflict trends and themes against the 
case study trends and themes that emerged from the data. 
The next chapter is focused on the case study.  First, it outlines the historical 
background of the Institution of Traditional Leadership in South Africa and the 
challenges the institution experienced under colonial and apartheid regimes.  It will 
be explained in the chapter how post-apartheid South Africa has accommodated and 
accepted the Institution of Traditional Leadership as an important stakeholder in 
governing the country.  Certain sections of the Constitution that recognise the 
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Institution of Traditional Leadership will be presented and discussed.  A discussion 
on how the Constitution restored the dignity of traditional leaders will also be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP IN  
SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the historical background of the Institution of Traditional 
Leadership and the various levels of traditional leaders that existed before 
colonialism.  The chapter will state the effects of colonialism in the structure and 
practices of traditional leadership.  It will also look at the role played by colonial and 
apartheid regimes in diluting the Institution of Traditional Leadership by introducing 
laws that contributed to traditional leadership succession disputes that we see now.  
Moreover, this chapter will explain why the removal of legitimate traditional leaders 
gave birth to contestations and serious clashes over traditional leadership positions.  
Furthermore, this chapter will outline the recognition that the Institution of Traditional 
Leadership is receiving in the South African democratic dispensation.  The chapter 
will also give an elaborate exposition on how the South African Constitution, as the 
supreme law of the country, recognises the institution of traditional leadership.  The 
current debates and legal aspects of traditional leadership will also be discussed in 
this chapter.  A number of case studies are discussed to give background to the main 
case.  Finally, an attempt is made to explore and describe the case of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict. 
3.2 The Historical Background of Traditional Leadership 
3.2.1 Traditional Leadership before Colonialism 
The African continent lived under the rule of traditional leadership until the 
emergence of colonialism in the 1800s.  Succession to positions of power under 
traditional leadership was in line with the customary law applicable to the people who 
resided in a community.  The emergence of colonialism and the rise to power of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa resulted in the manipulation of customary law of 
succession.  The colonial and apartheid regimes interfered with customary law by 
introducing a number of legislative acts that gave the colonial and apartheid regimes 
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the authority to appoint chiefs that they wanted regardless of the clan the chiefs came 
from.  This resulted in the sidelining of certain legitimate chiefs and the appointment 
of illegitimate chiefs. 
A number of traditional leaders were deposed in terms of laws that were passed by 
the colonial and apartheid governments because the traditional leaders were not 
amenable to colonial and apartheid government directives.  Consequent to that, 
some of the power-stripped chiefs went into exile in various countries because they 
were against the policies of the colonial and apartheid regimes.  Those who stayed 
behind were forever fighting for their rightful positions, but to no avail.  Certain 
powerful groups within communities forced themselves into traditional leadership 
positions through customary law.  In some instances, actions of powerful groups 
were influenced by the desire to control land and community resources, and to avoid 
being led by women.  Their actions led to the manifestation of traditional leadership 
conflicts and the polarisation of some communities. 
According to customary law, traditional leadership positions have three levels, 
namely kingship, chieftainship and headmanship.  In the pre-colonial era, the king 
exercised authority over all the homesteads.  In pre-colonial African societies, 
traditional leadership was patrilineal although there were a few matrilineal systems.  
In a patrilineal system, the line of descent is along the male line.  Matrilineal systems 
are not common but are normal among the Bolobedus in Limpopo Province.  A 
matrilineal system is a leadership system in which the line of descent is through the 
female line (Bertrand, 1967:308). 
The smallest social unit in traditional societies was the family headed by the father.  A 
number of families together formed a kraal headed by an elder.  A number of kraals 
together formed a village headed by a headman (Omer-Cooper, 1994:11).  A number 
of villages together formed a nation headed by a chief.  A kingdom existed where 
several chiefs were subordinate to a leader called a king. This is how a government 
structure was organised in pre-colonial African societies (Maylam, 1986:22). 
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The purpose of having these divisions was that leaders were expected to take care of 
their members’ material and spiritual well-being.  The members were provided with 
residential sites, fields for crop farming, lands for animal pastures, and protection 
against invasions, etc.  Chiefdoms and kingdoms emerged and were consolidated as 
a result of military conquests when chiefdoms or kingdoms competed for grazing 
lands, ploughing fields, ivory trade, watersheds and protection against possible 
invasions particularly during the Mfecane period, etc (Maylam, 1986:23). 
As a strategy to control subjects, traditional leaders grouped their subjects based on 
age.  All men and women on reaching the age of puberty were gathered into age-
sets.  Females in these age-sets could not marry unless the king granted permission.  
In doing so, the king controlled the rate and direction of production and reproduction.  
The king had land rights and he had to allocate land to the households for cultivation.  
He had to regulate trade and agricultural activities, and also had to coordinate 
activities like ploughing, harvesting, hunting, ancestral worship, caring of widows, 
performance of rituals, etc (Maylam, 1986:28). 
Although the Zulu kingdom under Shaka was more centralised in administration, the 
size of the state necessitated the delegation of authority.  According to Maylam 
(1986), before African states were engulfed by European colonialism, they were 
rooted in tradition.  A traditional leader who cared for the needs of his subjects 
attracted a following.  Omer-Cooper (1994:57) writes that this was the case with King 
Shaka of the Zulu nation.  His military indunas (chiefs) received many cattle from him 
and were able to build up a large personal following.  All members of the kingdom 
also shared in the pride evoked by the magnificence of the royal herds as well as the 
consciousness of unrivalled military power.  Smaller chiefs gained greater security 
from incorporation in the Zulu kingdom.  As long as they had the king’s favour, no 
local rival could challenge those smaller chiefs and their subjects.  It was the 
responsibility of traditional leaders to see to it that their subjects were well cared for 
without any influences. 
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The king’s medicines and his favours with the unseen powers had to be used for the 
benefit of the people.  The king was responsible for the prosperity of the realm.  With 
the help of medicines, certain kings were able to prevent droughts, plagues, insect 
infestations and similar disasters.  The king had to perform rituals to ensure the well-
being of the subjects (Maylam, 1986:24).  He had to have specialist rainmakers and 
medicine men who cared for the health and well-being of his people and who had to 
perform rituals for various activities that ensured the prosperity of the kingdom. 
This argues well against unfounded beliefs of the colonialists that the African masses 
were roaming the African continent in the pre-colonial era.  And that these masses 
were on the verge of extinction due to unorganised way of living had it not been due 
to timeous interventions by colonialists, who introduced an organised way of living.  
Historical literary evidence has shown that the pre-colonial Africans were never as 
backward as colonialists had assumed.  Through the Africans’ indigenous knowledge 
systems that catered well for all aspects of their existence, prosperity was 
guaranteed. 
Traditional leadership was well entrenched in pre-colonial African communities.  It 
emerged and developed to prominent heights.  Though there were no written 
constitutions, roles and responsibilities of leaders and their subjects and other 
provisions were enshrined in unwritten constitutions.  Nothing was haphazard.  The 
pre-colonial communities under their pre-colonial African traditional leaders were thus 
well organised and highly self-reliant without any foreign influence. 
3.2.2 Traditional Leadership in Colonial and Apartheid Eras 
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1973:128) strongly criticise colonialists and state that 
they were racist.  These authors go further to say that colonialists believed in their 
own superiority over indigenous Africans and came to South Africa with wild and 
disastrous pre-perceptions of Africans as uncivilised and barbaric people with no 
conceivable destiny.  Colonialists then developed prejudices and stereotypes against 
the Africans, which then biased them against the positive aspects of African culture 
and development.  Fortes and Evans-Pritchard add that the colonialists’ belief in their 
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superiority over Africans encouraged them to treat Africans unfairly.  This was shown 
by the colonialists faith in their military strength, which encouraged them to exploit 
indigenous African people, taking their land by force and removing them forcefully 
from their fertile lands and relocating them to barren lands.  They further removed all 
traditional leaders from positions of leadership such kings, chiefs, and headmen who 
resisted colonial policies.  Those removed were replaced by favourable successors 
who were appointed based on favouritism rather than according to customary law.  
During the colonial era, foreign additions to the traditional leadership positions of 
kingship, chieftainship and headmanship such as sub-chief, super-chief and 
independent headman were added.  The foreign additions rivalled the traditional 
leadership structures.  Unlike in the pre-colonial colonial era, colonialists based the 
leadership of sub-chiefs, super-chiefs and independent headmen on appointment.  
These new additional positions were meant for dispossessing land and the cattle 
from those who had lost wars against colonialists.  These pro-colonialist leaders were 
then allocated land that they had to rule over and they were instructed to collect taxes 
from those under their jurisdiction.  These traditional leaders reported to the 
magistrates and they were paid monthly salaries.  This meant that the Institution of 
Traditional Leadership was formalised by colonial authorities.  The westernised way 
of living was imposed on people.  Rural people were forced to pay taxes.  In order for 
them to be able to pay taxes they had to look for employment or else their property 
was dispossessed.  The traditional way of living changed as many rituals could no 
longer be performed as people flocked to urban areas in search of employment.  The 
cattle that people owned were forcefully reduced because people who defaulted on 
payment of taxes had their cattle repossessed.  Moreover, colonialists created district 
councils and thus limited the powers of traditional leaders (Omer-Cooper, 1994:109). 
The formalisation of traditional leadership was followed by the advent of Christian 
missionaries.  Kings, like Kgama in Bechuanaland, became Christian converts.  He 
then started fighting against most of the BaNgwato’s cultural practices as he now 
regarded these as heathen practices (Sparks, 1990:150).  A Christian Kgama then 
deprived the chieftainship in Bechuanaland of almost all of its tribal significance.  
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Moreover, the advent of colonialism brought many changes in traditional authority.  
After Governor D’Urban had annexed part of the AmaXhosa territory in 1835, he 
appointed white commissioners as representatives of the government and decrees 
were passed on the chiefs (Omer-Cooper, 1994:110).  Colonialists proclaimed that 
they were there to teach Africans the value of labour, trade and money.  
Governor Smith hoped to turn Africans into civilised, educated, Christianised, well-
dressed British subjects who were acquainted with the capitalist system and the 
value of labour.  Colonialists reduced the number of cattle, which were the symbol of 
African wealth, and forced Africans to seek employment.  This weakened traditional 
authorities and fragmented chiefdoms.  Africans returning home from urban 
employments often felt independent from their chiefs siding with the colonialists and 
questioned the authority and actions of the chiefs, thus preferring the urban way of 
life to the traditional one (Omer-Cooper, 1994:110). 
Colonialism spread throughout South Africa and as a result, the AmaXhosa were 
conquered by British military forces and then brought under British administration as 
they had lost their cattle and lands which were the pivots of their economy, life and 
existence.  The economy of the AmaXhosa then had to depend on colonial markets.  
It was not by choice that Africans had to become British colonial subjects but by 
military coercion.  Sir Harry Smith in a similar way as his colonial predecessors 
continued the brutal subjugation of Africans with the intention of solidifying their 
ambition of creating a total dependency of Africans on their colonial British masters.  
Smith wanted to turn the AmaXhosa hereditary chiefs into salaried magistrates, and 
to “civilise” the AmaXhosa by means of schools, missions and trade money.  Chiefs 
and their councillors who had suffered a loss of revenue due to the impoverishment 
of their followers were sometimes given inducement payments.  Smith further 
ridiculed the Institution of African Traditional Leadership by calling himself the Inkosi 
Inkulu (sic) (Great Chief) and referred to the AmaXhosa chiefs as his children and all 
AmaXhosa as dogs (Pieres, 1989:53). 
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These were some of the horrifying barbaric humiliations inflicted on the institution of 
traditional leadership by the uncaring and unsympathetic colonialists.  The strategy 
by the whites of annexing one chief’s territories and giving these to another chief 
sowed the seed of a great disunity among the Africans in the face of the advancing 
imperialists.  Some Xhosa chiefs ended up forming alliances with the colonial forces 
against other AmaXhosa chiefs (Omer-Cooper, 1994:111). 
During the apartheid era, traditional leader roles became increasingly divorced from 
their roots in the domestic realm and were attached to Bantustan/homeland state 
structures.  Many chiefs and their allies pursued accumulation through positions in 
bureaucracies and companies (Hyslop, 1999:424).  According to Hyslop (1999:425), 
apartheid efforts to build the Bantustans/homelands as alternative states and civil 
societies created new forms of land use, tenure, property holding and rent-seeking.  
Sections of the population began to derive their incomes from civil service and 
teaching jobs. 
Throughout the apartheid era, the chiefs were called upon by the government to act 
as agents of the South African state.  For their services, they were rewarded with the 
trappings of power and the material comforts of high office.  The homelands served 
as labour reservoirs from which the mining industry, in particular, could draw the 
requisite supply of migrant labour.  The institution of African traditional leadership 
during the apartheid era did not have any role to play at both national and provincial 
levels.  Due to the pressure exerted by colonialists, the Institution of Traditional 
Leadership was used as a platform to micro-manage people.  Few services were 
provided to the rural people and people were forced by circumstances to look for 
employment in big cities like Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town.  On the other 
hand, kings, chiefs and headmen became state functionaries while the state sought 
to co-opt the inherited legitimacy of their positions.  The state wanted to domesticate 
the legitimacy of chiefs and many pre-colonial functions of chieftainship were 
usurped by the state (Hyslop, 1999:424). 
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3.2.3 Traditional Leadership in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
In most sub-Saharan African societies, traditional leadership authority finds 
expression in forms such as religious leadership, lineage headship, leadership in 
extended families and chieftaincy.  Traditional leadership is, however, the fullest 
institutionalised expression of traditional rule.  It embodies the basic features of 
prescribed kinship and lineage succession to office, the awe and sacredness of office 
holders, specific forms of contractual relationship between chiefs and their subjects, 
and institutionalised procedures for conflict resolution, decision-making and 
implementation, mostly at the levels of community or kingdom (Assimeng, 1996).  
Traditional leaders therefore have contractual arrangements with their people in the 
maintenance of peaceful relations within the family/community as well as a host of 
general well-being functions. 
The recognition of the Institution of Traditional Leadership by the South African 
democratic dispensation came as a huge relief to the Institution.  South Africa is a 
republic with several thousands of chiefs and headmen, and seventeen kings, 
paramount chiefs and queens.  Most are gathered in two provinces, namely, 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, while the two richest provinces, namely 
Gauteng and the Western Cape, and Northern Cape have no kings or queens at all.  
Even though the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa promotes gender 
equality, very few female chiefs exist, and even fewer young men are represented.  
Chieftaincy in South Africa is not only essential, but also a vital element in the social, 
political and cultural establishment of South African communities.  It is a dynamic 
institution that reflects and also responds to the evolving political and social 
transformations of society.  The Institution of Traditional Leadership and the 
institutions of the modern state are located along the lines where the traditional world 
meets the modern-state administration.  Therefore, as South Africa continues to 
develop its political institutions to serve the demands of a democratic government in 
the modern-state, the position of traditional leaders continues to attract the attention 
of policy makers. 
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Present-day South Africa is characterised by numerous traditional leadership 
disputes among clans over succession.  One of the key problems facing South Africa 
is that chieftaincy operates on principles that are antithetical to democratic ideals.  
Selection for the office of chief is not by popular vote, but is usually hereditary and for 
life.  It is a hierarchical and patriarchal system that has largely excluded women from 
office, and it supports customary laws that are exclusionary and oppressive towards 
women, particularly in relation to inheritance (Beall, Mkhize & Vawda, 2004). 
During the transformation to a new democracy, there were calls for the complete 
abolition of traditional leadership.  However, traditional leadership remains an 
influential force in contemporary South African communities, as recognised by 
Chapter 12 section 211–212 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa Act 108 
0f 1996.  By way of affirmation that the Institution of Traditional Leadership is 
recognised in South Africa, section 211 of the South African Constitution of 1996 
states the following: 
(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution. 
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law functions 
subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes 
amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs. 
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable subject 
to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law. 
Section 212 states the following: 
(1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an 
institution at local level on matters affecting communities. 
(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional 
leaders, customary law and the customs of communities observing a 
system of customary law – 
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a. national or provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of 
houses of traditional leaders; and 
b. national legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders. 
Since 1996, there have been further attempts to define the role of traditional leaders 
and the traditional courts.  The status of traditional leadership was affirmed by the 
passing of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003.  
Although the Act does not specifically indicate that succession to traditional 
leadership should henceforth be gender neutral, section 2(3) indicates the following: 
A traditional community must transform and adapt customary law and 
customs relevant to the application of this Act so as to comply with the 
relevant principles contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in 
particular by – 
(a) preventing unfair discrimination; 
(b) promoting equality; and 
(c) seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the 
succession to traditional leadership positions. 
Section 3(2)(b) states that at least one third of the members of the traditional council 
must be women.  Moreover, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act of 2003 states, “traditional communities should be governed by a traditional 
council” and at least 25% of the members must be democratically elected.  The Act 
also allows for the President to refuse issuing a certificate of recognition to a 
traditional leader if there is evidence that this leader was not appointed according to 
customary law.  Thus, efforts have been made in the Act to address past problems of 
identifying “real” traditional leaders and concerns about the accountability of the 
institution to all sectors of the community. 
In order to provide background for an understanding of traditional leadership 
structures, it is necessary to make certain generalisations, keeping in mind that 
names could differ in specific South African areas because of language.  In general, 
there are three rungs in the hierarchy of traditional leadership, namely king, chief and 
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headman.  A chief, being the second from the top in the power hierarchy, is a 
traditional leader of a specific traditional community who exercises authority over a 
number of headmen in accordance with customary law, or within whose area of 
jurisdiction a number of headmen exercise authority. 
At the next level are headmen; they are usually the leaders of influential families and 
control specific areas of land.  All these levels of leadership should be exercised to 
benefit the wider group rather than the individual who occupies the position.  
Traditionally, a leader’s office is inherited by his eldest son, and in the case of 
polygamous marriages, it is the eldest son of the principal wife.  Traditionally, 
because of the principle of patrilineal succession, women were not allowed to hold 
ruling positions, but they could serve as regents for chiefs who were too young to rule 
(Assimeng, 1996). 
As with other customary structures, colonial and apartheid governments have 
distorted the Institution of Traditional Leadership.  In particular, colonial government 
invented the council system of local government whereby colonial governors 
appointed people to govern together with the chiefs.  The council system of 
government became the model for local government in rural areas, and it was 
nationalised with the passing of the Native Affairs Act 23 of 1920.  The creation of the 
Department of Native Affairs in 1920 meant that control over succession to traditional 
authority was transferred to the white government, which generally appointed 
members of the ruling families who would not oppose the apartheid policy.  This 
process considerably eroded the respect that people felt for traditional leaders at the 
same time as it decreased the incentives for traditional leaders to act in the interests 
of their subjects (Beall, Mkhize & Vawda, 2004). 
Over the years, the colonial and successive apartheid governments passed various 
laws aimed at controlling the Institution of Traditional Leadership.  These laws 
inevitably impaired the image and integrity of the institution.  When the notorious 
Bantustan system was introduced in 1951 by the then Prime Minister, Daniel 
François Malan (commonly known as DF Malan), through the introduction of the 
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Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951, the institution was further traumatised by a myriad 
of Bantustan legislation.  In the process, legitimate traditional leaders who differed 
from the government of the day and supported the liberation movement were 
banished, disposed of or driven into exile.  As a result, numerous traditional 
leadership disputes, claims and counterclaims were and still are, by all accounts, the 
order of the day because of the interference by the colonial and apartheid 
governments.  
Because of the interference with traditional leadership by both the colonial and 
apartheid governments that appointed certain individuals as kings, chiefs and 
headmen, South Africa was faced with many traditional leadership disputes and 
claims.  As a result, on 16 October 2004, the then President of the Republic of South 
Africa, Thabo Mbeki, established the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes 
and Claims in terms of section 22(1) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act 41 of 2003.  In terms of section 25(4) of Act 41 of 2003, the 
Commission has authority to investigate all traditional leadership claims and disputes, 
with those disputes after 1 September 1927 being the main focus and exceptional 
cases being entertained for a period before this date.  
Commissioners were appointed into the Commission in terms of Section 23(1) of Act 
No. 41 of 2003, which outlines the following: 
The President must appoint not more than 15 persons as members of the 
Commission who are knowledgeable regarding customs and the Institution of 
Traditional Leadership.  
The State President of the Republic of South Africa, Honourable Mister Jacob 
Gedl’eyihlekisa Zuma, made the findings of the Commission public in July 2010.  The 
highlight of the findings has been that, of the six kings in the Eastern Cape, three 
were deemed illegal (the three will remain kings for life but thereafter no one will 
succeed to their thrones) and only three were pronounced legal kings. 
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According to a statement released by the Department of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs on 16 October 2004, various attempts were made to settle the 
disputes through courts of law and commissions of enquiry, but to no avail.  With the 
advent of democracy, a strong voice emerged, particularly from those who were 
unfairly disposed of in the past, demanding that the democratic government restore 
them to their rightful positions.  Section 25(2) of Act 41 of 2003 states that the 
Commission has authority to investigate either on request or of its own accord:  
(i) a case where there is doubt as to whether a kingship, senior traditional 
leadership or headmanship was established in accordance with 
customary law and customs, and  
(ii) a traditional leadership position where the title or right of the incumbent 
is contested. 
When considering a dispute or claim, the Commission considers and applies 
customary law and customs of the relevant traditional community, as they were when 
the events occurred that gave rise to the dispute or claim.  Decisions of the 
Commission taken with the support of at least two thirds of the members of the 
Commission were conveyed to the President for implementation.  However, after the 
announcement of the Commission’s findings in 2010, media reports indicated that 
those who had been deposed of their leadership positions, especially kings, were 
intending to challenge the findings and recommendations of the Commission through 
courts of law. 
3.3 Traditional Leadership Debates and Legal Aspects 
Besides challenges that the Institution of Traditional Leadership experiences, there 
are positive developments with respect to its recognition and roles within the South 
African democratic dispensation.  The birth of democracy in South Africa allowed for 
the development of an equality-driven society in which political ideals and the rights 
of all citizens have legitimate voice guaranteed by the Constitution.  There are, 
however, a number of critical issues that have stemmed from the democratisation 
and liberalisation of South Africa.  In particular, the practice of traditional leadership 
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has become a point of vociferous debate, which has led to political contention.  The 
political and legal contention about traditional leadership and its legitimacy stems 
from its role in implementation of policies of the colonial and apartheid regimes 
between the 1800s and 1990s.  According to Lambert (1995), chiefs were 
manipulated by the colonial regime.  More specifically, although chiefs were offered 
the opportunity to increase their power through the accumulation of livestock and 
land, as the colony became firmly entrenched and the British gained greater power in 
the region, there were increasing attempts to reduce the authority the chiefs had. 
Under the National Party regime, a number of laws were formulated to regulate and 
control traditional leadership, often to the advantage of the racist regime (Nthai, 
2005).  The following legislative measures determined the appointment of traditional 
leaders in different homelands/Bantustans that have traditional leaders:  
• Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951; 
• Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; 
• Bophuthatswana Constitution Act 89 of 1976;  
• Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act 23 of 1978; 
• Ciskei Authorities Act 37 of 1984; 
• Ciskei Constitution Act 20 of 1981; 
• KwaNdebele Traditional Authorities Act 2 of 1984;  
• KwaZulu AmaKhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act 9 of 1990); 
• Lebowa Local Authorities Act 15 of 1988;  
• Lebowa Royal Allowance Act 3 of 1984; 
• Proclamation R110 of 1957;  
• QwaqQwa Administration of Authorities Act 6 of 1983); 
• Transkei Authorities Act 4 of 1965; 
• Transkei Constitution Act 15 of 1976;  
• Venda District and Territorial Council Act 15 of 1986; and 
• Venda Traditional Leadership Proclamation 21 of 1991. 
 56 
Traditional leaders did and do not exist in the highly urbanised province of the 
Western Cape as well as the rural Northern Cape.  However, in Gauteng there is 
one, the Kekana clan will be discussed below which is under the leadership of 
Chieftainess Mavis Mmamokete Kekana. The Acts listed above were not repealed 
even though the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 
was enacted into a law.  
As a result, the various Acts continue to be implemented by those who had been 
“illegitimately appointed” through them as a reference to defend themselves.  The 
effect of these laws is that provinces are using different laws of succession and 
procedures in the appointment of traditional leaders into positions of power.  
Furthermore, a number of traditional leaders were deposed in terms of these laws for 
not being amenable to colonial and apartheid government directives. 
However, the present government is in the process of re-instating those who were 
deposed.  Notwithstanding the traditional legitimacy they enjoyed, those who were 
ousted from office or passed over in matters of succession were deposed and 
legislation was also used to establish new chieftaincies as well as merge and 
dissolve existing communities.  The Institution of Traditional Leadership, its status 
and role in according to customary law is recognised subject to the Constitution, in 
terms of section 211 (1)(2) of Act 108 of 1996. Section 211(3) asserts that the courts 
must apply customary law when that law is applicable subject to the Constitution and 
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.  This, in fact, means that 
the legal chaos of the apartheid era has continued in the new dispensation. 
Cases are known where, during the apartheid regime, chieftainship was usurped or 
acquired by trickery or force.  Such occurrences have resulted in succession disputes 
that involved mostly genealogical controversies.  Recently, women in traditional 
communities challenged succession laws and customs on the basis that these laws 
and customs discriminate against them.  Such cases will be discussed below.  The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Promotion of Equality and 
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Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 are used as a basis for such 
challenges.  
The post-apartheid government has enacted subsequent pieces of legislation.  
These include, more significantly:  
• Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004; 
• Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998; 
• National House of Traditional Leaders Act 10 of 1997; and 
• Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003.  
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 is one of the 
most pertinent pieces of legislation aimed at outlining the roles and functions of the 
Institution of Traditional Leadership within the broader thrust of the post-1994 
democratic dispensation in South Africa.  However, besides the many pieces of 
legislation that have been discussed above, traditional leadership succession still 
subscribes to the customary law of succession. 
3.4 Customary Law of Succession: Patriarchal and Matriarchal Systems  
Central to the customary law of intestate succession in South Africa is the rule of 
male primogeniture.  Male primogeniture is inheritance by the eldest surviving male 
child, from which women and extra-marital male children are excluded.  With the 
entrenchment of the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, however, 
the constitutional validity of male primogeniture has been called into question in a 
number of cases that have come before the courts, for example, the case of the 
Valoyi clan.  This case and others are discussed below. 
Male primogeniture has been challenged because it discriminates unfairly on the 
grounds of age, birth and most importantly, gender.  Thus far, the aspects of gender 
discrimination that have received judicial attention have been confined largely to 
intestate succession of a deceased’s estate devolving in accordance with personal 
law or family law.  Little attention, either judicial or academic, has been paid to the 
issue of gender discrimination as played out by the customary (and constitutional) 
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law of patrilineal succession in terms of which women may not hold any traditional 
positions. 
As the majority of traditional leaders are males, there are few clans that are under the 
traditional leadership of females, and they function very well.  Bekker (2000:110) 
states that a few traditional communities exist in South Africa where an exceptional 
rule to patrilineal succession operates.  Two such communities are the Balobedu clan 
and the Mianzwi clan in Limpopo, and the Madlebe clan in KwaZulu-Natal.  In 
Limpopo, the Balobedu clan of Modjadji are renowned throughout Africa for their 
female rulers, and it is generally believed that their queen has rain-making powers.  
Before it became customary for female rulers to reign over the Balobedu clan, the 
eldest son of the tribal chief’s senior wife succeeded to the throne.  Since the start of 
the Modjadji dynasty in about 1800, with the inauguration of Modjadji I, the daughter 
of Kgoshi Mkoto, it has been customary for the rain queen to be succeeded by her 
eldest daughter. 
The second clan in Limpopo that practices matriarchal succession is the Mianzwi 
clan of the Venda tribe.  This clan also believes that only women are blessed with 
rain-making powers.  Among the Venda of the Northern Transvaal it is claimed, 
“succession to the powers of rain-making and to the chieftainship at Mianzwi has 
been matrilineal in an apparently unbroken line from Luvhimbi” (Roberts, 1997:6).  
According to Roberts (1997:7), the first female ruler at Mianzwi in Venda before 1900 
was Mufanadzo, also known by the title of Dzhenzhele Ramiholi.  She was treated 
like a chief.  The third clan, and the only one in KwaZulu-Natal that practises 
matriarchy, is the Madlebe clan.  Kerr (1994) cites a newspaper article that reported 
that in 1992, a woman chief reigned among the Madlebe clan, a group member of 
the Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The Balobedu, Mianzwi and Madlebe clans function well under the leadership of 
female traditional leaders.  However, some communities in South Africa have seen 
many chieftaincy succession conflict-related incidences wherein mostly male chiefs 
have been brutally killed and male regents appointed.  These incidences occur even 
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though male-led traditional communities are customary under the patriarchal system.  
For example, in Ward Z at the Ethekwini Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, a violent 
chieftaincy succession conflict erupted in 1988 after the brutal killing of the chief of 
the ward.  In March 1988, the chief of Ward Z, who was the biological father of the 
reigning chief, came under attack in his home and was shot and killed, execution-
style, allegedly by members of the neighbouring chiefdom.  In the aftermath, the 
chiefly family decided that one of his brothers should act as regent because the 
current chief was only eight years old at the time (Kramer, 2009). 
An indication of communities that function well under a matriarchal system has been 
explained above.  Some clans had disputes and ended up going to courts for 
mediation over chieftaincy disputes involving sisters, brothers and cousins.  These 
cases are motivated by communities not recognising females as heirs.  However, 
even though there are cases of the nature, affected female heirs are demanding 
recognition by approaching courts of law.  Females in such cases ask courts to re-
affirm their equal rights, as in the case of males, and request to be allowed to take 
chieftaincy positions, as enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
One such case is that of the Valoyi clan case5, Phillia N’wamitwa (applicant) versus 
T.L.P. N’wamitwa-Shilubana (first respondent).  The Pretoria High Court was asked 
to determine whether a woman could succeed her late father, a chief, and become 
the chief of a traditional community.  The first respondent and the applicant in the 
case were respectively female and male members of the royal family of the Valoyi 
clan.  The Valoyi clan, which is part of the contemporary Tsonga/Shangaan tribe led 
by Modjadji I (1800–1852) to Modjadji VI (2003–2005), is discussed only for 
illustrating the challenges of the chieftaincy succession system. 
The immediate events culminating in Valoyi dispute originated on 26 May 1948 when 
Chief Fofoza N’wamitwa was enthroned as chief.  He reigned for two decades until 
                                            
5 N’wamitwa versus N’wamitwa-Shulubana [2005] 3 case SA 536 Republic of South Africa 
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his death on 24 February 1968.  Chief Fofoza was the father of the first respondent.  
The first respondent was the only child born of the first wife.  Chief Fofoza did not 
have a son.  In view of this, when Chief Fofoza died in 1968, his younger brother, 
Richard, was appointed regent.  Later in the same year, he was appointed Chief.  He 
remained Chief until his death in 2001.  Chief Richard N’wamitwa was the father of 
the applicant.  The applicant was Chief Richard’s first-born son from his first wife.  It 
was upon the death of Chief Richard N’wamitwa in 2001 that the issue arose as to 
whether the applicant or the first respondent (the applicant’s female cousin) should 
succeed as chief of the Valoyi clan (Mireku, 2007). 
The contenders for the chieftainship of the Valoyi clan were cousins: their fathers 
were brothers.  For over five generations, the appointment and succession to 
chieftaincy among the Valoyi clan has been strictly patrilineal, as determined by the 
organising principle of male primogeniture.  The judgement was against the applicant 
on the grounds of the primogeniture principle that favours sons to inherit all the 
material positions of the father (Mireku, 2007).  He then appealed the judgement in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  On 1 December 2006, the Supreme Court of Appeal6 
unanimously dismissed an appeal against the High Court judgment in the case.  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal decision, which largely upheld the reasoning of the High 
Court, is reported in N’wamitwa-Shilubana v N’wamitwa [2006] SCA 174 (RSA). 
Based on various resolutions adopted by the Valoyi royal family, royal council and 
tribal authority, the Limpopo provincial government, acting for the State, appointed 
the first respondent as chief in 2002 in accordance with the practices and customs of 
the Valoyi clan and within the meaning of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  The applicant challenged the appointment of the first 
respondent and applied for an interdict from the High Court to the effect he was the 
                                            
6 N’wamitwa-Shulubana v N’wamitwa [2006] Supreme Court of Appeal, case 174 Republic of South 
Africa 
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heir to the Valoyi chieftaincy and had the right to succeed his late father as the chief.  
In his application, the applicant’s points of argument were as follows:  
• the first respondent was not entitled to succeed the applicant’s late father as 
chief; 
• all letters of appointment of the first respondent as chief issued by the State be 
withdrawn; and 
• the State is ordered to issue the applicant with letters of appointment as chief of 
the Valoyi clan. 
Judge Swart heard oral evidence with a view to determine inter alia three key legal 
issues:   
• First, the court sought to determine whether in terms of the customs and 
traditions of the Tsonga nation and, in particular the Valoyi clan, a woman 
could be appointed a chief. 
• Second, the court had to declare on the issue of whether, when appointing the 
first respondent as chief, the royal family acted in terms of the customs and 
traditions of the Valoyi clan. 
• Last, the court had to rule on the larger constitutional issue as to whether the 
provincial government’s appointment of the first respondent as chief was in 
accordance with the practices and customs of the Valoyi tribe within the 
meaning of the 1996 Constitution (Mireku, 2007). 
The court cases ensued and culminated at the Constitutional Court in 2008 where 
the principles of human rights enshrined in the Constitution were observed and the 
rule of democracy was fulfilled.  The first respondent, T.L.P N’wamitwa-Shulubana,  
won the Constitutional Court case and she was named Chief T.L.P. N’wamitwa II by 
her clan. Chief N’wamitwa II became the first woman of the Tsonga nation to become 
a ruler, a historic event indeed.  In all, the appointment of Chief T.L.P N’wamitwa II in 
2002 was characterised by a struggle of succession to the throne.  Customarily, 
before this case it was a taboo for a female to rule the Valoyi clan.  It was a 
prerogative of the male primogeniture.   
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3.5 Chieftaincy Dynamics and Succession Disputes 
Many tribes retained their indigenous authority system despite the process of cultural 
changes to which they were subjected and the fact that they had been under the 
administrative control of colonial authorities for many years.  The traditional leader 
was the most important person in the central traditional government.  The leader is 
normally the eldest son of his father’s principal wife.  He holds a hereditary position 
and is therefore generally of the most senior lineage and clan in the tribe.  However, 
Ray and Reddy (2003:149) found that in the 18th century, King Moshoeshoe I and 
King Phalo broke the rule of appointing the genealogically senior son as the only 
successor.  The former divided his tribe into seven clusters and made all four of his 
sons and some relatives chiefs of those areas, and the latter divided the AmaXhosa 
tribe into two and made his sons, King Gcaleka, who was the heir, and King 
Rharabe, kings of the AmaGcaleka and AmaRharabe tribes. 
Nearly half of all black Africans in South Africa are still living in rural areas.  The great 
majority live in traditional groups headed by hereditary kings and chiefs as well as 
chiefs and headmen.  The chief, for example, still plays a central role as the keeper 
and promoter of the traditional way of living (Chambers, 2000).  This way of living 
encourages male domination because women are excluded from decision-making.  
Barber and Allen (1992) view this treatment as oppression because these practices 
exclude women, in general, from experiences and activities that could enhance their 
growth and development in society as well as their access to resources and positions 
of power. 
An interesting account is presented by Hartman, Kriel, Else, Boonzaaier and 
Wassermann (1993:3) who say that, according to section 2(1)(a)(ii) of the Black 
Authority Act 68 of 1951, a community can choose its own leader through democratic 
procedures if there is no hereditary chieftainship.  The chairperson is elected from 
among community members and by the community’s councillors.  The genealogically 
senior headman in the community becomes chairperson almost automatically.  The 
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community authority eventually changes into a tribal authority, of which the 
chairperson becomes the recognised chief. 
According to Beall, Mkhize & Vawda (2004), in Africa more generally, traditional 
authorities have become dependent on elected or military governments for resources 
or recognition, leading to awkward lines of upward accountability.  In South Africa, 
similar instances occurred under the colonial and apartheid regimes.  Nevertheless, 
post-apartheid political pragmatism demands that governments seek co-existence 
with the Institution of Traditional Leadership in South Africa. 
Although resilient, the Institution of Traditional Leadership across the continent bears 
the battle scars of having to adapt to survive.  This is as true for South Africa as 
elsewhere.  In post-apartheid South Africa, traditional authorities are recognised 
under the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and are represented at 
national level by the National House of Traditional Leaders.  There is also a 
Provincial House of Traditional Leaders in six of the nine provinces, namely the 
Eastern Cape, Free State, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West and KwaZulu-Natal.  
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 accorded 
traditional leaders a role in local government and sought to reinforce their role in local 
governance and minimise the succession disputes. 
Although succession disputes and competition for power have occurred with 
remarkable frequency in Southern African chiefdoms, scholars have tended not to 
view these conflicts as sufficiently important to warrant a re-assessment of underlying 
assumptions about chieftaincy (Comaroff, 1978:1).  Determined not to see 
democracy in chieftaincy, the scholarship of dichotomies has branded such 
negotiability or manipulability of rules and legitimacy anomalies and continues with its 
sterile prescriptions divorced from real-life experiences. 
One of the key problems facing South Africa is that chieftaincy in Africa operates on 
principles that are antithetical to democratic ideals.  Selection for the office of chief is 
not by popular vote, but is usually hereditary and for life.  It is a hierarchical and 
patriarchal system that has largely excluded women from office, even though 
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legislation supports women involvement.  Customary laws that are exclusionary and 
oppressive towards women, particularly in relation to the right to inherit material 
positions and possessions, support exclusion of women.  In such a system, obvious 
limits to representation and downward accountability exist. 
The issue of gender equality has an effect on traditional leadership, marriage and 
family law and succession and inheritance.  In the case of traditional leadership, 
succession to traditional leadership positions is based on the principle of male 
primogeniture in terms of which only the eldest male child is suppose to succeed, 
although this succession is subject to appointment by the head of state (Olivier, 
Bekker & Olivier, 1995:162).  The reason behind this rationale used to be that the 
eldest son would step into the shoes of the father and was responsible for continuing 
after him.  Customarily, daughters are expected to marry and might therefore not 
have been able to continue to lead effectively after their fathers have passed on 
because it would lead to traditional leadership being transferred to a man she would 
marry, something which was unacceptable.  There is, however, no doubt that in the 
light of the South African Constitution, the eldest daughter might challenge such 
succession.  In fact, the Valoyi case has set a precedent, which says that eldest 
daughters are eligible to inherit from their fathers. 
In order to provide a background for the case study in terms of the dynamics of 
chieftaincy conflicts, some South African and Botswana case studies are discussed 
below. 
3.4.1 The Kekane Chieftaincy Dispute 
According to Moselakgomo (Sowetan, 2010:4), a bitter rivalry in the AmaNdebele-a 
Lebelo royal family at Majaneng in Hammanskraal, north of Pretoria, was raging 
ahead of the historic coronation of the first woman chieftainess of the clan.  Heir to 
the crown, Mavis Mmamokete Kekana, has revealed that the tribal council has 
scheduled a meeting with Gauteng premier Nomvula Mokonyane to set a date for the 
coronation.  Mavis Mmamokete Kekana’s coronation, as the eldest daughter of the 
late Chief Hans Kekana, who died in 1962, will make her the first woman to lead the 
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clan and the first to ascend to chieftainship in Gauteng.  The chieftainship of the tribe 
has been at the centre of a bitter storm between the royal family, Mavis Kekana, and 
her cousin Cornelius Kekana, who has been the regent of the clan since 2005. 
However, historical records show that Chief Hans Kekana’s widow, Esther Kekana, 
was appointed regent in 1963. On 12 April 1977 she was removed by the 
Bophuthjatswana government due to political interference. In the same year, 1977, 
Nathaniel Sillo Kekana was appointed regent of the Kekana clan. Nathaniel Sillo 
Kekana was also removed by the Bophuthatswana government in 1981 and 
replaced by Agrippa Kekana (regent). In 1986 Agrippa Kekana died and Nathaniel 
Sillo Kekana was reinstated as regent again and ultimately appointed chief of the 
Kekana clan until 2005 (Lekgoathi, 2003).    
3.4.2 The Monnakgotla Chieftaincy Dispute 
An article in the Sunday Times (Hawkey, 2010:3) reported that there was tension 
between ousted regent, Ezekiel Monnakgotla, and his sisters over the wealth of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange-listed company, Wesizwe Platinum Limited.  At that 
stage, regent Ezekiel Monnakgotla had been acting since 2003, but his father, Kgosi 
David, who was ill, had died in 2009.  In an unprecedented action, the family voted 
regent Ezekiel Monnakgotla out of his position in January 2010 after he was accused 
of secrecy and dismal mismanagement of clan’s finances to the tune of R250 million 
including the community’s empowerment stake in Wesizwe Platinum Limited valued 
at R170 million belonging to the 30 000-strong community.  The regent was then 
replaced by his older sister Margaret Monnakgatla.  Ezekiel Monnakgotla was said to 
be challenging the appointment of his sister as chief of the Ledig community on the 
grounds that it was not traditional practice to have a woman as head of the Bakubung 
clan.  However, the article reported that Ezekiel failed to convince the High Court in 
Mafikeng that he should resume his duties. 
3.4.3 The Sechele Chieftaincy Disputes 
In his study of the Barolong boo Ratshidi of South Africa, a sister chiefdom to the 
Barolong of Botswana, Comaroff (1978:2–6) observed that not only was competition 
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for power an ubiquitous feature of everyday politics and nor was it precluded by rule 
nor limited to interrogation, but rules could also not be assumed to determine the 
outcome of indigenous political processes.  If succession was to be exactly according 
to prescription, 80% of all cases of accession to the Barolong boo Ratshidi 
chieftainship would have represented anomalies.  He also noted that while access to 
authority is determined by birth, political power depends upon individual ability, and a 
significant amount of power in practice is wielded by recruited talented office-holders.  
Thus, although entitled to formal respect and ceremonial precedence, the chief is 
regarded as a fallible human being who may or may not be powerful and who may or 
may not rule efficiently.  Placing as high a value upon consultation and participatory 
politics as chiefdom does would ensure that even an incompetent chief would benefit 
from the advice of his subjects, whether it be proffered informally or in public. 
Similar negotiation and manipulation of legitimacy are frequent among the Tswana of 
Botswana, almost 30 years after Comaroff’s (1978) remarkable insights about the 
Barolong boo Ratshidi of South Africa.  Present-day Botswana is characterised by 
numerous disputes over succession among majority and minority tribes alike.  This 
points not only to chieftaincy as an institution, marrying might and right in fascinating 
ways, but it also highlights the continued importance of chieftaincy in Botswana.  Of 
the eight Botswana chiefdoms with permanent representation in the House of Chiefs, 
it is not only among the Balete that there have been disputes over succession to the 
throne.  The Bakwena have also been plagued by such disputes since the death of 
Bonewamang Sechele in 1978, and the designation of his then four-year-old son, 
Kgari Sechele III, as heir apparent.  Kgari Sechele III’s cousin, Kealeboga Sechele 
laid claim to the throne, describing Kgari Sechele III’s 1978 designation “irregular and 
accordingly null and void”, and arguing that he is the rightful heir following the death 
of his father Mokgalagadi in 2000 (Nyamnjoh, 2002). 
In March 2002, however, Kgari Sechele III, was sworn in at the House of Chiefs, 
taking over from Kgosikwena Sebele, who had served as regent for 16 years, and 
who resigned in January 2002.  Kealeboga Sechele tried in vain through his lawyer to 
stop the swearing in, and Kgosikwena was not happy with initiatives taken by Kgari 
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Sechele III supporters without consulting him.  In 2000, he was instructed by the 
Ministry of Local Government to make arrangements for Kgari Sechele III’s 
accession to the throne.  Kgosikwena Sebele disobeyed the instructions on the 
grounds that another Bakwena royal, Mokgalagadi Sechele, was also a claimant to 
the throne on behalf of her son, Kealeboga Sechele.  Instead, he called upon the 
Minister of Local Government to appoint a judicial commission of enquiry, as 
provided for in the law.  The Minister refused, insisting that Kgosikwena must make 
way for Kgari Sechele III’s enthronement.  Kgosikwena Sebele took the matter to 
court, which ruled against him, seeing no credible doubt to Kgari Sechele III’s 
legitimacy as heir to the throne.  The court did not understand “why the applicant was 
so stubborn as to consult the very tribe upon which his power must largely depend”.  
The court also wondered why Kgosikwena Sebele, in full knowledge, had delayed for 
21 years before raising his doubts about Kgari Sechele III’s legitimacy as heir 
apparent.  Kgosikwena Sebele resigned as regent following the court decision, which 
he appealed (Nyamnjoh, 2002). 
Commenting on a delegation of the Bakwena elders to Serowe (home of Kgari’s 
mother) to update the Bangwato royal family on the preparations for Kgari’s 
enthronement, Kgosikwena Sebele said,  
I do not know who sent them to Serowe because I am the contact 
between the clan and the royal family.  All communication between these 
two parties has to go through me.  I also hear that last month Kgari 
Sechele III was formally introduced to the tribe in the kgotla (meeting).  
How can that be when I am supposed to do that? 
He was also opposed to the enthronement of Kgari Sechele III before the court 
decided on the dispute over succession.  Kgosikwena Sebele further said,  
The case of who is the rightful heir to the throne is still before the High 
Court, and at this stage, it is premature to be talking about – let alone 
making preparations – for anyone’s installation.  When the High Court 
rules, either in Kgari Sechele III or in Kealeboga Sebele’s favour, it is only 
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then that people can start talking about installing the next Bakwena 
paramount chief and sending delegations to other tribes. 
This claim was made despite the Botswana’s Chieftaincy Act 19 of 1987, Section 
25(1), which states that no court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any 
matter concerning chieftainship, particularly with regard to the designation, 
recognition, appointment or suspension of chiefs.  Amid this controversy, Kgari 
Sechele III’s enthronement was scheduled for 17 August 2002.  In July 2002, 
however, Kgosikwena Sebele reportedly withdrew his appeal case from the court 
because he could not raise the money, R15 000.00, needed to lodge an appeal 
whilst working as security guard.  Commenting to the press, his lawyer, Duma Boko 
said, “It is frustrating to both the lawyer and the litigant when a person with a 
reasonably arguable case cannot see the light of the day in court just because he 
cannot raise security for costs” (Nyamnjoh, 2002).  
3.4.4 The Kgalagadi Chieftaincy Dispute 
Struggles for legitimacy are also common among chiefs and headmen of the minority 
tribes, sometimes not unconnected with the fact that these are paid positions in the 
civil service.  Among the most well-known struggles for succession at sub-chief level, 
is the court battle between Legodimo Leipego and Anthony Moapare for the position 
of sub-chief in Kgalagadi.  The court ruled in favour of Anthony Moapare, but to 
appease the former, the Botswana government took the unprecedented step of 
creating the post of deputy sub-chief (Dingake, 1995:171). 
Despite the large percentage of South Africans living in traditional communities, 
literature and research on how communities view traditional leadership in South 
Africa is scarce.  In addition, studies conducted on chieftaincy conflicts in South 
Africa are rare except for newspaper articles that are published when there is a case 
before a court of law.  The national newspapers, in most cases, do not provide 
follow-up articles. 
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The above case studies on dynamics of chieftaincy conflicts in South Africa and 
Botswana were discussed in order to provide a background for the case study of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict dynamics. 
3.5 Case Study: The AmaTshezi Chieftaincy Conflict 
Mthonjana village, in the jurisdiction of Mqanduli in the King Sabatha Dalindlebo 
Local Municipality, is situated along the Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape.  The area is 
popularly known as Coffee Bay/Hole-in-the-Wall (see Annexure F).  Mthonjana 
village is one of the rare villages found along the coast where people are still living a 
so-called “traditional lifestyle”.  This community is still living under the leadership of a 
traditional leader, the chief.  The majority of the people of this village are of the 
AmaTshezi clan, and the chief of the area belongs to the same clan.  The area has a 
tourist attraction site, Hole-in-the-Wall, which has resulted in many people becoming 
interested in investing in the area.  Hole-in-the-Wall has the potential to grow, but it 
remains very natural and most of the area belongs to the community that resides on 
it. 
This village, according to the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Amendment Act 41 of 2003 section 2 (1) (a) and (b), is eligible to be recognised as a 
traditional community and to be led by a traditional leader.  In terms of customary 
law, a person who qualifies to be the traditional leader is the heir of the royal family.  
However, if the heir is younger than 21 years, anyone identified by the family may be 
recommended to the king to be appointed as regent. 
The AmaTshezi family followed this trend until 1975, when the then chief/traditional 
leader died of natural causes.  At the time of his death, his heir was still too young to 
lead the community.  Therefore, a regent, who was the cousin of the late leader, was 
appointed to lead the community.  That particular regent led from 1975 until 1986.  
Thereafter, the AmaTshezi clan decided to appoint a second regent who came 
directly from the AmaTshezi clan.  The second regent led from 1987 until 2002, when 
he also passed away due to natural causes. 
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The period in which the second regent led, the heir was old enough to lead, but he 
was working in Johannesburg and yet to be circumcised.  Family elders advised the 
heir in 2001 to come back home and be circumcised.  The heir agreed to return 
home to be circumcised and 31 August 2001 was the date set for the ritual.  He had 
to surrender his job because he would not be going back to Johannesburg.  
However, on 12 August 2001, he was shot and killed in Johannesburg, the same 
week he was due to return home to prepare to take over as chief of the AmaTshezi 
Tribal Authority (Mdlele, 2007). 
After the death of the second regent, the wife (widow) of the heir was appointed in 
2002 by the King of the AbaThembu tribe to be temporary regent of the AmaTshezi 
clan.  The AbaThembu king is the head of the traditional council to which the 
AmaTshezi clan belongs.  Not everybody in the clan was happy about being led by a 
woman.  The decision to make her the regent was taken because the next heir was 
still too young for the position.  In July 2004, the king of the AbaThembu tribe officially 
appointed the widow the regent on behalf of her heir.  Community members, 
including some relatives of the family, could not accept being led by a woman.  They 
started attacking the female regent and everyone close to her.  The first attempt on 
her life was at night in September 2004 when she was shot at while sleeping at 
home.  She escaped unharmed (Sokana, 2007). 
All in all, the AmaTshezi Tribal Authority at Mthonjana Village has been led by 
regents for more than three decades: from 1975 to 1986, 1987 to 2002, 2004 to 2007 
and 2008 to 2009.  From 2002 to 2007, the AmaTshezi clan of Mthonjana village in 
Mqanduli in the Eastern Cape experienced a power struggle that resulted in the 
outbreak of violence that led to the death of many people, including the female regent 
and her close relatives. The AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict continued to escalate 
because it divided the family and polarised the Mthonjana community.  One group 
was willing to be led by the deceased’s wife, while the other group was opposed to 
being led by a woman.  The opposing group proposed certain people, while another 
group stood by the female regent as the rightful leader on behalf of her heir who was 
a minor. 
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Another attempt was made in broad daylight on 17 September 2004, when she was 
shot at whilst walking in the village.  She again escaped unharmed and managed to 
identify the culprit who was arrested on 19 September 2007.  The female regent was 
eventually killed on 24 September 2004, when a relative’s house, within which she 
was sleeping, was burnt down.  After her funeral, in October 2004, the AbaThembu 
king appointed the deceased’s daughter the next regent.   
Even though the first person to be killed in August 2001 was the heir, it appears that 
his death was not linked to the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  This is because the 
emergence of conflicts is said to have begun in 2003.  One of the questions that this 
study sought to answer was whether there were any incidences of conflict in 
Mthonjana with respect to the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict before 2002.  Answers 
to this question have the potential to reveal what was happening before 2002 and to 
offer possible grounds for the later conflict. 
Based on documents, the case of Mthonjana chieftaincy conflict was only reported to 
the leadership of the province in May 2007.  During this period, the opposition group 
that was against the appointment of the female regent was executing contentious 
tactics.  The homes of those who supported her were burnt down, cars were set 
alight and people were killed.  In May 2007, the Eastern Cape Provincial Government 
established an ad hoc committee with the mandate to mediate for a resolution.  
However, prior to that, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict was manifesting on its own 
without any intervention on the part of government. 
Documents show that it was only in July 2007 that the South African Police Services 
noticed trends in cases that were reported to the Coffee Bay Police Station.  The 
Cluster Commander of Mqanduli area appointed a team of three officers to 
investigate the cases.  At the time, nine cases had been reported between March 
2006 and June 2007.  In 2006, three cases were reported: two were attempted 
murder cases and one was an arson case.  Between May and June 2007, six cases 
were reported: three cases were for arson, and three were attempted murder cases.  
 72 
The investigating team arrested 10 suspects who appeared in court and were 
refused bail. 
After the death of the heir, until 2007, government initiated very little intervention.  It 
was when the conflict was at its climax, in June 2007, that an ad hoc committee 
consisting of government officials was established.  The committee was involved in 
the community until the first court case on 27 November 2007.  The perpetrators 
accused of killing the female regent appeared before the Mqanduli magistrate.  
Because the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa prohibits interference with 
the judiciary, the ad hoc committee had to open access to court processes and ever 
since, the committee ceased to operate. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to outline the historical background of the Institution of Traditional 
Leadership, this chapter discussed how the pre-colonial traditional leadership was 
structured.  The chapter further explored how the colonial and apartheid regimes and 
their policies diluted the Institution of Traditional Leadership in South Africa.  
Moreover, this chapter explained how the practise of customary law favours male 
heirs at the expense of female heirs, and how South Africa’s new democratic 
dispensation recognises the existence of the institution of traditional leadership and 
the right of equality between male and female heirs. 
This chapter further delineated legal provisions that recognise the Institution of 
Traditional Leadership since the advent of democracy in South Africa.  The current 
main debates and legal aspects of traditional leadership were discussed.  A few 
cases of chieftaincy succession disputes in South Africa and Botswana were also 
discussed with specific focus on the case of AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Before 
moving on to look at the specific findings of the current research, the following 
chapter will outline the research methodology that was employed.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters provided a frame of reference for this study.  In Chapter 
Two, a literature review of the theory covering conflict processes was presented, and 
in Chapter Three, the history of the Institution of Traditional Leadership in South 
Africa was outlined.  The focus was on the pre-colonial, colonial and apartheid eras, 
and the current democratic dispensation.  The current legal debates about the 
Institution of Traditional Leadership were explained, and the AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict was discussed from its origin until the conflict stopped. 
In this chapter, the research design and the methodology of the study are discussed.  
The purpose of the chapter is to discuss the background, rationale, and research 
problem as well as the primary aim and objectives of the study.  In addition, the 
sampling method and procedure, the methods of data collection that included 
document reviews and interviews as well as the data analysis and interpretation are 
described in detail.  Finally, the validity and reliability of the qualitative research, 
relevant ethical considerations, and limitations of the research are discussed in detail. 
4.1.1  Background of the Study, Motivation and Research Problem  
Due to the interference by colonial and apartheid regimes, South Africa has seen 
many communal conflicts because of chieftaincy succession disagreements.  These 
chieftaincy conflicts are becoming a trend and there are no proper systems in place 
to manage them.  Poor management of chieftaincy conflicts results in the annihilation 
of a societal milieu because of the destructiveness of the conflicts.  In this study, the 
dynamics and evolution of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict are explored and 
described.  
The intention of the study was to provide a reference to future research about 
communal conflicts and conflicts motivated by chieftaincy succession.  The explosive 
nature of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict prompted a desire to investigate the 
dynamics of the conflict.  Why the conflict occurred and who was involved is of less 
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concern than describing how the conflict developed and evolved.  The findings of this 
study might be used for policy development by both government departments and 
non-government organisations to improve the management of communal conflicts.  
In most cases, communal conflicts are left alone to unfold, ripen and settle.  
Generally, the only intervention is by the police, because police officers can enforce 
the law and their visibility will encourage the antagonists to retreat.  However, conflict 
that is not managed as it manifests may prove perilous for vulnerable groups.  The 
intention of this study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  The findings may serve as a guide for institutions like the Eastern 
Cape House of Traditional Leaders (ECHTL), the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Legislature, the South African Police Services (SAPS), and the provincial Department 
of Safety and Liaison in the formulation of policies for addressing communal conflict. 
4.2  Primary Aim and Objectives 
The primary aim of this study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  The specific aim for executing the methodology was 
to follow an appropriate procedure in achieving that objective.  A methodology 
involves the “steps one has to take, one by one, realistically at grass roots level, 
within a certain span, in order to attain the dream” (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché & 
Delport, 2007:104).  A qualitative research approach was followed to explore the 
perceptions of ad hoc committee members (government officials) about the 
chieftaincy conflict by using AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict as a case study.  The 
aims and objectives of the research study are outlined below.  
4.2.1 Aim  
The aim of the research was to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict in Mthonjana village of Mqanduli, Eastern Cape.  
4.2.2 Objectives  
The objectives of the study were: 
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• to analyse the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict from 2002 to 2007; 
• to explore and describe the impact the AmaTshezi conflict had on the chieftaincy 
position; 
• to discover if any incidences of conflict in Mthonjana Village were reported prior the 
outbreak of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in 2002; 
• to ascertain when the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict came to the attention of those 
in authority and what their approach towards mediating between the parties was; 
and 
• to ascertain if any conflict practitioners were part of the ad hoc committee. 
4.3 Interpretive Theory as the Foundation of this Research 
The aim of interpretive social science is to develop an understanding of social life, 
discover how people construct meaning in natural settings, and explore what is 
meaningful to the people being studied (Neuman, 2006:28).  Human consciousness 
forms the basis of the presumed connection between the study of human beings and 
the study of society.  The aim of the interpretive approach in research is to define and 
explain the understanding of people in society in a scientific way. 
Interpretive social science is idiographic and inductive in its approach.  The term 
idiographic shows that the approach provides a symbolic representation or thick 
description of something else.  It is therefore rich in description (Neuman, 2006:91).  
In this philosophy, an explanation is considered to be true if it makes sense to those 
being studied and if it allows others to understand deeply or enter the reality of those 
being studied.  According to Smart (1976:100), if scientific accounts of human action 
were to be presented to an individual actor as a script, the account must be 
understandable to that actor, translatable into action by the actor and, furthermore, it 
must be comprehensible to fellow actors in terms of a common sense interpretation 
of everyday life. 
Interpretive social science is closely associated with qualitative research 
methodology.  Qualitative research seeks a holistic perspective by using words as 
the units of analysis for an in-depth description of study objects, usually objects in a 
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small-scale research in which the researcher is deeply involved (Denscombe, 
2003:232–234).  When conducting research, the researcher brings his or her 
subjective experience to the text, absorbs the viewpoints presented in the text, and 
then develops a deep understanding of how the parts relate to the whole.  Participant 
observation and field research are often used to gather data by interpretive 
researchers.  Researchers gather qualitative data from research participants using 
one of a number of techniques such as interviews, diaries or focus groups.  Data is 
collected in order to focus on grasping the experiential world of the research 
participant.  Open-ended dialogue between the researcher and participants leads to 
unforeseen answers, including new perspectives about the research question 
(Babbie, 2007; Babbie & Mouton, 2008; Neuman, 2006). 
4.4  Research Design and Methodology 
A research design is a careful and detailed planning of a scientific inquiry indicating 
as much as possible about both major and trivial characteristics that are an integral 
part of the inquiry.  That is, the research design clearly specifies what the researcher 
wants to discover.  In this study, a qualitative paradigm was adopted because the 
research involved exploring and describing the perspectives and experiences of the 
ad hoc committee members. 
A qualitative design uses holistic methods of gathering information.  It involves direct 
personal contact with participants of the study and includes inductive logic where 
specific observations lead to the discovery of general patterns for the purpose of 
analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  Furthermore, a qualitative research design yields 
inside knowledge that is rich, contextual and deep, involving many interrelated 
variables useful for understanding a particular phenomenon (Bhana & Kanjee, 2001). 
A research methodology is the approach employed to achieve the objectives and the 
aims of a study (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:72).  The methodology deals with the proper 
application of the methods, techniques and procedures at the time of executing the 
research design.  
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4.4.1 The Research Purpose 
There are a number of rationales for carrying out a scientific inquiry.  The reasons for 
conducting a study may differ in similar studies.  However, three of the most common 
and useful purposes for conducting social research are exploration, description and 
explanation.  An exploratory, descriptive and contextual qualitative research design 
was employed in this study to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  
Neuman (2006:157) holds that qualitative researchers see most areas of social life 
as intrinsically qualitative.  For qualitative researchers, data is not imprecise or 
deficient; data is highly meaningful.  Instead of trying to convert social life into 
variables or numbers, qualitative researchers borrow ideas from the people studied 
and place the ideas within the context of a natural setting. 
De Vos, Strydom, Fouché, and Delport, (2007:272) remark that the exploration and 
description of a case takes place through detailed, in-depth data collection methods 
involving multiple sources of information rich in contextual information.  The methods 
may include interviews, documents, observations and archival records.  A meta-
theoretical tradition of interpretivism has been selected for this research design.  
Interpretivism emphasises that all human beings are engaged in the process of 
making sense of their worlds (Neuman, 2006). 
According to Mark (1996:219), three types of case study analyses exist.  First is the 
intrinsic case study, which is focused solely on the aim of gaining a better 
understanding of the individual case.  The purpose of intrinsic case study is to 
describe the case studied.  Intrinsic case study analysis was the research method 
adopted for this study.   
The other two types of case studies are instrumental and collective case studies.  
The former is used to elaborate on a theory or to gain a better understanding of a 
social issue; the latter furthers understanding of a social issue or population being 
studied.  In these two types of case study, the interest in the individual case is 
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secondary to the interest in a group of cases.  Cases are chosen so that 
comparisons can be made between cases and concepts, and theories extended and 
validated. 
Intrinsic case analysis is an established research method.  It is one of the most 
commonly used in social sciences.  This method is crucial, especially in the study of 
social phenomena.  Denzin and Lincoln (2003:136) claim that case analysis is a 
method used at individual level to gain knowledge and insight into a social 
phenomenon that is associated with it.  The fundamental assumption on which case 
analysis rests in the social sciences is that a social phenomenon is a human act and 
the point of departure in the investigation ought to be the perceptions of human 
beings. 
The current study was an attempt to explore and describe the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict, using the intrinsic case study method.  An intrinsic 
case study analysis was appropriate because of the aim of this study.  A qualitative 
research method was chosen because the purpose of the study was to explore and 
describe the dynamics of the conflict, not the causes of the conflict.  The perceptions 
of ad hoc committee members and the analysis of documents pertaining to the case 
studied were used to provide data. 
4.4.2 Unit of analysis 
A good research design clearly identifies from the onset what it is going to be studied.  
A unit of analysis is thus the concept the researcher has applied and about which he 
or she does the study.  Concepts can be applied to individual people, groups, 
organisations, movements, institutions, countries, and so forth.  When a concept is 
applied to unit of analysis, the researcher has a duty to explicitly decide on the focus 
of the study and tailor the concept to that focus.  In applying a concept to a unit of 
study, the researcher becomes clear about his or her sampling population and 
establishes theoretical connections that could operate across the unit of analysis 
(Neuman, 2006:58). 
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The sample comprises elements of the population considered for actual inclusion in 
the study or a subset of measurements drawn from a population of interest (Arkava & 
Lane, 1983:27).  In this study, the sample was drawn from civil servants who formed 
an ad hoc committee intended to mediate in the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  The 
ad hoc committee was comprised of government officials from various Eastern Cape 
Provincial departments and state organs. 
4.5 Qualitative Research 
Interpretivists claim research is essentially subjective.  From this perspective, a 
researcher exercises a great deal of power over the research conducted.  Qualitative 
researchers select what they believe to be appropriate research topics.  When they 
review literature, they select aspects they judge relevant to their purposes.  During 
data collection, they construct the questions accordingly, and they are likely to hear 
most clearly those statements from interviewees that dovetail with their research 
expectations and perhaps even personal preferences. 
During analysis of the data collected, qualitative researchers create meaning by 
finding the connections between the reality and the content of the data that help 
justify their interpretations (Babbie, 2007).  Much of this process may be 
unconscious.  In interpretive research, therefore, a considerable degree of power is 
exercised over the research, a process that was initiated at the outset of the research 
when the researcher started to create meaning by choosing the topic and 
conceptualising the research. 
In this research, an interpretive approach was adopted for seeking to understand the 
phenomenon of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Babbie (2007:270) writes that in 
qualitative research, an attempt is made to understand human behaviour from the 
perspective of the social actors themselves, which involves describing and 
understanding rather than explaining.  A qualitative approach to research permits 
exploration and description of the dynamics of a case study. 
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4.6 The Case Study Approach 
A case study is an intensive investigation of a single unit (Babbie & Mouton, 
2001:281).  According to Babbie (2007:298), in case studies, the focus of attention is 
on one or a few instances of some social phenomenon.  An in-depth study of a 
particular case can yield explanatory insight.  Case study research excels at eliciting 
an understanding of a complex issue and can extend experience or add strength to 
what is already known through previous research.  In case studies, the emphasis is 
on detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events and their relationships.    
Social scientists, in particular, have made frequent use of qualitative research 
methods, such as case studies, to examine contemporary real-life situations and to 
provide the basis for the application of ideas and extension of methods.  Yin 
(2003:23) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear, and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used to test the theory. 
Even though there are many traditional leadership conflicts across the world, it is not 
possible to study them all at once or to encompass all of them within one study.  
Moreover, it is unfeasible to undertake a generic study without reference to an 
exploration of the real-life experiences of the phenomenon (Denscombe, 1998:38).  
For this reason, this research focused on a particular case that allowed the 
exploration of a phenomenon occurring within a single context. 
The case study method has the advantage of using multiple sources of data and data 
collection methods or triangulation to achieve consistency and credibility.  
Triangulation helps to verify data as it is being collected.  Babbie & Mouton 
(2006:282) state that triangulation allows multiple sources of evidence to be brought 
to bear on the interests of the participants by employing methods such as 
interviewing, simple observation and document analysis. 
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4.6.1 Limitations of the Case Study 
Adopting a case study has its own limitations.  The limitation of a case study 
approach is that the resulting recommendations will be directly applicable to the case 
study context only.  Generalisations cannot be justified based on this methodology 
(Burke-Johnson, 1997:163).  Often, generalisations from case studies are treated 
with varying degrees of scepticism.  Case study researchers face the difficulty of 
convincing others that from a single case, one can arrive at a general view, as is the 
case in experimental research.  According to Yin (2003:10), a common concern with 
case studies is expressed in the question: “How can you generalise from a single 
case?”  However, Yin counters this with a similar question: “How can you generalise 
from a single experiment?”  Nevertheless, he agrees that scientific facts based on 
single experiments are rare. 
With Yin’s (2003) assertion in mind, the major limitation of the current case study was 
that the target group consisted of people who were not directly affected by the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  If the environment at Mthonjana Village were 
conducive to include community members and antagonists as part of the study, it 
would have generated more data that are valuable.  Because the directly affected 
groups could not be included in this study, generalisation of the findings is limited. 
For an inclusive research project, enough time, resources and experience of working 
in post-conflict zones would be required.  Time restrictions and the decision not to 
incorporate antagonists and community members in the field research were major 
limitations for the current study.  Nonetheless, the study could contribute to a wider 
body of research about similar cases, which might justify generalisation in the longer 
term.  
4.7 Sampling Strategy 
This study employed non-probability purposive sampling, which is used most often in 
an exploratory research.  Non-probability purposive sampling refers to any kind of 
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sampling where the selection of elements is not determined by the statistical principle 
of randomness (Terre Blanche, Durrheim & Painter, 2006:139). 
Flick (1998:41) states that for qualitative research, the way in which interviewees are 
selected for the study is determined by relevance rather than representativeness.  
Information-rich subjects, namely ad hoc committee members, were chosen to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict. 
4.7.1  The Sample 
In this study, insights about the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict were accessed from 
members of the ad hoc committee who worked together in attempting to mediate 
between the adversaries.  According to Babbie and Mouton (2008:166), it is 
acceptable to select a sample based on knowledge of the population towards which 
the research is directed.  Purposive sampling is used for exploratory research, in 
which case selection is undertaken with a specific purpose in mind.  Neuman 
(2006:222) adds that purposive sampling is appropriate to select unique cases that 
are especially informative.  The judgement of an expert is used in selecting cases for 
the sake of achieving a specific purpose. 
The selected interviewees in the study were part of the ad hoc committee mandated 
to mediate in the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Eight members of the ad hoc 
committee were interviewed in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  The interviewees included one 
official from the Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs, two 
members of the South African Police Service, two officials from the Department of 
Safety and Liaison, and three officials from Department of Social Development (one 
based in the local office and the other two based in the district office).  These people 
had the ability to articulate the dynamics of the case study from different angles, and 
further to contribute effectively to the research process.  A purposive sampling 
method was used to select interviewees.   
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4.8 Data Collection Methods  
Before the process of data collection via interviews began, the identified ad hoc 
committee members were contacted telephonically in order to obtain their permission 
to be included in this study.  Once permission was obtained, appointments for 
interviews were made. 
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews.  Questions were open-ended 
in order to provide a frame of reference without influencing responses, to build an 
atmosphere of mutual discovery, and to stay as close as possible to the interviewees’ 
experiences of the research phenomenon (De Vos, 1998: 297; Neuman, 2006:407). 
4.8.1 Documents Available for Public Use 
Documents are important sources of insights into the social meanings underpinning 
social action.  Documents can explain social meanings underlying social action and 
can show how people interpret the social worlds in which they live, as well as give 
evidence of how institutions and events are constructed (McNeill & Chapman, 
2005:156). 
Official documents (minutes, memorandums, articles and reports of the ad hoc 
meetings) were accepted when supplied.  Documents were an important source of 
information for helping to elicit meaning from social actions and events.  Documents 
were also used to triangulate data collected through interviews.  After verifying the 
documents’ authenticity and credibility, they were used to cross-check the history of 
events and describe the emergence of the phenomenon under study. 
4.8.2 Semi-Structured, Face-to-Face Interviews  
De Vos, Strydom, Fouché, and Delport (2007:287) state that interviewing is the 
predominant mode of data or information collection in qualitative research.  
Qualitative interviews are an attempt to understand the world from the interviewees’ 
points of view, to unfold the meaning of their experiences, and to uncover their lived 
world prior to providing scientific explanations. 
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During data collection, a semi-structured interview method was employed.  This 
method allowed the process to be guided while giving participants enough space to 
steer the interview in a particular direction (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999).  The 
purpose of the qualitative research interview has been depicted as the description 
and interpretation of themes in interviewees’ lived worlds (Kvale, 1996).  This type of 
interview encourages interaction between researcher and interviewees in an attempt 
to understand individual experiences and the way interviewees make sense of what 
is happening.  At the most basic level, qualitative interviews are conversations 
(Kvale, 1996). 
A digital voice recorder was used to record each interview and written notes were 
taken to ensure the accurate capture of data.  The research process was explained 
and permission sought to use the digital voice recorder to collect data.  The primary 
method of creating text from interviews is to tape-record the sessions and to 
transcribe them (Seidman, 1998).  Data recorded was transcribed verbatim for the 
purposes of close analysis, as suggested by De Vos, Strydom, Fouché, and Delport 
(2007:298). 
Before the start of the interview, interviewees were asked to sign a consent form, 
namely the NMMU REC-H Informed Consent Form (see Appendix C) after the 
purpose of the study and the rights of the interviewees had been explained to them. 
Interviewees were asked the following open-ended questions:  
• When (which year) were you made aware of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict? 
• How did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict develop? 
• Which factors made the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict worse? 
• Before the death of the heir (in 2001), were there signs of disagreement over 
the chieftaincy position? 
• Which conflict incidents were reported after the death of female chief? 
• What role did the government play? 
• How has the conflict been resolved? 
 85 
• What would you recommend as a conflict management and peacebuilding or 
reconciliation method for Mthonjana Village? 
• When did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict come to the attention of those in 
authority, and what was their approach towards managing the conflict? 
• Were conflict practitioners part of the ad hoc committee? 
4.9 Data Analysis  
Qualitative data analysis is defined by Bogdan and Biklen (1992:145) as working with 
data, organising data, breaking data into manageable units, synthesising data, 
searching for patterns in the data, discovering what is important and what is to be 
learned from the data, and deciding what one is going to tell others.  Furthermore, 
qualitative analysis is a process used to expand understanding of multifaceted social 
and human factors in ways that cannot be understood through employing quantitative 
data analysis method (Kerlin, 1999). 
4.9.1 Categorisation and Coding 
Neuman (2006:460) argues, “Concept formation is an integral part of data analysis 
and begins during data collection” in qualitative research.  Neuman adds that, in case 
study analysis, “cases are not given pre-established empirical units or theoretical 
categories apart from data; they are defined by data and theory”.  This approach is 
important in data analysis, especially for covering extensive and multiple sources of 
information.  By means of conceptualising and organising the data from the onset of 
the data collection, themes and concepts are identified and categories created to 
compound the themes.  Thematic categories are defined and relationships analysed 
between the themes.  Thereafter, concepts and themes are converted into theoretical 
statements. 
A qualitative data coding system was employed to condense and reduce the large 
amount of raw data to a more manageable data set and then to analytical categories 
(Neuman, 2006:460).  An open coding technique was used to identify interspersed 
thematic categories in order to link both complementary concepts and theories 
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together and to identify contrasting features in the data (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:499; 
Neuman, 2006:462).  After several reviews of the categorised codes, through a 
second, axial coding technique, the codes were organised and linked in order to 
discover key analytical categories (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:500). 
In order to discover regularities in the data, a third stage of coding, selective coding, 
was carried out in order to identify data that supported the conceptual coding 
categories already developed (Neuman, 2006:464).  This step in the process of data 
analysis sought to identify major or key connecting theories and to establish the final 
analysed categories (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:501).  The “constant comparison 
method” of Ryan and Bernard (2000:783) was employed to build the analysed 
categories into theoretical models.  In recognition of possible interpretative errors, 
similar research conducted was accessed in order to augment the reliability and 
validity of the interpretations reached, as suggested by Boulton and Hammershey 
(2006:257). 
4.10 Research Objectivity, Validity and Integrity  
Qualitative research is interested in giving a fair, honest and balanced account of 
social life from the view of those who live it every day (Babbie & Mouton, 2008:122).  
Conducting research using civil servants who attempted to mediate in the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict ensured the collection of reliable data about the dynamics of the 
case study.  Reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied 
repeatedly to the same subject of study, yields the same results each time (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2008:119).  An effort was made to ask relevant and clear questions about 
topics with which interviewees were familiar.  In qualitative research, reliability means 
dependability or consistency (Neuman, 2006:196). 
To preserve anonymity, protection of the identity of interviewees was ensured at all 
times.  Babbie and Mouton (2008:523) argue that ensuring anonymity in cases 
where it is requested must be regarded as a minimum measurement of both validity 
and reliability.  Neuman (2006:136) states that anonymity is the ethical protection that 
interviewees will remain nameless and that their identities will be protected from 
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disclosure.  Assuring interviewees they would not be identified in any way was a 
means for obtaining honest and truthful responses. 
4.11 Triangulation 
Keeping documents and notes collected during the research process and employing 
triangulation when verifying for consistency supported the reliability of the study.  
Triangulation refers to the use of a variety of methods and techniques of data 
collection in a single study (Neuman, 2006:149).  Triangulation, reliability and 
objectivity were used in an attempt to balance out the shortcomings emanating from 
using two methods of data collection, namely interviews and document analysis.  
Findings were the product of analysing and combining the data collected from 
interviews and documents. 
Triangulation implies that it is better to look at a phenomenon from several angles 
than to look at it from only one perspective (Neuman, 2006:146).  Qualitative 
researchers are encouraged to articulate their findings in such a manner that the 
logical process by which the findings were developed is accessible to a critical 
reader.  The relationship between the actual research and the conclusions is made 
explicit and the claims made are thereby rendered credible and believable (Thorne, 
2000).  
4.12 Limitations of the Study 
The intention of the study was not to analyse what contributed to the outbreak of 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict, to establish who spearheaded the conflict, or to 
identify what the interests of those who started the conflict were.  Rather, the aim of 
the study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict.  Because of the sensitivity of the case study, the antagonists and community 
members were not included as interviewees in the study.  In addition, at the time of 
data collection a court case about the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict was still before 
a High Court Judge.  Inviting Mthonjana community members to participate in the 
research might have resulted in unintended legal consequences. 
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The target group of the study were ad hoc committee members who were 
mandated to mediate in the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Of the targeted 10 
interviewees, two withdrew from the study due to unforeseen circumstances.  In 
qualitative research, the sample size is usually small, which affects the possibility 
for generalising the results.  Moreover, as pointed out by Creswell (2008:248), it 
is difficult to aggregate data and make systematic comparisons. 
4.13 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical behaviour is important in research, as is true of any other field of human 
activity.  Certain ethical considerations associated with matters such as plagiarism 
and honesty in the reporting of results arise in all research, but additional issues arise 
when the research involves human subjects in both the biological and social 
sciences.  According to Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:181), the principles 
underlying “research ethics” are universal and concern issues such as honesty and 
respect for the rights of individuals.  Ethical considerations come into play at three 
stages of a research project, namely when interviewees are recruited, during the 
interviews and the measurement procedure to which interviewees are subjected, and 
in the release of the results obtained. 
In order to comply with the above principles, the following tasks were addressed: 
• Interviewees gave their informed consent to participate in the study. 
• Interviewees were not deceived in any way.  The research is freely and 
openly available for perusal by interviewees. 
• Interviewees were allowed to withdraw from the study at any time without 
prejudice or sanction. 
• Respect for interviewees’ rights to confidentiality, anonymity and privacy were 
preserved throughout. 
• The risks to interviewees were minimal. 
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4.14 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research methodology used to describe the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in Mthonjana village of Mqanduli, in the Eastern Cape 
was outlined and the appropriate research design used to give credibility to the entire 
research process, based on the aim and objectives of the study, was described.  The 
motivation for the qualitative research framework was explained.  A detailed account 
of the philosophical and methodological paradigms was rendered as a justification for 
the research process as a scientific inquiry. 
An attempt was made to justify the choice of qualitative research, and more 
specifically, the case study method, and the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with and encountered in the process were provided.  The limitations and 
advantages of a case study were considered and important issues of validity and 
reliability were covered.  The importance of ethics in social science research was 
clarified and ethical concerns pertaining to the research discussed to allay any 
scepticism because the research topic involved vulnerable and sensitive issues.  In 
the following chapter, the findings of the research are discussed, using the literature 
review and various other sources of data that served to triangulate the themes 
discovered in the course of the data analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research design and methodology for the study were 
discussed in detail.  In this chapter, the focus is on presenting the data analysis and 
discussion of the findings. The findings of this study are discussed by focusing on the 
aim of the study, which was to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict in Mthonjana village in Mqanduli.  In this chapter, the researcher 
interprets and analyses the data using the thematic analysis that is commonly known 
as the systematic and interpretative analysis of data. 
This chapter is discussed around conflict processes theory, which has seven themes:  
• latent conflict;  
• conflict emergence;  
• conflict escalation;  
• conflict stalemate;  
• conflict de-escalation;  
• conflict resolution; and  
• conflict management and peacebuilding. 
The last two themes, namely conflict resolution and conflict management and 
peacebuilding, are conflict intervention strategies.  These themes have been derived 
from the literature that was reviewed in Chapter Two as well as the documents that 
explained the conflict dynamics as it was the basis for this study.  From the data that 
was collected sub-themes emerged. The analysis of the interconnection between 
themes and sub-themes was quite significantly presented based on the primary 
information sourced from the interviewees. 
5.2 Data Analysis 
In this section, the findings of the study are presented using thematic analysis, and it 
is interpreted and discussed with reference to the interconnection of the findings with 
conflict processes theory.  The themes, sub-themes and analytic categories are 
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tabulated below and precede discussion (see Table 5.1).  Throughout the discussion, 
verbatim quotes from the interviewees are used to support discussion of the findings. 
Table 5.1: Thematic Data Analysis Table 
THEME SUB-THEME ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES 
LATENT CONFLICT 
• Chieftaincy position 
 
• Death of the heir 
• Heir dies 
• Two candidates for the AmaTshezi clan 
       emerge 
• Power and control of resources 
CONFLICT 
EMERGENCE 
• Appointment of widow 
as regent 
 
 
• Community polarisation 
• Authorities support female regent 
• Female regent and supporters threatened and 
attacked  
CONFLICT 
ESCALATION 
• Contentious issues 
proliferate  
 
• Dispute over the legitimacy of the “new” heir  
• Relatives attacked and killed each other 
• Houses burnt 
• People displaced 
• Involvement of third parties 
CONFLICT 
STALEMATE 
• Catastrophe occurred 
 
• Female regent killed 
• Regent’s supporters killed and homes burnt  
• Many cases of violence reported 
• Police arrested many suspects  
CONFLICT DE-
ESCALATION 
• Ad hoc committee 
intervention  
• Community meetings 
• Victim support measures 
CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION 
• Unresolved conflict  
 
• Current female regent (sister of the “new heir” and 
eldest daughter to the deceased female regent) not 
recognised 
• No formal agreement regarding the community 
resources  
• Conflict became latent 
CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
AND  
PEACEBUILDING 
• Advocacy  
• Cultural interventions 
 Traditional leadership 
interventions 
• Conflict practitioners’ 
interventions 
 
• Government 
interventions 
• Community sensitisation and awareness  
• Gender equality and succession issues  
• Changing of community perceptions and attitudes 
• Ritual performance 
• Cultural activities 
• Awareness of traditional leadership regulations 
• Community reconciliation 
• Problem-solving workshops and facilitation 
• Development of conflict management system 
• Community rebuilding  
• Community development programmes 
• Counselling the victims  
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5.2.1  Discussion of Themes and Sub-Themes 
5.2.1.1  Latent Conflict 
The circumstances fuelling the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict included a variety of 
issues.  Conflict emerges whenever individuals, groups, organisations, or nations 
have differences and contradict each other.  The contradictions may be influenced by 
perceived differences in socio-economic equalities, ethnicity, the absence of 
opportunities for political participation, religious inclinations, fragile government 
structures and civic structures, and political ideologies as well as competition over 
scarce resources (Anstey, 1991; Burton, 1990).  However, these differences are 
often not great enough to cause one side to act to alter the situation.  There are 
various sources of conflict.  These include the need for control (power), scarce 
resources, different interests and values, which all have the potential to ignite conflict, 
especially when a triggering event occurs. 
a) Chieftaincy position 
The circumstances contributing to the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict emerged from 
the responses of interviewees.  When interviewees were asked how the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict developed, they expressed the following views, suggesting the 
triggering event was the death of the heir and differences of opinion about who 
should take over as regent as well as objection to a female regent: 
After the death of the heir, a family member (uncle) who was working 
at Lusikisiki was asked to leave his job and come back home and be 
the chief of the clan.  At that time, the widow of the heir was still 
mourning.  At the end of the mourning period, the widow made herself 
available to take over as a regent.  The uncle, with the support of other 
family members, refused to relinquish the position.  However, other 
family members went ahead and appointed the widow as a regent, but 
those who supported the uncle insisted that he would remain their 
chief.  The uncle’s group was also disputing the legitimacy of the 
widow’s son.  They claimed that he was not of their clan because when 
he was conceived, the widow and the late heir were separated.  When 
the second group realised that the widow was supported by authorities 
and by the king, who proposed that DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) tests 
should be conducted to prove the claim, the opposing group rejected 
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the idea.  Then they started attacking the female regent and her 
supporters, mostly those attacks were happening at night.  
(Interviewee 5) 
[I]t was developed on the fact that the AmaTshezi clan did not want to 
be led by a female regent.  Also, there was a group that appointed their 
own chief because they refused to be led by a female regent.  The 
group was also disputing the legitimacy of the heir to the deceased.  
(Interviewee 1) 
It started in 2002, a year after the death of the heir.  A group of family 
members rejected the female regent and the uncle, who had no right to 
occupy the chieftaincy position, availed himself to the position … the 
majority of people preferred him.  (Interviewee 2) 
All was well until the death of the heir.  When a regent was supposed 
to be appointed on behalf of the young heir, another group of the 
AmaTshezi clan proposed another candidate instead of the widow.  
The group that opposed being led by a female elected the uncle as 
chief and threatened those who opposed [or] rejected him.  When they 
saw that they were not supported by higher traditional leadership 
structures, they started attacking and burning households of those who 
supported the widow.  (Interviewee 3) 
After the death of the heir who was to be appointed the chief, the family 
had different candidates for the chieftaincy position.  The [one] group 
wanted the widow to be appointed as the regent, whereas the other 
group wanted an uncle to take over as the chief because they [were] 
not in favour of the idea of being led by a female regent.  (Interviewee 
4) 
When the heir died, some members of the family appointed one of 
them as the chief without consulting the main household.  At the time, 
the widow was still mourning.  When the mourning period was over, 
the widow availed herself to take over as the regent, but the uncle 
refused to leave the position.  The uncle, some family members and 
the community claimed that they cannot be led by a woman, and they 
were also questioning the legitimacy of her son.  The whole community 
was then divided into over the matter.  (Interviewee 6) 
It was as a result of the appointment of the female regent.  Certain 
quarters of the family refused to be led by a woman, and they had their 
own preferred candidate.  When it was put to them that the law 
provides that females can be appointed as regents, they disputed that.  
Those in authority went ahead and appointed the widow as a regent.  
(Interviewee 7) 
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It started after the death of the heir.  There were disagreements about 
who should take over as the regent.  The family had different 
candidates that they felt should take the position.  Some wanted the 
widow to be the regent, whereas others wanted the uncle because 
they said they cannot be led by a female.  (Interviewee 8) 
b) The death of the heir 
It is important to remember that in Mthonjana village, a chief died due to natural 
causes and a regent (cousin to the chief) held the reigns until the heir to the chief 
came of age.  However, the heir died before he inherited the throne, and then a 
female regent (widow to the heir) was appointed to the throne but was murdered by 
opposing family and community members. 
While all interviewees emphasised that the death of the chief and the appointment of 
a female regent were the cause of the conflict, none mentioned the death of the heir 
to the throne prior to the appointment of the female regent as directly linked to the 
violent AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict when asked about the state of affairs prior to 
heir’s death.  The period between the heir’s death in 2001 and the establishment of 
the ad hoc committee in 2007 was long, but nonetheless, the circumstances in 
existence before the heir died were probed.  The point was to try to find out more 
about the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict. 
It is necessary to mention that people in conflict always have a biased or incomplete 
perception of the true nature of the conflict.  They become too immersed in the 
conflict and a cluster of emotions accompanies their subjective experience.  The 
researcher had to ensure that interviewees remain impartial when they responded to 
questions by utilising follow-up questions.  Based on the responses from 
interviewees, it appeared that the death of the heir was related to the conflict. 
[Yes] there were signs even before the heir died.  The son of the senior 
chief wanted the chieftaincy position to be occupied by someone 
whom he could manipulate.  When it was clear that the heir was 
coming back to take over the position, suddenly he was killed before 
he came back home.  Thereafter the uncle (brother to senior chief) 
whose son who wanted the position was appointed as the chief whilst 
the widow was still mourning.  (Interviewee 1) 
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There were signs.  The regent who was at the helm was reluctant to 
hand over the reins to the heir upon his arrival.  The then regent 
claimed that he left his permanent job in Lusikisiki for that position, and 
the chieftaincy position was his only source of income.  However, 
unfortunately, he [uncle, the then regent] passed away because he 
was sick.  (Interviewee 3) 
Yes, there were signs of disagreement because one of the key 
persons who wanted that position was the son of the uncle.  He 
wanted that position although he did not qualify for it.  Then he pushed 
that his father be appointed as a chief so that after him, he can take 
over as the chief.  That happened when some elders were advising the 
heir to come back home because the then regent was sick.  
(Interviewee 7)   
Interviewee 4 claimed not to know the circumstances because “It was only after the 
death of the heir and the appointment of two chiefs that the disagreement was 
obvious.”  Interviewee 6 pointed only to the possibility of disagreements by 
suggesting, “It is possible that the reason why the heir was killed was related to the 
control of resources because some business initiatives were brought into the village 
before his death.” 
5.2.2 Conflict Emergence 
5.2.2.1  Female Regent 
According to Kriesberg (2007:53), the potential for conflict exists whenever people 
have different needs, values or interests.  Conflict may not become apparent until a 
triggering event leads to the emergence of obvious conflict.  The AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict did not become violent immediately.  It developed gradually and 
was triggered when two chiefs competed for leadership of the AmaTshezi.  The 
conflict remained latent for a long time, and when the matter of who should be the 
chief of the village was not addressed and agreed upon, the conflict became manifest 
and erupted in violence. 
The appointment of the heir’s widow in 2004 as regent when certain members of the 
family elected another uncle chief triggered the conflict.  The AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict started as a low-level conflict, but it was left to ripen.  This was demonstrated 
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by the responses of interviewees when they were asked when (the year) they 
became aware of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Their responses were as 
follows: 
I became aware of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in May 2007, 
when a number of criminal incidences (attempted murder, murder, and 
arson cases) were report through the media and by the police.  After 
being involved, I realised that the appointment of the female regent 
triggered the conflict.  (Interviewee 1) 
Interviewee 2 stated, “I became aware of it in 2003 when the community was in the 
process of appointing a regent.  But I was not involved then … it was in 2007 that I 
became involved”, while Interviewee 3 stated as follows: 
It was in 2003 when threats that were subjected to certain members of 
the AmaTshezi clan who supported the appointment of the female 
regent were reported to the police.  Whilst investigating the reported 
incidences, the police realised that the opposing group was employing 
violent tactics to express rejection of the female regent.  The police 
found that the sporadic incidents were related to the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  Then a number of arson, attempted murder and 
murder cases were reported and were also associated with that 
conflict. 
We were informed sometime in 2007 that members of the AmaTshezi 
clan were rejecting the female regent.  At that time, the conflict had 
become manifest and that is when I started to attend the ad hoc 
committee meetings.  (Interviewee 4) 
Interviewee 5 claimed, “I became aware of it towards the end of 2006.  The 
appointment of the female regent triggered the conflict”, while Interviewee 6 said, “It 
was brought to the attention of my department in 2007; I am not sure about other 
departments”.  Interviewee 7 replied: 
It was immediately after the death of the heir.  It was in 2002, when the 
Department of Local Governance and Traditional Affairs was in the 
process of appointing his widow as the regent.  The department was 
served with court paper from the High Court of Mthatha opposing her 
appointment. 
Finally, Interviewee 8 said, “I think it was in July 2007 when it came to our attention”. 
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5.2.3 Conflict Escalation 
When adversaries engage in coercive strategies, they generate a spiral of tit-for-tat 
retaliation.  Each party increases the amount of tit-for-tat punishment with each action 
and reaction, with both parties paying higher and higher prices for a continuing 
standoff (Oberschall, 2007:33).  A spiral of tit-for-tat retaliation explains why 
adversaries, all of whom were members of the AmaTshezi clan in the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict, found themselves trapped in conflict escalation.  It appears many 
contributing factors led to the opposing group wanting to win the battle at all costs.  
The irony of being trapped in a conflict is that the greater the cost and sacrifice 
expended in the conflict, the more valuable winning becomes and the less likely 
parties are to change their courses of action as issues proliferate.  The opposing 
group appeared to have employed zero-sum strategy in this violent conflict.  
5.2.3.1  Contentious Issues Proliferated  
Like any conflict, the chieftaincy conflict escalated as the opposing group employed 
heavier and heavier tactics against the actions of the other group.  The uncle’s group 
employed heavy tactics by becoming violent against the group supporting the widow.  
The whole family was polarised as contentious issues expanded and the conflict 
escalated.  Interviewees’ general perceptions about the factors making the conflict 
worse were as follows: 
The fact that relatives were attacking and killing each other at night 
made it worse and difficult to manage the conflict.  Night attacks made 
it difficult to identify the culprits.  People were displaced … those that 
stayed behind were sleeping in nearby bushes as they were running 
for their lives.  That area has tourist attraction sites like Hole-in-the-
Wall, potential business sites and a lot of people have an interest to 
own pieces of land.  The existence of a community trust fund, which 
had money donated by government, further made things worse, and 
the opposing group wanted to have control over it, being motivated by 
self-enrichment; the two hotels that the community were shareholders 
of were benefiting few individuals, not the whole community.  Hotel 
owners wanted the uncle to be part of their board and sidelined all 
those [who] were capable of understanding how the business 
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operates, including the female regent.  We found out that the local 
ward councillor also supported this idea.  (Interviewee 1) 
The division within one family made it difficult for us to manage the 
conflict when the opposing group defied their king (king of the 
AbaThembu tribe), who suggested that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
tests should be conducted between those who disputed the legitimacy 
of the widow’s son.  This emanated from rumours that the heir and the 
regent were once separated, hence the claim that the “new” heir was 
not of the AmaTshezi clan.  (Interviewee 2) 
When perpetrators were arrested, they were released on bail, and 
when they were out, they continued perpetuating the violence.  Those 
who were outside were bailing out those arrested.  Perpetrators were 
not denied bail.  Also, the violence was left alone for too long before 
intervention was initiated.  People with business interests were 
requesting permission to open businesses in the areas from the 
opposing group.  The opposing group was continuing selling pieces of 
land to business people.  And lastly, the opposing family members 
refused to do DNA tests but continued to label the young boy as an 
illegitimate child.  (Interviewee 3) 
The family members and the community were manipulated.  Some 
community members were not open enough about the situations when 
they asked about it.  When they were asked about what the 
contributing factors [were], they claimed that they knew nothing.  To us 
it appeared as if they were withholding information because of fear of 
being attacked.  When the ad hoc committee convened community 
meetings to advocate against domestic violence, child abuse and for 
gender equality, the community members were not attending those 
meetings.  No one wanted to be associated with us.  It was difficult to 
gain access to community members.  (Interviewee 4) 
It was the fact that the young boy was not ready to take the position, 
and therefore, the traditional leadership regulations had a provision 
that a female regent can be appointed.  When authorities supported 
the appointment of the female regent, the opposing group became 
angry.  On the other hand, the uncle was not willing to vacate the 
position as he was supported by some elders of the family and the 
community.  So the female regent was supported by the authorities, 
but the support was not enough within the family.  Lastly, the House of 
Traditional leaders should not have allowed the uncle to be appointed 
as the chief.  (Interviewee 5) 
It was because there were allegations that faceless community 
members who were based in Rustenburg and the business people 
who wanted to open businesses were financing the opposing group.  
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When it was clear that money was involved, we knew that it was going 
to be difficult to manage the conflict.  For example, a R20 000 deposit 
in Rustenburg into the account of a certain community member was 
intercepted by the police.  On the other hand, the widow had a vision to 
develop the community, whereas the uncle had no clue, but his son, 
whom we suspect was eying the chieftaincy position, was at the 
forefront of those who did not want the widow to lead them.  Another 
thing there were business projects initiated without the involvement of 
the community and it was not going to benefit them, so the widow 
stopped them.  In general, besides the chieftaincy position issue, there 
were silent contributing factors.  The fact that money was involved, 
there was no way we could have resolved the conflict.  (Interviewee 6) 
Government took long to appoint the widow as a regent and should not 
have allowed the uncle to be appointed as the chief instead of the 
widow.  The department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs 
consulted the king and the House of Traditional Leaders, and both 
supported the appointment of the widow as the regent, but the process 
was delayed unnecessarily.  (Interviewee 7) 
The fact that people who were killing and burning houses were 
operating at night made it complicated.  It was not easy to identify 
culprits.  Close to 121 members of the AmaTshezi clan were victims of 
that conflict.  Some were left homeless; others lost their children and 
parents.  Overall, dealing with family members made the conflict worse 
because during the day all was well, but at night, it was a different 
story.  (Interviewee 8) 
5.2.4  Conflict Stalemate 
In describing the reaction after a tragedy between adversaries, Zartman (2008:232) 
discusses how, when parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they 
cannot escalate to victory and the deadlock is painful to both, the parties tend to seek 
a way out.  A recent or impending catastrophe can provide a deadline, or sharply 
increased pain may force the parties to take a step back and think.  The parties being 
forced to take a step back and think arose as a sub-theme (catastrophe) in the 
process towards de-escalation of the conflict that affected AmaTshezi clan. 
5.2.4.1  Catastrophe: The Killing of the Female Regent 
The general feeling arising from the interviewees was that, after the death of the 
female regent, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict de-escalated and discontinued.  
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The interviewees expressed the following sentiments when they were asked about 
conflict incidences reported after the death of the female regent: 
[There were none] to my knowledge, but there were tensions 
among community members in the village.  It emerged that 
relatives who were based in Rustenburg sponsored the violence.  
These relatives provided the arrested suspects with money to hire a 
lawyer.  (Interviewee 1) 
Interviewee 2 commented, “Only two cases [were reported], one of arson and a close 
associate of the late female regent was murdered.”  In turn, Interviewee 3 noted, 
“Yes, two or three cases were reported, and the victims were those that supported 
the female regent, but other than that, it was quiet.”  Interviewee 3 noted, “There 
were two cases [reported].  Two households that were in favour of the killed female 
regent were attacked”, and Interviewee 5 said, “There were few cases reported.  But 
I do not remember the details.”  Interviewee 6 replied, “Not to my knowledge; all the 
people who were at the forefront were arrested”, but Interviewee 7 admitted, “Yes, 
there were cases [reported].  As a result, even the heir to the deceased female 
regent was not present during his mother’s funeral proceeding for fear of his life.”  
Interviewee 8 disagreed, suggesting, “No.  After her death and intervention of 
government everything was back to normal.”   
Anstey (2006:50) and Pruitt and Rubin (1986) emphasise that once conflicts have 
escalated for a while, they often reach a stalemate, or a situation in which neither 
side can win but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either.  Stalemates 
emerge for a number of reasons: the failure of contentious tactics, the exhaustion of 
necessary resources, the loss of social support, and unacceptable costs.  
Nevertheless, after the conflict reaches stalemate, the next stage is de-escalation 
and then resolution.  Literature shows that it is during the de-escalation stage that a 
conflict can be resolved through interventions by third parties.  However, there was 
some disagreement among interviewees about whether the “conflict “was over or not. 
It appears that after the death of the female regent, the manifestation of the conflict 
was no longer visible but as with all deep-rooted conflicts with a history which involve 
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human needs, they recycle and become latent again.  The death of the female regent 
may be taken as an indication that the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict was at a 
stalemate.  After that catastrophe, the conflict became latent again and it may re-
emerge in another form. Pruitt and Kim (2004:175) assert that parties in conflict often 
do not recognise when they have reached a stalemate.  In such circumstances, 
some sort of shock may be needed to bring them to their senses.  Such shock leads 
parties to carefully examine what is actually happening.  It is at this stage that 
conflicts de-escalate and, if the contributing factors are not addressed, the conflict 
become latent again. 
5.2.5 Conflict De-Escalation 
The intervention by the ad hoc committee had a minimal impact; it merely 
discouraged the perpetuation of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Bartos and Wehr 
(2002:113) argue that after a conflict has been in equilibrium for a long time, it tends 
to de-escalate.  Conflict de-escalation is a process whereby coerciveness between 
parties becomes lower, hostility decreases and the tendency to retaliate becomes 
smaller. 
5.2.5.1 Ad Hoc Committee intervention  
It is at the stage of de-escalation of a conflict that it is easy for third parties to 
intervene and initiate resolution.  Based on the findings, it was at this stage that the 
ad hoc committee, as government representatives, tried to convince parties to end 
the conflict.  However, it did not have much success because members of the 
opposing group members were not known.  They only operated in the evening, 
therefore they were not easy to identify.  The ad hoc committee demonstrated little 
capacity to mediate in the conflict.  This is based on the interviewees’ responses 
when asked about the role played by the government during the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict:  
Intervention by the ad hoc committee played a huge role to a 
certain extent … South African Police Services patrolled the area 
for almost a year.  People were provided with food parcels and 
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tents for shelter.  Government did not put in place proper systems 
to manage the community trust fund.  However, all these were 
short-term interventions.  The mistake that was done by 
government was to concentrate on addressing the chieftaincy 
conflict and not deal with other contributing factors.  (Interviewee 1) 
The ad hoc committee tried to address the conflict by convening 
community meetings where people were addressed about the 
disadvantages of conflict.  But community members did not 
participate fully.  Police were permanently deployed to patrol the 
area.  The establishment of the ad hoc committee also helped 
victims of that conflict.  (Interviewee 2) 
Police patrolled the area for a long time … the Department of Social 
Development assisted victims of violence by providing them with 
food parcels; the local municipality gave people that lost their 
homes tents.  Community meetings were held, and the negative 
impact of violence was explained to the community but they were 
not freely participating.  (Interviewee 3) 
Government tried to manage the conflict, but the capacity was not 
enough because there were no conflict practitioners involved.  We 
only emphasised the value of family preservation and of a human 
being to those that we managed to speak to.  However, it was not 
enough because no one came up front and said he or she is behind 
what was happening.  Government provided assistance in different 
ways, like providing counselling, food parcels, shelter and a place 
of safety for the children who had lost parents.  (Interviewee 4) 
Social workers offered counselling and trauma debriefing to all 
victims.  Community basic-needs assessments were conducted 
and as such, affected people were provided with food parcels, 
tents, blankets and clothes, and psychologists were made available 
to the people.  Police investigated the reported cases and suspects 
were arrested and sentenced.  The local municipality promised to 
build houses for all the victims.  (Interviewee 5) 
We tried to identify members of the opposing groups but it was not 
easy because they only operated at night.  After the eldest 
daughter of the late female regent was appointed a regent, 
government provided the victims with food, clothes and blankets, 
and I think shelter was also made available.  Different government 
departments came together and assisted the community members 
with their social needs but the dynamics of the conflict were never 
addressed.  (Interviewee 6) 
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Government took an active and a very positive role in trying to 
resolve the conflict, but conflict practitioners were not involved.  
Relevant departments were brought together by the provincial 
government and the committee was established and given a 
mandate to mediate in the conflict.  However, I regret that 
government did not protect the female regent or took her away from 
that community until the matter was resolved.  (Interviewee 7) 
We, as government officials from the social needs cluster, 
convened community meetings, but the attendance was poor.  So, 
it was difficult to gain access to community members.  An event, 16 
Days of Activism on No Violence against Women and Children, was 
hosted in that community, which was meant to bring awareness of 
how dangerous the violence was in the community.  But I do not 
think we were effective.  (Interviewee 8) 
Even though there was an ad hoc committee mandated to mediate in Mthonjana, the 
above responses indicate insufficient capacity among the ad hoc committee 
members to deal with the conflict.  Government relied on arrests made by police.  
Conflict scholars (Kriesberg, 1973:167; Vledder, 1997:110) argue that de-escalation 
may be influenced by coercion, which can lead to de-escalation in two ways.  First, if 
coercion is sufficient to prevent the one side from continuing with conflict physically, 
the party loses its capacity to continue its conflict behaviour at the same level and 
must allow the conflict to de-escalate.  Second, one side may lose its will to persist in 
the conflict because it doubts its abilities and questions the desirability of continuing. 
5.2.6 Conflict Resolution 
5.2.6.1 Unresolved Conflict 
The concept of conflict resolution has been discussed in detail in Chapter Two, and it 
has been clearly stated that, in order for a conflict to be resolved, both parties should 
own the agreement.  Bradshaw (2008:74) writes that the term conflict resolution is 
frequently used to cover a broad range of conflict management strategies.  Conflict 
resolution implies a termination of conflict, through solving of the fundamental 
problems that have given rise to it.  Conflict resolution denotes the addressing of 
human needs frustrations underlying a deep-rooted social conflict.  The implication is 
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that this is a long-term solution to conflict.  Coser (1967:40–42) holds that social 
conflicts follow a law of social inertia insofar as they continue to operate if no explicit 
provision for stopping their course is made by adversaries.  In social conflict, 
contenders must make explicit provision for its termination.  If no mutual agreements 
are made, at some time during the struggle, conflict ceases on the death or total 
destruction of at least one of the antagonists. 
Besides the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict was never resolved.  There was no agreement reached by neither 
antagonists nor a resolution for a settlement facilitated by the ad hoc committee.  
Under normal circumstances, in order for a conflict to be resolved, parties to it should 
have an agreement that addresses the contentious issues.  The responses of the 
interviewees show a worrying factor.  When asked if the conflict has been resolved, 
the following was said: 
Well, on the surface, it has settled.  But the conflict in Mthonjana is 
not settled.  If you do not provide proper counselling for people, one 
day the young people who lost their parents will want to revenge for 
what happened.  Then the conflict will re-emerge.  Land ownership 
as the real cause of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict has not 
been addressed even today; how the hotel community shares 
should benefit the community has not been addressed; and what 
should be done with the trust funds that are not being utilised are 
some of the outstanding issues that a settlement should be reached 
around.  All the development that was planned was put on hold 
since the outbreak of conflict.  The unaddressed underlying factors 
can trigger the emergence of that conflict anytime.  (Interviewee 1) 
It has settled.  All those who were arrested but found not guilty 
would never participate in any violence of such nature.  They were 
lucky to escape jail terms.  But I cannot be sure that the conflict will 
never erupt.  (Interviewee 2) 
Based on the period since the last cases were reported, I am of the 
opinion that it has settled.  Community members who were 
opposing the appointment of the female regent claimed that they 
were not going to benefit in any way even if the regent was allowed 
to lead them.  But the people who were opposing the female regent 
do not attend community meetings convened by the current regent 
unless there are government services provided.  (Interviewee 3) 
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I do not think so because before the death of the female regent, we 
all thought it was settled.  Then we surprisingly heard that the 
[female] regent had been killed.  Also, after everything that 
happened, nothing has been done to address the matter or target 
the perpetrators with regard to the change of their mindset.  But 
currently, the community is under the leadership of another female 
regent (daughter to the deceased).  But I think there is a need for a 
post [-conflict] intervention on the Mthonjana case, just to make 
sure that it is addressed otherwise it will erupt again.  (Interviewee 
4) 
Interviewee 5 said, “I am not sure, but since the appointment of the current female 
regent nothing has been reported”, while Interviewee 6 claimed, “Even though it has 
been quiet since the death of the female regent, I cannot say it has settled.”  
Interviewee 7 indicated as follows: 
It is difficult to say so, but at this stage, we have no reason to 
believe that the conflict has not settled.  There are no signs of any 
conflict in that community.  But there is no guarantee that it will 
never re-emerge in future.   
Interviewee 8 said, “I think it has settled because since the death of the female 
regent, nothing has happened.  But we do not know what will happen in future.” 
Based on the above responses, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict has not been 
resolved, and this suggests no guarantee exists it will never re-emerge.  The 
responses clearly show that after the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict had reached the 
de-escalation phase it became latent again.  Like all deep-rooted conflicts, this 
conflict can manifest again anytime.  Above all, the underlying causes of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict were never addressed or resolved.  Supporters of the 
human needs approach are critical of the traditional approaches to managing conflict 
and the strategies they suggest for resolving conflict.  Traditional approaches tend to 
focus on the positions the parties have adopted, with these serving as the basis on 
which settlements are negotiated.  These settlements invariably do not reflect the 
true interests and fundamental needs of the parties, thus laying the seeds for future 
conflict. 
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On these grounds, basic human needs theorists distinguish between conflict 
settlement and conflict resolution.  Conflict settlement deals with specific disputes but 
does not address the underlying conflict because it deals with the symptoms of 
conflict, not the actual problem or underlying reason for the conflict.  Basic human 
needs theorists argue deep-rooted conflict requires resolution and prevention rather 
than settlement (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990). 
If the underlying grievances remain unresolved, the conflict may appear settled for 
the time being but they will re-emerge in future as grievances become significant 
again.  Thus, even at the supposed end of an intractable conflict, the path to 
resolution is not always smooth and linear, but may fall back into previous stages if 
conditions change (Anstey, 2006; Burton & Dukes, 1990). 
5.2.7 Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 
The personal dimension of conflict management and peacebuilding is focused on 
desired changes at the individual level.  If individuals are not able to undergo a 
process of healing, there will be broader social, political and economic repercussions.  
It is critical that the destructive effects of social conflict be minimised and its potential 
for personal growth maximised.  Reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts must 
prioritise rebuilding trust among adversaries and integrate these efforts into peace 
plans and rehabilitation efforts (Lederach, 1997:82).  The key to transforming and 
managing conflict is to build strong equitable relations where distrust and fear were 
once the norm.  When interviewees were asked to recommend methods of conflict 
management and peacebuilding for Mthonjana village, the following sub-themes 
were identified. 
5.2.7.1  Advocacy  
One of the key strategies for bringing awareness to people is advocacy.  The people 
of Mthonjana need to be educated by government about issues of equality, human 
rights and the importance of respecting each other regardless of gender.  According 
to the interviewees, it is important that people be made aware of the issues of gender 
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equality.  According to Interviewee 2, “People of that community are illiterate.  
Government should educate them about gender equality.  Awareness can make the 
community members reconcile.”  Interviewee 5 suggested the following: 
People should be made aware of gender equality rights [and] the 
regulations and processes of traditional leadership, but the main 
contributing factor was not addressed there.  That is [the] 
greediness of the opposing group to have access to the control the 
resources. 
5.2.7.2  Cultural Rituals 
When a tragedy happens, Africans perform certain rituals as a way of cleansing and 
repairing the breach.  Africans believe that the function of a ritual is to contain and 
repair associations either with those living or with the ancestors.  According to Mbiti 
(1991:11), traditional leaders have to see to it that practices, ceremonies and festivals 
are performed in a way that expresses their beliefs in practical terms.  Festivals are 
normally joyful occasions when people sing, dance, eat and celebrate a particular 
occasion or event, like when marking the harvest time, the start of the rainy season, 
the birth of a child, victory over enemies, etc.  Mbiti (1991:143) believes festivals 
bring people together, renewing community life, strengthening the people’s unity and 
cohesion, entertaining people and relieving people of tension.  Interviewee 7, who 
said the following, confirmed the importance of performing rituals: 
Because there was spilling of blood, according to the customary law, there are 
certain rituals that must be performed.  Therefore, a cleansing ceremony 
should be performed as it would enable AmaTshezi to start life on a clean 
slate.  Then stability and peace will be brought back in that family. 
A detailed account of responsibilities of traditional leaders in the pre-colonial era was 
discussed in Chapter Three. The issue of preserving customary rituals was explained 
and the response of interviewee 7 is in line with the literature reviewed. 
5.2.7.3  Traditional Leadership Intervention 
It is a general view in South Africa that traditional leaders themselves should solve 
problems affecting Institution of Traditional Leadership.  This view is based on the 
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belief that traditional leaders, as custodians of customary law, are better positioned 
than government officials to understand traditional leadership dynamics.  Because 
the Institution of Traditional Leadership is recognised by the Constitution of the 
country, institution receives support from government through the Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  One interviewee was of the view 
that the Department should provide guidance and build peace in Mthonjana village.   
The Department of Traditional Affairs should intervene and sort out 
the issue of traditional leadership.  I am of the opinion that the 
chieftaincy position was not the major cause of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  If it can be addressed then the contributing 
factors will be brought to the surface.  (Interviewee 1) 
5.2.7.4  Intervention by Conflict Practitioners 
Conflict resolution and management is a specialised field, so conflict practitioners are 
more suited than government officials to intervene in a conflict situation.  Burton 
(1990:2–3) states that conflict resolution is the transformation of relationships in a 
particular case by the solution of the problem that led to the conflicted behaviour in 
the first place but does not necessarily eliminate future problems in relationships.  
The result of conflict resolution is a motion or pledge reached by parties who 
struggled over values, scarce resources and power.  Conflict is resolved when rivals 
reach an agreement and the parties agree about most or all of the issues for which 
they fought.  Either party in a conflict can invite conflict practitioners’ participation or 
conflict practitioners can make themselves available to assist in resolving the conflict. 
When the ad hoc committee intervened in the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict, conflict 
practitioners were not part of that committee; as a result, the committee was unable 
to mediate in the conflict.  Interviewees proposed conflict management programmes 
be implemented in Mthonjana village.  Interviewee 3, for example, suggested, “The 
opposing parties should be brought together to resolve the violence.  A workshop 
should be part of the programme.  Victims and perpetrators should form committees 
that would represent them before the whole community is involved”, while 
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Interviewee 2 said, “Human rights workshops should be considered and be facilitated 
by specialists.”  Interviewee 4 claimed as follows: 
The community should be encouraged to talk about their feelings 
since the manifestation of conflict.  Government should roll out a 
post-conflict peacebuilding programme that seeks to address the 
contributing factors to that violence.  The chieftaincy position was 
not the real cause of that violence.  The impact of the conflict in that 
village should be assessed intensively. 
Interviewee 7 suggested, “The whole family should be brought together so that 
reconciliation can be achieved.” 
5.2.7.5  Government Intervention  
The importance of government intervention in implementing a conflict management 
and peacebuilding programme is captured in the views of the ad hoc committee 
members.  They consider government involvement as significant because there were 
many contributing factors to the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Some of these 
factors had to do with the control of community resources and the involvement of 
faceless parties.  Interviewees explained what should happen and why they believe 
government should intervene.  For example, Interviewee 1 suggested, “As a way of 
building peace, community development programmes should be implemented.” 
Interviewee 4 said:  
Government should roll out a conflict management programme that 
seeks to address the contributing factors to that violence.  The 
chieftaincy position was not the real cause of that violence.  Both 
parties should be brought together and encouraged to open up 
about what happened.  Before it emerged, there was an income-
generation project that the Department of Social Development had 
initiated in that village.  Since Mthonjana village is situated along 
the coast, there is a potential to develop the area, and government 
should develop a strategy on how small business can be 
structured. 
Interviewee 7 suggested, “As a neutral body, government should initiate a 
reconciliation programme for that community.  But government alone cannot 
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succeed; other neutral bodies should be brought in”, and continued, “The House of 
Traditional Leaders, the custodian of the customary law has a statutory responsibility 
in cases of this nature to advise government on how best this matter can be settled”.  
Finally, Interviewee 8 suggested the following: 
Even though we did intervene, the case of Mthonjana was left to 
settle on its own.  No follow-up strategies were developed, no 
report was consolidated, and there were no recommendations 
made by the ad hoc committee to the provincial government on 
how future, similar cases can be handled.  I would recommend that 
businesses that were initiated be revived for the benefit of the 
whole community.  Trauma debriefing should be provided to that 
community because that violence was traumatic even to us as 
government officials. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the findings of the study were discussed.  The major themes and sub-
themes were reported, analysed and discussed in detail.  The focus was on exploring 
the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict at Mthonjana village.  Seven major themes were 
discovered, all of which were congruent with conflict processes theory, which formed 
the basis of this study.  The themes pertained to latent conflict, conflict emergence, 
conflict escalation, conflict stalemate, and conflict de-escalation.  The last two 
themes, namely, conflict resolution and conflict management and peacebuilding, are 
conflict intervention strategies.  These conflict stages together present the 
multifaceted processes that conflicts can go through if they are not managed 
properly.  The stages further reveal how destructive conflict can become, if not dealt 
with effectively. 
The next chapter summarises the findings and recommends areas for the formulation 
and implementation of conflict management policy at community level.  The value of 
the study is explained, as are some of the ad hoc committee challenges and 
successes.  The limitations of the study and spiral of unmanaged conflict are 
discussed and recommendations are made about how community conflicts can be 
managed best, and further areas of research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter One served as a general introduction to the study.  In Chapter Two, the 
literature consulted during the research process was reviewed, and the focus was on 
conflict dynamics and the phases of conflict.  The conflict stages or phases reviewed 
were used to analyse the dynamics of the chosen case study.  In Chapter Three, the 
historical roots of the Institution of Traditional Leadership, its current legal debates 
and the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict as a case study were explored.  In Chapter 
Four, the research design and methodology, sample size, data collection and 
analysis, issues of validity and reliability, ethical considerations, and the limitations of 
the case study were discussed.  Chapter Five presented the research findings 
collected through semi-structured interviews with the ad hoc committee members 
selected and studying official documents (ad hoc committee minutes of proceedings, 
reports and memorandums, and newspaper articles); and highlighted the key 
findings that emerged from the data.  In this chapter, a summary of the research 
findings is presented along with recommendations on how to resolve the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  The significance of the findings and limitations of this research 
will be discussed. 
In 2003, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict broke out in a small village of Mthonjana 
in the Eastern Cape.  The conflict outbreak was ignited by the appointment of a 
female regent by the king of the AbaThembu to lead the AmaTshezi clan.  Several 
failed attempts to assassinate the female regent were made.  The AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict unfolded on its own without intervention on the part of government 
until May 2007, when an ad hoc committee was established by the Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government with the mandate to mediate in the conflict.  Despite the 
establishment of the ad hoc committee, the opposing group successfully managed to 
kill the female regent in September 2007.  Prior to the death of the female regent, 10 
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of her supporters were killed, including a 91-year-old women and a three-year-old 
boy.  In addition, 35 huts and three cars were burnt. 
The aim of this qualitative study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict because almost six years after the Mthonjana conflict 
began, hardly any comprehensive information about the process this traditional 
leadership conflict followed exists; moreover, it remains unclear what government 
plans to do, should similar cases occur.  This study was further influenced by the 
much-anticipated outcomes of the Nhlapho Commission, which was established to 
investigate the legitimacy of traditional leadership claims.  Who was behind the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict and the motives remain unclear, so the focus of the 
case study was on the unfolding of the conflict process. 
The objectives of the study were as follows: 
• to analyse dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict from 2002 to 2007; 
• to explore and describe the impact the AmaTshezi conflict had on the chieftaincy 
position; 
• to discover if any incidences of conflict in Mthonjana village were reported prior 
the outbreak of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in 2002;  
• to ascertain when the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict drew the attention of those 
in authority and what their approach towards managing the conflict was; and 
• to ascertain if any conflict practitioners were part of the ad hoc committee. 
In order for this study to accomplish its aim and objectives, the following questions 
were asked of the participants: 
• When (which year) were you made aware of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict? 
• How did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict develop?  
• Which factors made the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict worse? 
• Before the death of the heir in 2001, were there signs of disagreement over the 
chieftaincy position? 
• Which conflict incidences were reported after the death of the female chief?  
• What role did the government play?  
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• How has the conflict been resolved?  
• What would you recommend as a conflict management and peacebuilding or 
reconciliation method for Mthonjana Village? 
• When did the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict come to the attention of those in 
authority, and what was their approach towards managing the conflict?  
• Were conflict practitioners part of the ad hoc committee?  
In this study, the dynamics of the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in Mthonjana were 
explore and described.  The study was planned and conducted in an accurate, 
ethical, and professional manner to ensure its validity, reliability, credibility and 
trustworthiness.  The findings that have emerged from this study may contribute to a 
better understanding of traditional leadership disputes in general. 
6.2 Summary of the Research Findings  
The previous chapter outlined the major findings of this study with respect to the 
perceptions of the ad hoc committee members about the process followed by the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  Analysis of the data revealed that the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict followed the conflict stages as supported and outlined by conflict 
processes theory and models.  Further analysis revealed that no attempt was made 
to initiate conflict intervention strategies. 
In the literature reviewed, it was explained that conflicts go through different stages 
as they escalate.  Like many complex conflicts, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict 
began as a latent conflict.  The latency stage was noticeable when the family became 
divided over their preferred regent to lead them after the death of the heir in 2002.  
While the conflict erupted after the death of the heir in 2002, the interviewees were 
unable to clearly link the killing of the heir to the violence that followed in Mthonjana.  
Furthermore, the ad hoc committee members were unable to state precisely when 
the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict started.  During face-to-face interviews with ad hoc 
committee members, it emerged very strongly that the disputing group wanted to put 
their own preferred candidate in the position of power so that their group could have 
access to, and control of, community resources.  The research findings showed that 
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the intention to control community resources contributed to the violent AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict. 
The research findings further showed that the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict 
emerged in response to a gender issue.  When the king of the AbaThembu tribe 
appointed the widow to the heir as a regent, the opposing group rejected the female 
regent.  The opposing group appointed its own regent, and that meant that there 
were two regents in the same village.  Based on the data solicited from the ad hoc 
committee members, the existence of two regents in one village triggered the 
emergence of violent conflict. 
Deeper analysis revealed that the death of the heir created a void in which those who 
had wanted access to community resources attempted to exploit the situation.  While 
the issue of gender was also noticeable, the group who opposed the female regent 
was influenced by greed.  Its attempt to take over the leadership position was 
motivated by personal gain and the opposing group was mobilised by rich and 
influential members of the group. 
The AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict escalated as contentious issues proliferated.  The 
findings of the study showed that apart from disputing the gender of the regent, the 
opposing group also questioned the legitimacy of the heir to the female regent.  As 
the conflict manifested, the opposing group attacked and killed supporters of the 
female regent, huts were burnt, and some people were displaced.  It was at this 
stage that the Eastern Cape Provincial Government started to pay attention to what 
was happening at Mthonjana village.  The provincial government established and 
deployed an ad hoc committee, comprised of government officials from different 
departments and organs of the state, with a mandate to mediate in the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict. 
The conflict stalemate stage was reached when the female regent was brutally 
murdered by her opponents.  This major catastrophe followed many assassination 
attempts on her life.  Besides killing her, three of her supporters were also killed.  
After many cases of murder, attempted murder, arson, and grievous bodily harm had 
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been reported to the police, the police were deployed to the area and the suspects 
were arrested.  Some of those arrested were sentenced to different periods in jail; 
others were released due to lack of evidence linking them with acts of violence. 
The presence of police at Mthonjana village contributed to the de-escalation of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  During the de-escalation phase of the conflict, the ad 
hoc committee tried to convene community meetings and tried to establish support 
groups.  However, community members ignored these initiatives.  After suspects had 
been arrested and had appeared in court, the ad hoc committee ceased to operate.  
By ceasing to operate, the ad hoc committee observed the principle of non-
interference with judicial system and police investigations by not interacting with 
community members who might have been witnesses.  When some of the arrested 
suspects were found guilty of perpetuating the violent conflict and were sentenced to 
jail terms, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict abated.  After the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict de-escalated, no formal attempts were made to resolve the 
conflict through dialogue and negotiation. 
This study found that no formal resolution was reached and no way forward planned 
on how to handle and manage the chieftaincy position and community resources and 
how to share the profits of community businesses.  Consequently, even though the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict had faded away, only a portion of the community 
recognise the current female regent (daughter to the deceased female regent) at the 
helm of the village.  Arguably, the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict is latent again: the 
absence of violence does not automatically mean an absence of conflict.  It should 
be borne in mind that conflicting interests can be pursued without violence or 
coercion. 
Various conflict management techniques can be employed to manage conflict, and 
can include dialogue, negotiation, third-party intervention and problem-solving.  The 
rejection or disregard of the female regent is an indication that the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict is latent and it should be acknowledged as was mentioned by the 
interviewees.  In addition, it should be emphasised that the violent escalation of every 
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conflict evolves from a latent phase.  As suggested in the literature review, conflict 
scholars do not support a mono-causal model of conflict and linear conflict process; 
rather scholars (such as Burton, 1984, 1990; Coser, 1956, 1967; Galtung, 1996; 
Kriesberg, 1973, 1998, 2007; Pruitt & Kim, 2004) argue that conflict is characterised 
by a multitude of factors.  Conflicts are complex, multi-causal and dynamic, and 
conflict cannot always be detected without the existence of some visible signs 
showing position differences or opposition of interests between two parties. 
The history of the ordeal in Mthonjana, the location of the selected case study, also 
cannot be ignored.  The fact that not all members of the village accept the current 
female regent indicates position differences and opposition of interests, and violent 
conflict can manifest in Mthonjana at any time.  Lack of acceptance is shown by non-
cooperation in village activities, poor attendance of community meetings and the fact 
that the female regent’s younger siblings are residing at the king’s palace as a safety 
precaution.  The late female regent was recognised by a portion of community 
members, a situation that contributed to the outbreak of violence.  Even now, a minor 
triggering event could lead to the re-emergence of a violent conflict.  It is normal for 
deep-rooted or protracted conflicts to recycle. 
This conflict fits well with attributes of deep-rooted conflict or protracted social conflict 
as has been explained in Chapter One. Deep-rooted conflicts are conflicts that are 
based on strife regarding the satisfaction of basic human needs between people with 
communal, collective identities and they often become destructive.  On the other 
hand, protracted social conflicts are influenced by mutually incompatible goals 
among parties amidst a lack of resolution mechanisms that cause communal 
cleavages to become petrified, and the prospects for cooperative interaction become 
progressively poorer.  These conflicts often escalate into long-term malignant 
processes with high social and economic costs, eventually appearing boundless and 
hopelessly unsolvable.  Due to the current state of affairs at Mthonjana, the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict is latent, again, and the lack of acceptance of the 
current female regent reinforces that this is the case in Mthonjana.  In this particular 
context, signs show that a clan is divided, does not work closely with its own leader, a 
 117 
female regent leads only community members that accept her, and a female regent 
who is not safe at her own village. 
Strangely, those in authority do not appear to notice or do not choose to notice what 
is happening in Mthonjana with respect to the lack of acceptance to which the current 
female regent is subjected.  As explained at the beginning of this chapter, 
government only intervened in the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict in 2007, five years 
after many sporadic incidents, which were perceived to be the responsibility of 
criminal elements, were reported to the police.  It was whilst investigating the 
reported incidences that the police realised the opposing group was employing 
violent tactics to express rejection of the late female regent.  The police found the 
sporadic incidents were related to the AmaTshezi leadership conflict.  At the 
conclusion of the study, it appeared as if those in authority, again, were waiting for 
the conflict to re-emerge before intervening.  Those in authority should bear in mind 
that relations among Mthonjana community members are fragile and a minor 
confrontation can trigger the re-emergence of the violent conflict. 
As it has been indicated, the sudden disbanding of the ad hoc committee meant that 
parties were never brought together to resolve the conflict.  This study found that the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict passed the conflict de-escalation phase and became 
latent.  The next stage, after conflict de-escalation, is the conflict resolution stage.  It 
is at this segment of a conflict that conflict intervention strategies are employed.  
Possibilities of resolving a conflict are enhanced by the fact that after de-escalation, 
adversaries tend to have new goals.  Goals change because neither side’s new 
goals include the destruction of the adversary.  At this stage, the ad hoc committee 
should have initiated formal negotiations.  Negotiating for a resolution in a conflict is 
crucial because it gives parties a chance to remedy the complex contributing and 
underlying causes of a conflict (Anstey, 2006:104). 
As the study findings show, no resolution was reached with respect to the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict because no conflict management and peacebuilding 
programme was initiated and implemented.  If a conflict management programme 
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had been implemented, it would have led to sustainable and positive resolution.  
Unfortunately, the ad hoc committee left the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict 
unresolved; there was no closure.  For that reason, the violence de-escalated and 
became latent with the risk of re-emerging.  A consequence of leaving the conflict 
unresolved is that certain community members do not accept the current female 
regent.  Furthermore, because the conflict was not resolved, there is nothing that 
would deter adversaries from attacking each other than being arrested in jail if 
caught.  Moreover, the fact that conflict management strategies have not been 
initiated may act as a stumbling block to peacebuilding initiatives.  It should be noted 
that the absence of conflict management and peacebuilding programmes is an 
indication that no common vision for the future exists among community members.  
Unless a resolution is negotiated or mediated the adversaries might easily consider 
inflicting revenge on each other. 
The ad hoc committee believe the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict negatively affected 
Mthonjana community members, especially the children, including those from the 
royal household, who today are growing up without parental guidance because their 
parents had been killed during the violence.  These children and the Mthonjana 
community members need professional help, which should involve conflict 
management and peacebuilding initiatives.  It is not too late to resolve the conflict for 
the purposes of preventing its re-emergence and more fatalities. 
6.3  Limitations of the Research  
Babbie & Mouton (2001:150) notes the lack of generalisability as a limitation when 
employing a case study, and Thomas (1976:35) claims generalisations can be made 
only at a considerable risk of error.  According to Thomas, the limitation becomes 
important when readers are not interested solely in the findings of a particular 
investigation but, rather, are interested in how these findings can help them 
understand other similar cases or events.  Denscombe (2003:36) argues that, while 
choosing a case study approach is likely to be confronted with scepticism about the 
findings, these issues can be addressed by arguing that case studies are known to 
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produce “thick” data, or data that is deep rather than broad.  The strength of a case 
study is that it provides an intimate understanding of a phenomenon, in this instance, 
the conflict process as it unfolded within a particular context, namely, the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict. 
The research was also faced with limited time and resources, which made 
conducting a more extensive study difficult.  Another limitation of the study was that 
only eight ad hoc committee members were interviewed because two withdrew from 
the study unexpectedly.  The timing of the research also presented its challenges 
because interviewees had since relocated to other regions of the Eastern Cape and 
country, had busy lives, and took time to recollect their memories about what had 
happened at Mthonjana village at the time.  Finally, very little has been written about 
traditional leadership conflicts.  However, the understanding of the conflict processes 
explored in the literature review provided a guide for mapping the phases of the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict. 
6.4  Significance of the Findings  
The findings of the study are of great significance to government, civil society, NGOs 
and all those interested in the conflict resolution and management field.  The findings 
provide a foundation for understanding the processes and dynamics of traditional 
leadership.  The current research contributes to the broader knowledge base about 
communal conflict, communal conflict processes and conflict in the context of the 
Institution of Traditional Leadership.  The findings will not only contribute towards the 
body of research but will also contribute towards promoting an understanding of the 
role of the Institution of Traditional Leadership as a recognised form of governance in 
South Africa.   
6.5  Recommendations  
After interpreting the findings of this study, the following can be recommended:  
• It would be helpful if government ensure that the opposing parties with 
extensive consultation on both sides reach a negotiated conflict resolution.  
 120 
• After a resolution has been negotiated, it is important that government initiates 
conflict management strategies and peacebuilding programmes at Mthonjana 
village.  
• Added to that, professional counselling of victims and reconciliation initiatives, 
as discussed below, between victims and perpetrators would be helpful.  
• It is important that the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, in the 
process of peacebuilding and reconciliation, lead the cultural cleansing ritual 
initiatives and ensure it consults affected communities extensively when 
appointing traditional leaders.  
• Most of all, it is essential that government assist the AmaTshezi clan by 
addressing the contributing factors to the violence.  Government may use the 
truth and reconciliation model that helped South Africa in its transition to the 
democratic dispensation.  Using the model may further enhance 
peacebuilding by reconciling the clan and the opposing community groups.  
• Government may capacitate and educate communities about traditional 
leadership regulations and matters of birthright in relation to gender equality.  
This may help change community perceptions and attitudes towards women. 
• Workshops on the effects of violence and conflict and the significance of 
peace could be offered to communities by professional organisations familiar 
with conflict resolution and management.  
• Community members should be assisted to develop their own conflict 
management systems and business plans to run community-based business. 
• It is important that government commission a detailed study about the 
AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  The study could be directed to make concise 
recommendations for developing conflict intervention policies in other parts of 
the country. 
• This study found that government was tardy in intervening in the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  It is critical that government establish systems to detect 
traditional leadership conflicts and other communal conflicts early and address 
the issues.  
 121 
• It would be helpful if government would ensure conflict practitioners who have 
training in conflict resolution and management be brought on board when 
similar cases of conflict occur.  
• Finally, it would be helpful if those who own majority shares in businesses in 
which the community also has shares, invite community leadership and 
interested community members to audits.  This gesture would enhance 
transparency in how community resources are managed. 
6.6  Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to explore and describe the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict.  Through the semi-structured interview method employed, the 
perceptions of the ad hoc committee members were solicited.  Available archival 
documents were studied to obtain a better understanding of the history of the conflict.  
Some of the ordeals Mthonjana community members faced during the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict were described.  A triangulation of method was employed for 
verifying and validating collected data about the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict.  The 
data collected was analysed and categorised into themes.  By using the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict as a case study, the researcher analysed how the conflict moved 
through the conflict process phases as discussed in the literature review. 
It was found that the AmaTshezi chieftaincy conflict moved past the conflict de-
escalation phase and became latent again.  Conflict intervention strategies, conflict 
resolution and conflict management and peacebuilding initiatives, were not initiated 
by the ad hoc committee.  It is only after a resolution has been negotiated that 
reconciliation among adversaries can begin.  Therefore, until the AmaTshezi 
chieftaincy conflict is explored and negotiated with all the stakeholders involved, the 
conflict cannot move to the resolution phase. 
This chapter summarised the findings of this study and described some of its 
limitations.  In addition, recommendations for resolving the AmaTshezi chieftaincy 
conflict and similar traditional leadership conflicts were made. 
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As has been recommended, it is important to the whole Mthonjana community, local 
leaders, and the children themselves to be extensively consulted in order to achieve 
a successful process of peacebuilding and reconciliation. 
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conducted without REC-H’s approval.  Queries with regard to your rights as a 
research subject can be directed to the Research Ethics Committee (Human), 
Department of Research Capacity Development, PO Box 77000, Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, 6031. 
If no one could assist you, you may write to: The Chairperson of the Research, 
Technology and Innovation Committee, PO Box 77000, Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, 6031. 
Participation in research is completely voluntary.  You are not obliged to take part in 
any research.  If you do partake, you have the right to withdraw at any given time 
during the study without penalty.  However, if you do withdraw from the study, you 
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should return for a final discussion or examination in order to terminate the research 
in an orderly manner. 
Although your identity will at all times remain confidential, the results of the research 
study will be presented to you individually on completion of the project.   
This informed consent statement has been prepared in compliance with current 
statutory guidelines. 
Yours sincerely 
Lubabalo Yandisa Nodada  
RESEARCHER 
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APPENDIX C: INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
RESEARCHER’S DETAILS 
Title of the research project 
 
Reference number  
Principal investigator  
Address  
Postal Code  
Contact telephone number (private 
numbers not advisable) 
 
A. DECLARATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF PARTICIPANT 
 Initial 
I, the participant and the 
undersigned 
(full names) 
ID number  
OR  
I, in my capacity as (parent or guardian) 
of the participant (full names) 
ID number  
Address (of participant)  
  
A.1 HEREBY CONFIRM AS FOLLOWS:  Initial 
I, the participant, was invited to participate in the above-mentioned research project 
that is being undertaken by  
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From Department of Political and Governmental Studies 
of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
 THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME, THE PARTICIPANT:  Initial 
2.1 Aim:  The investigators are studying the dynamics of the AmaTshezi 
Chieftaincy Conflict process  
  
The information will be used to make recommendations for how 
traditional leadership conflicts could be handled by the authorities, 
which will be included in the researcher’s Masters treatise. 
  
2.2 Procedures:  I understand that I will participate in a semi-structured interview to 
contribute to this research.   
  
2.3 Risks: There are no significant risks to me as a consequence of my 
participation in this study.   
  
2.4 Possible benefits:  As a result of my participation in this study, there will be no benefits to 
me or my group/company. 
  
2.5 Confidentiality:  My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description or 
scientific publications by the investigators. 
  
2.6 Access to findings: 
Any new information or benefit that develops during the course of the 
study will be shared as follows: any new information will be shared 
with me directly by the researcher.  The researcher will share a copy 
of the research project with me upon request or as agreed.   
  
My participation is voluntary YES NO 
2.6 
Voluntary participation/ 
refusal/discontinuation: 
My decision whether or not to participate 
will in no way affect my present or future 
care/employment/lifestyle 
TRUE FALSE 
  
 
3. THE INFORMATION ABOVE WAS EXPLAINED TO ME/THE PARTICIPANT BY:  Initial 
(name of relevant person) 
In Afrikaans  English  Xhosa  Other  
and I am in command of this language, or it was satisfactorily translated to me by 
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(name of translator) 
I was given the opportunity to ask questions and all these questions were answered satisfactorily. 
4. 
No pressure was exerted on me to consent to participation and I understand that I may withdraw at any 
stage without penalisation. 
  
5. Participation in this study will not result in any additional cost to myself.   
A.2 I HEREBY VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROJECT: 
Signed/confirmed at  
O
n 
 20 
Signature of witness: 
Signature or right thumb print of participant 
Full name of witness: 
STATEMENT BY OR ON BEHALF OF INVESTIGATOR(S) 
I,   declare that: 
I have explained the information given in this 
document to 
(name of patient/participant) 
1. 
and/or his/her representative (name of representative) 
2. He/she was encouraged and given ample time to ask me any questions; 
This conversation was 
conducted in 
Afrikaans  English  Xhosa  Other  
And no translator was used OR this conversation was translated into 
3. 
(language)  By (name of translator) 
4. 
I have detached Section D and handed it to the 
participant 
YES NO 
Signed/confirmed at  
O
n 
 20 
Signature of witness: 
Signature of interviewer Full name of witness: 
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DECLARATION BY TRANSLATOR (WHEN APPLICABLE) 
I,  (full names) 
ID number  
Qualifications and/or  
Current employment  
confirm that I: 
1. Translated the contents of this document from English into (language) 
2. 
Also translated questions posed 
by  
(name of participant) 
As well as the answers given by the 
investigator/representative; 
3. Conveyed a factually correct version of what was related to me. 
Signed/confirmed at  on  20 
I hereby declare that all information acquired by me for the purposes of this study will be kept confidential. 
Signature of witness: 
Signature of translator Full name of witness: 
IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO PATIENT/REPRESENTATIVE OF PARTICIPANT 
 
Dear participant/representative of the participant 
 
Thank you for your/the participant’s participation in this study.  Should, at any time during the study: 
 
- an emergency arise as a result of the research, or 
- you require any further information with regard to the study, or 
- the following occur 
 
- you are approached by anyone other than the researcher to request information about your 
participation in this study 
 
 (indicate any circumstances which should be reported to the investigator) 
 
Kindly contact  
at telephone number  
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APPENDIX D: CONFLICT STAGES 
 
Source: www.beyondintractabilty.org 
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APPENDIX E: MAP OF THE WILD COAST 
Source: www.wildcoast.co.za. 
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APPENDIX F: PHOTOS OF THE COFFEE BAY AREA 
   
Mthonjana village overseeing Coffee  A rural village at Coffee Bay  
Bay  
         
The coast of Coffee Bay                Hole-in-the-Wall at Coffee Bay 
           
Part of Coffee Bay                                 The type of houses in Mthonjana village  
